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Part I: Introduction  
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Market Discipline and Public Policy: New Complexities  
in an Old Debate 
 
The financial crisis which started in 2007 destroyed an unimaginably huge amount of global 
wealth. But it was not only destructive. In some regards it was also creative. It, for example, 
gave a new boost to one of economics’ most eminent and most venerable debates: the debate 
over whether market discipline yields the best economic results when it is left alone or whether 
markets need external policy regulation to deliver these results. Instead of mentioning the most 
important milestones of this century-long debate I merely make explicit, in pars-pro-toto-
fashion, that already Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is torn between these two ends of the 
debate. In the face of an ancien régime that externally regulated nearly every economic aspect, 
the unambiguous thrust of the book is to call for less – much less – external regulation of the 
economy, of foreign trade in particular. But towards the end of the book Smith, nevertheless, 
emphatically demands that “government takes some pains to prevent” that the laborers’ 
“dexterity at [their] own particular trade” which is triggered by the increasing division of labor 
– the main driver of economic progress, according to Smith – is “acquired at the expense of 
[laborers’] intellectual, social, and martial virtues” (1776/2008, p. 430). In other words, he 
demands that the government intervenes into the economy.  
In being torn on this issue, Smith sets the tone for the collection of essays at hand. But being 
torn alone does not suffice. The goal of economic research today is to illuminate the conditions 
under which market discipline is advantageous and under which public policy is useful while 
at the same time being open to situations that demand an intelligent interplay between the two 
forces of economic decision-making. This way, one steers between the Scylla of believing in 
free markets as a social panacea as well as the Charybdis of believing in governmental policies 
as an economic cornucopia.  
Djankov et al. (2003) show that this issue must not be conceptualized as a choice between two 
extremes but as a choice on a continuum and, hence, a choice that allows for infinitely many 
positions between complete market discipline and complete reliance on public policy. Ensuing 
from their argument that a trade-off exists between preventing disorder and preventing 
dictatorship – preventing the former through more public policy, the latter through more private 
ownership – they provide a model that picks up four different possibilities on the continuum 
(2003, p. 599). In ever growing powers of public policy vis-à-vis market power this model 
differentiates: 1) market discipline, 2) private litigation, 3) public enforcement through 
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regulation, and 4) state ownership. Obviously, the four strategies are “not”, as the authors point 
out, “mutually exclusive” (2003, p. 601). To explain these strategies Djankov et al. refer to the 
following example:  
“Suppose that society wants to have broad and liquid securities markets and, to this end, deems 
it desirable that firms issuing equity disclose accurate information about their circumstances. 
This society has four basic institutional strategies for the enforcement of good conduct. First, 
the market discipline solution relies on the incentives of issuers themselves, or of their 
underwriters, to disclose the truth about the securities because they need to establish a 
reputation for credibility to raise funds in the future. Second, the society can rely on private 
suits by buyers of securities who feel that they have been cheated by the issuers, under the 
general doctrines of contract or tort. For this, the society needs a court and a judge. The question 
for the court is whether the issuer disclosed inaccurate information or failed to disclose material 
information. Third, the society can designate a public regulatory agency, which mandates what 
should be disclosed by security issuers, inspects their books and disclosures, and penalizes 
issuers and underwriters who break its rules. Between private litigation and full-scale 
regulation, the regulator can establish the rules for security issuance, but leave the enforcement 
of these rules to private litigation by the wronged investors. Fourth, the society can nationalize 
security issuance. A company wishing to raise capital must relinquish the inspection, 
disclosure, and sale of securities to the state.” (2003, p. 601) 
 
The collection of essays at hand connects to the first, the second and the third strategy of 
Djankov et al. (2003) whereas the fourth, state ownership, is not considered. Relying on a paper 
by Shleifer (2005), Djankov et al.’s model can be amended with the observation that the 
differences between the second and the third strategy – private litigation and public 
enforcement through regulation – should not be overemphasized. After all, the judges who 
litigate in the second strategy must also be considered, just like the regulators in the third 
strategy, government agents. Therefore, strategies two and three can both be subsumed under 
public policy.  
Recent literature has produced a tremendous amount of papers that try to determine the 
conditions under which rather the market-discipline-strategy or either the private-litigation- 
and the public-enforcement-through-regulation-strategy (which are here, for reasons of 
simplicity, subsumed under the term ‘public policy’) is more prone to yield the desired overall 
results. Thereby it is important to be aware that this is not necessarily an either-or question. 
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Instead it is very often crucial to find the optimal interplay between these different modes of 
economic decision-making.  
Furthermore, there is the argument that it is wrong to assume that one kind of regulatory 
structure always fits (see Mishkin, 2001, p. 95). Building on this argument, it can be stressed 
that the right balance between market discipline and public policy can be influenced by a 
region’s or a country’s economic environment and thereby especially whether the economy 
experiences a time of volatile or a time of stable markets (ibid.). In general, there is then the 
recommendation for less public policy in stable times and more in volatile times (ibid.). This 
implies that a society’s decision for a point on Djankov et al.’s (2003) continuum must be 
revised in the face of different economic environments. Hence, the optimal interplay between 
market discipline and public policy cannot be determined once and for all but is permanently 
up for revision. 
Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003) as well as Pistor et al. (2003) indicate that a country’s 
level of development is another element that needs to be considered for finding the right 
interplay between market and policy regulation. These papers provide evidence that a point on 
the market-discipline-and-public-policy continuum which is suitable for developed countries 
can trigger massive delay and corruption when adopted by developing countries. Others, such 
as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008), demonstrate that also the legal origins as 
well as the existing law and how it is enforced determine the optimal interplay on the continuum 
in question. Regarding the law as an important factor they furthermore elaborate that special 
attention needs to be paid to the correlation of law and finance.  
Among the most recent trends in the research on the continuum we are interested in is the focus 
on culture. Haniffa and Cooke’s paper (2005) can, for example, be interpreted to provide 
evidence that it is especially the culture of directors on company boards that is an important 
factor. Bushman et al. (2015) have a close eye on the culture of a specific region or country as 
it translates into and as it shapes the main institutions of society as a whole. In a 2007-paper, 
Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, on the other hand, put an emphasis on the wider culture of 
society (2007). This list merely provides a small selection of recent contributions on the optimal 
interplay between market discipline and public policy. It could be continued easily. 
The essay collection at hand intends to contribute to this research in a number of ways. 
Especially it wants to do so by applying the insights of this recent literature, which is mostly 
concerned with companies in general, to the banking sector in particular. That such an 
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application is important has been a contested issue until a few decades ago. As long as the 
financial sector was considered to be a mere appendage to the ‘real economy’, i.e. agriculture, 
industry and non-financial services, it was hard to argue for the need of special inquiries into 
the banking sector. In this vein, Joan Robinson announced that “where enterprise leads finance 
follows” (1952, p. 86). And as late as 1988 Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas remarked that the 
financial sector is an “over-stressed” determinant of economic growth (1988, p. 6). In the 
meantime, such sweeping gestures of dismissing the distinct importance of the banking sector 
have become rare. And since the recent financial crisis and the tremendous impact it had on 
the rest of the economy it is no longer dubious that the issue of finding the optimal position on 
the continuum of market discipline and private policy is also of interest to the banking sector 
in particular and therefore warrants inquiries in its own right.  
In making this recent literature fruitful for the banking sector, the essay collection at hand 
underscores the complexity of the connection between market discipline and public policy. 
These two general contributions are an upshot of all four essays this collection is composed of. 
But, of course, each of the essays tries to deliver its own unique contribution to the research 
area that holds this collection together. Therefore, in the following I shortly introduce the four 
essays the collection is composed of and highlight each essay’s distinct contribution to the 
research interest that underlies the collection as a whole. 
The first and most general paper in this collection of essays starts from experiments in 
behavioral economics. These experiments were mostly conducted under the aegis of Ernst 
Fehr. The paper argues that the results of these experiments emphasize the need for 
coordination – whereby the paper does not assume a position in the debate to what extent this 
coordination is supposed to rely on market discipline or on public policy – against claims that 
the economy could be steered based on implicit obligations put on individual actors. Thereby 
this first paper intends to demonstrate that the issue of the relation between market discipline 
and public policy cannot be circumvented. In doing so, it paves the way for the three papers to 
come. 
The second paper focuses on the banking sector. It builds a theoretical framework to analyze 
how sustainability disclosure along materiality criteria affects potential greenwashing. 
Moreover, the framework is used to illustrate weaknesses in existing disclosure guidelines. 
With regards to the general research interest of the collection of essays at hand this paper 
contributes to the question which effects public policy can trigger that is devoted to issues 
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which are not part of the core of a bank’s business model. Based on this, the paper highlights 
potential shortcomings of disclosure guidelines which need to be avoided to ensure adequate 
public policy. 
To be able to rely on a large dataset, the third paper investigates not only banks but also includes 
large firms from other sectors of the economy. It studies the effect of mandatory sustainability 
disclosure regulations on the sustainability disclosure level of firms. As mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations differ across Europe the paper compares companies from 
Continental Europe with companies from the United Kingdom. The results demonstrate that a 
positive relationship exists between adherence to voluntary standards and sustainability 
disclosure as well as between mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations and sustainability 
disclosure. However, the interaction between adherence to voluntary standards and mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations on the disclosure level of companies indicates that the 
impact of mandatory disclosure regulations is less pronounced among firms that already adhere 
to voluntary standards. With regards to the thrust of this collection of papers as such, this third 
paper prompts the conclusion that to oblige companies which disclose sustainability 
information on a voluntary basis can reduce such voluntary efforts if mandatory sustainability 
disclosure regulations are implemented. Under such circumstances companies have a tendency 
to reduce their disclosure activities to what they are required to do by law instead of offering a 
surplus of information as they did when no such external regulation was in place. This provides 
further evidence for the hypothesis that, under certain circumstances, external policy regulation 
displays a tendency to crowd-out internal market discipline. This finding, in turn, stresses, one 
more time, the manifold complexities of the connection of market discipline and public policy. 
Starting from the observation of the existence of various pleas for integrating environmental, 
social, and governance factors (‘ESG-factors’, in short) into the business models of companies, 
the fourth paper elaborates an index for measuring ESG-criteria. Building on the insights of 
the three earlier papers of this collection, it assumes that these criteria play out differently 
depending on the specific circumstances of the business sector in question. In line with the 
research focus of this essay collection, which was made explicit in the above, the index 
developed is tailored to the banking industry and within that realm to the needs of globally 
operating, large banks. The development of the index builds on an empirical analysis of 270 
banks which are domiciled in 50 different countries. Furthermore, this fourth and final paper 
of the essay collection at hand investigates to what extent the proposed index is, at the same 
time, a reliable indicator of a bank’s social and economic success. In analyzing the to and fro 
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between ESG measures and the business model of banks, the fourth paper provides an apt 
conclusion to the essay collection as a whole. 
  
8 
References 
Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., & Richard, J. (2003). Economic development, legality, and the 
transplant effect. European Economic Review (47), pp. 165-195. 
Bushman, R. M., Davidson, R., Dey, A., & Smith, A. (10 2015). Bank CEO Materialism, 
Corporate Culture and Risk. Retrieved from http://public.kenan-
flagler.unc.edu/faculty/bushmanr/Bushman%20et%20al.%2010%202015.pdf  
Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003). The new 
comparative economics. Journal of Comparative Economics (Vol. 31), pp. 595–619. 
Haniffa, R., & Cooke, T. (2005). The impact of culture and governance on corporate social 
reporting. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy (Vol. 24, No. 5), pp. 391-430. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008). The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins. Journal of Economic Literature (Vol. 46, No. 2), pp. 285-332. 
Licht, A. N., Goldschmidt, C., & Schwartz, S. (2007). Culture rules: The foundations of the 
rule of law and other norms of governance. Journal of Comparative Economics(Vol. 
35, No. 4), pp. 659-688. 
Lucas, R. E. (1988). On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of Monetary 
Economics (22), pp. 3-42. 
Mishkin, F. S. (2001). Prudential Supervision. What Works and What Doesn't. Chicago, 
London: Chicago University Press. 
Pistor, K., Keinan, Y., Kleinheisterkamp, J., & West, M. (2003). Innovation in corporate law. 
Journal of Comparative Economics(31), S. 676-694. 
Robinson, J. (1952). The Rate of Interest and Other Essays. London: Macmillan. 
Shleifer, A. (2005). Understanding Regulation. European Financial Management (Vol. 11, No. 
4), pp. 439-451. 
Smith, A. (1776/2008). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
9 
Part II: Research Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10  
Wirtschaftsethik – Individualmoral oder Rahmenordnung?  
Ein Beitrag zum Einfluss der Verhaltensökonomik auf die Wirtschaftsethik. * 
MICHAEL G. FESTL UND DIANA FESTL-PELL ** 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Dieser Aufsatz untersucht den Einfluss von neuesten Erkenntnissen der Verhaltensökonomik 
auf die Plausibilität wirtschaftsethischer Ansätze. Bekanntlich hat die Verhaltensökonomik in 
den letzten Jahren die ausschließliche Fokussierung auf den Homo Oeconomicus als Idealtyp 
des wirtschaftlichen Akteurs aufgebrochen und durch ein differenzierteres, insbesondere auch 
altruistischen Handlungsmotiven gerecht werdendes Bild menschlichen Verhaltens 
weitgehend ersetzt. Im Gegensatz zu bisherigen Untersuchungen wollen wir zeigen, dass diese 
Erkenntnisse weniger wirtschaftsethische Ansätze stützen, die den Ort der Moral primär beim 
Individuum sehen, als vielmehr solche, die den Ort der Moral vor allem in der Rahmenordnung 
erblicken. 
Schlagwörter: Wirtschaftsethik, Verhaltensökonomik 
 
  
                                                          
*
  This paper is published as «Wirtschaftsethik – Individualmoral oder Rahmenordnung? Ein Beitrag zum 
Einfluss der Verhaltensökonomik auf die Wirtschaftsethik»,                                                                                                                                                                                        
Festl, M., Festl-Pell, D., zfwu 13/2 (2012), 141-153. 
** Michael G. Festl, Kulturwissenschaftliche Abteilung, Fachbereich Philosophie, Universität St. Gallen, 
Tannenstr. 19, CH-9000 St. Gallen, Tel.: +41-(0)71-2243116, E-Mail: michael.festl@unisg.ch, 
Forschungsschwerpunkte: „Gerechtigkeitstheorie“, „Anwendungsethik“, „Erkenntnistheorie“. Diana 
Festl-Pell, Institut für Banking und Finance, Universität Zürich, Plattenstr. 14, CH-8032 Zürich, Tel.: 
+41(0)44-6344046, E-Mail: diana.festl@bf.uzh.ch, Forschungsschwerpunkte: „Bankenregulierung“, 
„Behavioral Finance“, „Rechnungslegung“. 
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1. Zwischen Individualmoral und Rahmenordnung 
Auf dem notorisch umstrittenen Feld der Moral finden sich wohl nur wenige Behauptungen, 
die eine breitere Übereinstimmung hervorrufen, als die, dass die Wirtschaft moralischer werden 
muss. Angesichts des gegenwärtigen Zustands der Weltwirtschaft dürfte sich dies so schnell 
kaum ändern. Sobald aber die Anschlussfrage gestellt wird, wie eine Erhöhung der Moral in 
der Wirtschaft erreicht werden kann, ist es mit der Eintracht abrupt vorbei. In Bezug auf die 
Lösung dieser Frage lassen sich, grob gesprochen, zwei Extrempositionen unterscheiden, die 
als die beiden Enden eines Kontinuums zu verstehen sind. Die eine Seite argumentiert, dass es 
vor allem die in der Wirtschaft handelnden Akteure sind – insbesondere die Manager –, die die 
moralische Qualität der Ergebnisse wirtschaftlicher Interaktionen durch moralische 
Erwägungen in ihren Entscheidungen erhöhen müssen. Die andere Seite vertritt dagegen die 
Auffassung, dass die Ergebnisse der Wirtschaft nur durch Eingriffe in die der Wirtschaft 
vorgegebene, gesetzlich festzulegende Rahmenordnung moralischer werden können. Erstere 
sehen den primären Ort der Moral im Individuum, letztere in der Rahmenordnung. In der 
Wirtschaftsethik haben beide Positionen in den letzten nun schon gut 30 Jahren prominente 
Vertreter gefunden und einen mitunter heftig geführten, die deutschsprachige Wirtschaftsethik 
nachhaltig prägenden, aber sicherlich auch belebenden Streit ausgelöst. Für die Seite der 
Individualmoral stehen dabei vor allem Peter Ulrich und seine Schüler. Die Seite der 
Rahmenordnung wird insbesondere durch Karl Homann und dessen Schüler repräsentiert. Die 
Mehrzahl der anderen im deutschsprachigen Raum vertretenen wirtschaftsethischen Positionen 
lässt sich zwischen diesen beiden Polen verorten.1 
Um diesen verhärteten Konflikt zu entscheiden, wurden schon viele Versuche unternommen. 
Das hierbei in den vergangenen Jahren aufgekommene Herbeiziehen von Ergebnissen der 
Verhaltensökonomik stellt dabei schon allein deshalb einen der spannendsten dar, weil es in 
dieser Teildisziplin der Experimentellen Ökonomik in letzter Zeit zu großen Umwälzungen 
gekommen ist. Die innerhalb der Verhaltensökonomik durchgeführten Experimente sind 
bekanntlich gerade dabei, das Paradigma des Homo Oeconomicus als das der ökonomischen 
Theorieproduktion zugrunde liegende Menschenbild nach und nach durch ein komplexeres und 
näher an der Realität der menschlichen Präferenzen verortetes Bild zu ersetzen. Ein solch 
realistischeres Bild wird vor allem der Bereitschaft von Individuen zu Kooperation gerecht, 
                                                          
1 
 Wie nahe am jeweiligen Pol die Positionen von Ulrich und Homann tatsächlich stehen, kann hier nicht 
eingehend untersucht werden. Die tendenzielle Zuordnung ist aber ebenso wenig umstritten, wie die Aussage, 
dass weder Ulrich noch Homann die jeweilige Position radikal vertreten (können). Einen diese beiden Aussagen 
bestätigenden Überblick zu Ulrichs und Homanns Ansätzen liefert Gerlach (2009: 841-848 und 863-871). 
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selbst wenn diese Kooperation mit einem Verlust an individuellen Vorteilen einhergeht oder, 
um es in den Worten der Ökonomie zu sagen: die Verhaltensökonomik zeigt, dass das 
Wohlbefinden anderer Teil der Präferenzstruktur von Akteuren ist, womit so etwas wie eine 
altruistische Wende im Menschenbild der Ökonomie verzeichnet werden kann.2 
Die Auswirkungen dieser Experimente auf die Wirtschaftsethik sind – so könnte man prima 
vista meinen – ziemlich eindeutig. Die Verfechter der Rahmenordnung sind mit ihrer Fixierung 
auf gesetzliche Regelungen und der damit einhergehenden moralischen Entlastung des 
Individuums gut auf das ökonomische Standardparadigma mit seiner Annahme von egoistisch 
handelnden Akteuren eingestellt. Indem sie ohnehin davon ausgehen, dass eine Gesellschaft so 
eingerichtet werden muss, dass sie sich nicht auf das moralische Verhalten der Individuen 
verlassen braucht, sind sie von Haus aus in Harmonie mit einer unter dem Paradigma des Homo 
Oeconomicus arbeitenden Ökonomie. Sollte die Ökonomie nun aber evident machen, dass das 
von den Verfechtern der Individualmoral geforderte moralische Verhalten der Individuen nicht 
nur ein leeres Postulat ist, sondern tatsächlich gelebt wird, müsste diese Erkenntnis dieser 
wirtschaftsethischen Position Aufwind verleihen. Damit wäre moralisches Verhalten der 
Individuen – auf welches die Verfechter der Individualmoral ja bauen – in den Stand einer 
empirisch nachweisbaren Annahme erhoben und zugleich der wichtigste Einwand der 
Verfechter der Rahmenordnung entkräftet, wonach der Appell an das moralische Verhalten der 
Individuen meist auf taube Ohren stößt. Die Gleichung scheint eindeutig: die Ökonomie ersetzt 
den egoistischen Homo Oeconomicus durch ein altruistisches Menschenbild; weil die 
Verfechter der Rahmenordnung auf ersteren eingestellt sind und die Verfechter der 
Individualmoral schon seit jeher auf letzteren zählen, verschiebt die altruistische Wende der 
Ökonomie das wirtschaftsethische Kräfteverhältnis in Richtung der Verfechter der 
Individualmoral. Und in der Tat weisen die bisher vorgenommenen Untersuchungen in diese 
Richtung. Wenn er der an die Verfechter der Individualmoral angelehnten Ulrich-Schule auch 
keinen eindeutigen Sieg zuspricht, so argumentiert Panther in seiner Untersuchung der 
Auswirkungen der Verhaltensökonomik auf die Wirtschaftsethik doch eindeutig dafür, dass 
deren Ergebnisse die Position der Verfechter der Rahmenordnung schwächen (2005). Damit 
stimmt überein, dass Suchanek, als Homann-Schüler und damit als Vertreter der 
                                                          
2
  Für die Mehrzahl der Ökonomen dürfte diese Aussage über die tatsächlichen Präferenzen von Menschen 
freilich keine Neuigkeit sein. Neu ist aber, dass es der Verhaltensökonomik gelungen ist, dieses Bild zu 
systematisieren und auch für ökonomische Untersuchungen zu modellieren. In diesem Sinne kann wohl gesagt 
werden, dass es in der Verhaltensökonomik nicht darum geht, das Homo-Oeconomicus-Modell zu falsifizieren, 
sondern vielmehr darum, es durch ein realistischeres und damit freilich komplexeres, aber dennoch für 
ökonomische Modellierungen praktikables Modell zu ersetzen. 
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Rahmenordnungsseite, den Ergebnissen der Verhaltensökonomik eine nur geringe Relevanz 
für die Wirtschaftsethik bescheinigt (2005). 
Gegen die Auffassung, dass die Ergebnisse der Verhaltensökonomik die Seite der 
Individualmoral stärken, möchten wir im vorliegenden Aufsatz zeigen, dass ein genauer Blick 
auf einen wichtigen Ausschnitt der Verhaltensökonomik eher eine gegenteilige Verschiebung 
der wirtschaftsethischen Kräfteverhältnisse nahelegt. Um dies zu plausibilisieren, werden wir 
den Leser zunächst mit Erweiterungen des Ultimatumspiels vertraut machen, welche unter der 
Ägide von Ernst Fehr durchgeführt wurden und ein sehr einflussreiches Beispiel für die oben 
beschriebenen Arbeiten innerhalb der Verhaltensökonomik darstellen (Kapitel II). Dies bereitet 
den Boden, um im Anschluss die kontraintuitiven Ergebnisse der Verhaltensökonomik in 
Bezug auf die Individualmoral-Rahmenordnung-Debatte der Wirtschaftsethik darzulegen 
(Kapitel III). Dabei wird einerseits gezeigt werden, dass die untersuchten Aspekte der 
Verhaltensökonomik die individualmoralische Annahme schwächen, wonach moralischere 
Individuen auch moralischere Interaktionsergebnisse hervorbringen. Andererseits, dass sie die 
zentrale Auffassung der Verfechter der Rahmenordnung über notwendige Bedingungen für 
moralische Interaktionsergebnisse bestätigen.  
Sich auf eines der vielen in der Verhaltensökonomik durchgeführten Experimente zu 
fokussieren, scheint uns unverzichtbar, um konkrete Auswirkungen der altruistischen Wende 
der Verhaltensökonomik auf die Wirtschaftsethik in den Blick zu bekommen. Fehrs 
Erweiterungen des Ultimatumspiels sind u.E. nicht nur geeignet, weil sie ein ausgeklügeltes 
und für dieses Feld repräsentatives Experiment auf dem neuesten Stand dieser Wissenschaft 
darstellen, sondern auch weil sie gerade die Effekte moralischen oder unmoralischen 
individuellen Verhaltens auf das Ergebnis von Interaktionen unter bestimmten 
Rahmenbedingungen in den Blick nehmen. Nicht zufällig beanspruchen die Experimente des 
Teams um Fehr den bei weitem größten Raum innerhalb der bisher umfassendsten uns 
bekannten Analyse der Auswirkungen der Verhaltensökonomik auf die Wirtschaftsethik, 
nämlich Panther (2005). Durch die Einschränkung auf die Arbeiten von Fehr & Co. können 
wir freilich nicht den Anspruch erheben, den Einfluss der Verhaltensökonomik auf die 
Wirtschaftsethik umfassend zu beschreiben, wohl aber können wir damit nachweisen, dass 
deren Implikationen für die Wirtschaftsethik keineswegs so eindeutig in Richtung 
individualmoralische Seite weisen, wie momentan angenommen.3 
                                                          
3
  Eine erschöpfende Analyse müsste neben der Verhaltensökonomik wohl auch Befunden der 
Evolutionsbiologie sowie der Neurowissenschaft Rechnung tragen. Für diesen Hinweis danken wir einem 
anonymen Gutachter. 
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2. Fehrs Modifikationen des Ultimatumspiels  
In ihren verhaltensökonomischen Experimenten, u.a. in denen zum Ultimatumspiel, 
unterscheiden Fehr und seine Mitarbeiter drei Akteurstypen: den bedingungslosen Altruisten 
(altruistic Cooperator), den Homo Reciprocans (strong Reciprocator) und den Homo 
Oeconomicus (reciprocal Altruist)4, wobei sich für die Existenz aller drei Typen empirische 
Belege  finden lassen (Fehr, Fischbacher und Gächter 2002: 3f.). Der bedingungslose Altruist 
ist dadurch definiert, dass er stets kooperiert und zwar unabhängig davon, ob er dabei 
ausgebeutet wurde oder erwartet, dass er es wird. Er lebt mithin das christliche Ideal der 
bedingungslosen Nächstenliebe. Der Homo Reciprocans zeigt dagegen eine „willingness to 
sacrifice resources for rewarding fair and punishing unfair behavior even if this is costly and 
provides neither present nor future material rewards for the Reciprocator”(ebd.: 3). Ihm sind 
faire Ergebnisse wichtig und er lässt sie sich etwas kosten.: Fairness ist ein Element seiner 
Präferenzstruktur. Allerdings ist er im Gegensatz zum bedingungslosen Altruisten unwillig, 
sich ausbeuten zu lassen. Er wünscht Kooperation, ist aber bereit, andere zu bestrafen, wenn 
diese nicht kooperieren. Dagegen ist der Homo Oeconomicus als dritter im Bunde als jemand 
definiert, der stets darauf aus ist, seinen langfristigen, egoistisch verstandenen Nutzen zu 
maximieren, ohne dass Fairness ein genuines Element seiner Präferenzstruktur wäre.5 Um 
seinen Nutzen langfristig zu maximieren, kann es manchmal nötig sein, kurzfristig zu 
kooperieren und dabei auf das situative Maximum an Geldeinheiten zu verzichten. Jedoch ist 
der Homo Oeconomicus im Gegensatz zum Homo Reciprocans weder bereit, kooperatives 
Verhalten anderer zu belohnen, noch unkooperatives zu bestrafen, wenn er davon ausgeht, dass 
ihn Belohnung oder Bestrafung Geldeinheiten kosten. Er verkörpert mithin das Menschenbild 
der ökonomischen Standardtheorie. Mit je zwischen 40 und 60 % sind der Homo Reciprocans 
                                                          
4
  Der reciprocal Altruist ist auch mal bereit, zu kooperieren, obwohl es ihm kurzfristig Nachteile einbringt, 
wenn er dadurch seinen langfristigen Nutzen maximieren kann. Fehr, Fischbacher und Gächter bezeichnen 
diesen im Weiteren daher als Egoisten („selfish“ 2002: 4). Wir halten es für gerechtfertigt, hier analog vom 
Homo Oeconomicus zu sprechen, da die verwendete Definition des reciprocal Altruists der Definition des Homo 
Oeconomicus, als demjenigen, der sein wohlverstandenes Eigeninteresse maximiert, entspricht. Fehrs, 
Fischbachers und Gächters Definition lautet: „while a Reciprocally altruistic actor is willing to incur short-run 
costs to help another actor, she does this only because she expects long-term net benefits” (ebd.: 3). Fehr spricht 
wohl nicht vom Homo Oeconomicus, weil er diesen mit einer kurzsichtigen Maximierung des Eigeninteresses 
assoziiert. Der reciprocal Altruist ist für Fehr somit der klügere Homo Oeconomicus. Wir halten diese implizit 
vorgenommene Unterscheidung innerhalb des Homo-Oeconomicus-Konzepts für überflüssig, da von nur 
kurzfristig agierenden Homo-Oeconomicus, ohnehin kaum mehr jemand ausgeht. 
5
  Mitunter wird der Homo Oeconomicus im Unterscheid dazu als Akteur definiert, dessen Präferenzen auch 
altruistische Anliegen umfassen können. Ein solch offener Vorteilsbegriff wurde paradigmatisch von Gary 
Becker ausgearbeitet (z.B. 1976). Für die Notwendigkeit auf diesen Hinweis an dieser Stelle danken wir einem 
sehr hilfreichen anonymen Gutachten. 
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und der Homo Oeconomicus gemäß der Experimente des Teams um Fehr am häufigsten 
anzutreffen, wohingegen der bedingungslose Altruist lediglich eine Randerscheinung sei; eine 
Verteilung, die sich über verschiedene Länder hinweg als stabil erwiesen habe (ebd.: 8).  
Das Überraschende an den Experimenten Fehrs ist, dass selbst bei Gleichbleiben der relativen 
Häufigkeit der drei verschiedenen Typen von Akteuren je nach Setting der Experimente mal 
ein Ergebnis herauskommt, das den Anschein erweckt, als wären nur Homines Oeconomici, 
mal ein Ergebnis, das den Anschein erweckt, als wären nur Homines Reciprocantes am Werk. 
Besonders eindrucksvoll dargestellt haben dies Fischbacher, Fong und Fehr anhand von 
Variationen des Ultimatumspiels (2009). In der Grundform des Ultimatumspiels müssen sich 
zwei Spieler über die Verteilung eines Geldbetrages, z.B. 100 Geldeinheiten (GE), einig 
werden. Der eine Spieler (A) muss dabei dem anderen einen Vorschlag über die Aufteilung der 
GE unterbreiten. Wenn der andere Spieler (B) den Vorschlag annimmt, kommt die von A 
vorgeschlagene Verteilung der GE zustande und das Spiel ist beendet. Wenn B jedoch nicht 
annimmt, bekommt keiner der beiden Spieler auch nur eine GE; die GE gehen also zurück zum 
Spielleiter und das Spiel ist beendet. Wären alle Menschen Homines Oeconomici, wäre zu 
erwarten, dass A den kleinsten teilbaren Betrag an GE (zur Vereinfachung wird hierbei in der 
Regel von 1 GE ausgegangen) anbietet und B dieses Angebot annimmt. Das Gleichgewicht der 
Verteilung, das zustande kommt, wäre also 99 GE für A und 1 GE für B. B würde diese 
Verteilung annehmen, da für ihn als Homo Oeconomicus der Zugewinn einer GE stets positiv 
ist, sprich, besser als gar kein Zugewinn an GE. Da A dies antizipiert, ist es für ihn die 
nutzenmaximierende Lösung, dem B nur eine 1 GE anzubieten. Tatsächlich zu beobachten ist 
aber, dass B Angebote unterhalb von 20 % der zu verteilenden Summe mit sehr hoher 
Wahrscheinlichkeit ablehnt (Fehr, Fischbacher, Gächter 2002: 11). Da A dies erwartet, bietet 
er B einen höheren Anteil der GE an, um sicherzustellen, dass B die Verteilung akzeptiert. Im 
Schnitt bekam B gar 42,7 % der Geldeinheiten (Fischbacher, Fong und Fehr 2009: 536).6 
Es ist allerdings verblüffend, mit welch simplen Modifizierungen der ursprünglichen Struktur 
des Ultimatumspiels Fischbacher, Fong und Fehr in der Lage sind, das Ergebnis der Interaktion 
erheblich zu beeinflussen. So führten sie neben B einen zweiten Spieler (B2) in das 
Ultimatumspiel ein, der gleichzeitig mit B das Angebot von A annehmen oder ablehnen kann. 
Nehmen sowohl B als auch B2 das Angebot an, wird gelost, welcher von beiden den 
                                                          
6
  Dass das von der Standardtheorie der Ökonomie erwartete Ergebnis einer 99 zu 1 Verteilung nicht erreicht 
wird, lässt sich freilich dadurch erklären, dass sich nicht alle Akteure wie Homines Oeconomici verhalten und 
dass auch diejenigen Akteure, die sich wie Homines Oeconomici verhalten, dies antizipieren und 
dementsprechend ihre Entscheidungen anpassen. 
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versprochenen Anteil erhält. Nimmt keiner der beiden das Angebot an, kommt der Deal nicht 
zustande, und niemand bekommt GE (auch A nicht). Nimmt beispielsweise B2 das Angebot 
an und B lehnt es ab, kommt die von A vorgeschlagene Verteilung der GE zwischen A und B2 
zustande; B geht leer aus. Im umgekehrten Fall, B nimmt an und B2 lehnt ab, kommt die 
Verteilung zwischen A und B zustande; B2 geht leer aus.  
Wohingegen im Fall, in dem ein Spieler allein über das Zustandekommen der Verteilung 
entscheidet, im Schnitt 42,7 % der GE als Verteilung angenommen werden, kam nun im Schnitt 
eine Verteilung von 25,5 % der GE für die annehmenden Spieler heraus. Die Spieler, die das 
Angebot annehmen oder ablehnen müssen, können von A nun also mit einem erheblich 
geringeren Anteil GE abgespeist werden und der Deal kommt trotzdem zustande. Noch 
eklatanter wird der Unterschied, wenn Fischbacher, Fong und Fehr anstatt einem weiteren 
potentiellen Annehmer, der von A vorgeschlagenen Verteilung, vier weitere am Spiel 
teilnehmen lassen. Im Schnitt gingen die angenommenen Angebote dabei sogar auf 16,2 % der 
GE nach unten (ebd.: 536).  
Auffällig ist folgendes: Sobald mehr als ein Spieler die Möglichkeit hat, das Angebot der 
Verteilung an GE anzunehmen, findet eine Annäherung des Ergebnisses der 
Interaktionssituation an das Ergebnis statt, das herauskommen würde, wenn sich tatsächlich 
alle Akteure wie Homines Oeconomici verhalten würden. Da sich gemäß den Experimenten 
des Teams um Fehr (siehe oben) aber circa 50 % der Akteure grundsätzlich wie Homines 
Oeconomici und circa 50 % grundsätzlich wie Homines Reciprocantes verhalten, lässt dies 
darauf schließen, dass die Homines Oeconomici in diesem Fall in der Lage sind, die Inter-
aktionssituation zu dominieren, sprich, sobald ein zweiter potentieller Annehmer der 
Geldeinheiten ins Experiment eingeführt wird, kommt trotz gleichbleibender Anwesenheit des 
Anteils an Homines Reciprocantes ein Ergebnis heraus, das erwartet werden würde, wenn der 
Anteil an Homines Oeconomici gestiegen wäre. Fischbacher, Fong und Fehr explizieren, dass 
dies auf die Abschwächung des Bestrafungsmechanismus für das eigennützige Verhalten der 
Homines Oeconomici zurückzuführen ist, welcher aus der Erhöhung der Anzahl potentieller 
Annehmer der von A vorgeschlagenen Verteilung resultiert (ebd.: 531). Selbst wenn B ein 
Homo Reciprocans ist – und damit grundsätzlich bereit, unfaires Verhalten zu bestrafen, auch 
wenn es ihn etwas kostet –, steigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass er ein sehr ungleiches Angebot 
über die Verteilung der GE annimmt und damit genauso handelt, wie ein Homo Oeconomicus 
handeln würde.  
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Wird angenommen, B sei tatsächlich ein Homo Reciprocans – sei also bereit, ein als unfair 
empfundenes Verhalten As zu bestrafen, selbst wenn ihn dies GE kostet – wird er im konkreten 
Fall davon abgehalten, ein als unfair empfundenes Angebot As zu bestrafen, weil neben ihm 
noch ein B2 sitzt, der das Angebot As annehmen könnte. In diesem Fall würde die von A 
vorgeschlagene Verteilung zwischen A und B2 zustande kommen. B wäre der Dumme. Er 
würde leer ausgehen, ohne dass A für sein unfaires Verhalten bestraft worden wäre. Wegen der 
Existenz von B2 kann B die Bestrafung As nicht sicherstellen. Daher entsteht für B ein 
zusätzlicher Anreiz, das Angebot anzunehmen. Wenn er davon ausgeht, dass A aufgrund des 
Verhaltens von B2 nicht bestraft wird, hat er zumindest noch die Chance, den angebotenen Teil 
der GE (welcher ja im Fall beiderseitiger Annahme durch Los zwischen B und B2 zugeteilt 
wird) zu bekommen. Dies ändert sich nur, wenn er gute Gründe hat, anzunehmen, dass B2 ein 
unfaires Angebot As ebenfalls ablehnen wird. Dann wird er sich, weil er ein Homo Reciprocans 
ist, dafür entscheiden, As Angebot ebenfalls abzulehnen, um As Bestrafung für sein unfaires 
Verhalten sicherzustellen. Wenn nun neben B2 noch ein B3, B4 und B5 mitspielen, wird die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass A für ein unfaires Angebot bestraft wird, noch kleiner, da es ja 
ausreicht, wenn lediglich einer der anderen vier potentiellen Annehmer des Angebots eine 
Bestrafung As durch Annahme verhindert. Dies erklärt, warum der Wert der im Schnitt 
angenommenen Angebote noch weiter sinkt, sobald vier anstatt nur ein weiterer potentieller 
Annehmer mitspielen (ebd.: 531f., 540).7 Aufgrund der konkreten Ausgestaltung des 
Ultimatumspiels handeln die Homines Reciprocantes so, dass das Ergebnis der Interaktion den 
Anschein erweckt, als wäre der Anteil an Homines Oeconomici gestiegen. Dabei reicht es 
freilich schon, wenn die Bs annehmen, dass sich unter ihnen ein Homo Oeconomicus befindet, 
selbst wenn dies eigentlich gar nicht der Fall ist. 
Dies ist die eine Seite der Medaille. Wird die Sache von der anderen Seite aus betrachtet, wurde 
mit diesem Experiment aber auch gezeigt, dass die Homines Reciprocantes in der Lage sind, 
den Homines Oeconomici ihr Verhalten aufzuzwingen, nämlich, wenn ein verlässlicher 
Bestrafungsmechanismus für eigennütziges Verhalten Teil der Interaktionssituation ist. Bei der 
ursprünglichen Ausgestaltung des Ultimatumspiels mit nur einem potentiellen Annehmer ist 
genau das der Fall. Angenommen A wäre ein Homo Oeconomicus, müsste er B dennoch einen 
Betrag anbieten, der als fair empfunden wird, weil er davon ausgehen muss, dass B ein unfaires 
                                                          
7
  Die niedrigeren Angebote von A im Fall, dass mehr als ein potentieller Annehmer mitspielt, resultieren 
übrigens aus dem Verhalten der As, welche Homines Oeconomici sind. Diese erwarten das Verhalten der Bs 
und wissen daher, dass auch geringere Angebote ihrerseits eine hohe Wahrscheinlichkeit haben angenommen zu 
werden (Fischbacher, Fong und Fehr 2009: 534).    
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Angebot ablehnt und A somit leer ausgehen lässt. Auf eine detaillierte Argumentation dieses 
Sachverhaltes kann hier verzichtet werden, da sie umgekehrt zum gerade dargestellten Fall, 
leicht erschlossen werden kann. In Übereinstimmung mit Fehr, Fischbacher und Gächter (2002: 
15) konnten Fischbacher, Fong und Fehr (2009) zeigen, dass die Existenz eines 
Bestrafungsmechanismus für eigennutzmaximierendes Verhalten ein wichtiger Parameter für 
das Ergebnis von Interaktionen ist.  
In der Frage, wer die Interaktionssituation dominiert, ist somit weniger entscheidend, wer in 
der Mehrzahl ist, Homines Oeconomici oder Homines Reciprocantes, sondern vielmehr die 
konkrete Ausgestaltung der Interaktion selbst, zum Beispiel, ob es einen 
Bestrafungsmechanismus gibt oder nicht (explizit hierzu Camerer und Fehr 2006: 47). Schon 
wenige Homines Oeconomici können Interaktionen dominieren, wenn kein 
Bestrafungsmechanismus vorhanden ist, genauso wie wenige Homines Reciprocantes in der 
Lage sind, Interaktionen zu dominieren, wenn ein Bestrafungsmechanismus für 
eigennutzmaximierendes Verhalten zur Verfügung steht. In beiden Fällen kann es, wie 
erwähnt, schon ausreichend sein, wenn die Akteure davon ausgehen, dass zumindest ein Homo 
Oeconomicus oder ein Homo Reciprocans in die Interaktion involviert sein könnte, auch wenn 
dies faktisch gar nicht der Fall ist. 
 
3. Implikationen für die Wirtschaftsethik 
Bevor wir zeigen wollen, warum die Ergebnisse Fehrs die wirtschaftsethischen 
Kräfteverhältnisse weniger in Richtung Individualmoral, sondern vielmehr in Richtung 
Rahmenordnung verschieben, verdienen zwei Punkte Erwähnung. Der erste betrifft die 
Relevanz der Laborexperimente Fehrs für die Lebenswelt. Viele Interaktionssituationen 
außerhalb des Labors, erst Recht in den anonymen Massengesellschaften der heutigen Zeit, 
können analog zu Laborsituationen verstanden werden, in denen kein 
Bestrafungsmechanismus zur Verfügung steht. Dies ist der Fall, weil Massengesellschaften so 
viele verschiedene Möglichkeiten für Interaktionen bieten, dass es schwer ist, 
eigennutzmaximierende Akteure von kooperierenden zu unterscheiden; die Spreu vom Weizen 
zu trennen. Sich ausbeuterisch zu verhalten, kann in Massengesellschaften eine auch langfristig 
gewinnbringende Strategie sein, weil der Ausbeuter sich beim Ausgebeuteten einfach nicht 
mehr blicken lässt und letzterem damit keine Gelegenheit zur Bestrafung seines egoistischen 
Verhaltens gibt. Er profitiert davon, stets wieder genügend neue Möglichkeiten zur Interaktion 
mit anderen Interaktionspartnern zu haben, die er ebenfalls wieder ausbeutet. In den 
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Massengesellschaften unserer Zeit gilt eben nicht mehr die alte Weisheit, dass man sich im 
Leben immer zweimal trifft. Oder mit Martin Hollis: „in today’s shifting societies of partial 
strangers, we can all be invisible often enough (1998: 32)“. 
Daraus wird ersichtlich – und dies ist der zweite Punkt, der Erwähnung verdient –, warum die 
Annahme, dass das Homo-Oeconomicus-Modell eine überzeugende Beschreibung 
tatsächlicher Menschen darstellt, so viel Überzeugungskraft entfalten konnte, sodass es nicht 
selten von einer konstruktivistischen Annahme zu einem anthropologischen Faktum 
hochstilisiert wurde. Die Ergebnisse von Interaktionssituationen in anonymen 
Massengesellschaften erwecken oftmals den Anschein, als wären in ihnen lediglich Homines 
Oeconomici am Werk. Stattdessen sind, aufgrund des Fehlens eines Bestrafungsmechanismus 
in diesen Situationen schon wenige Homines Oeconomici ausreichend, um die Situation zu 
dominieren. Sie bringen die anderen Interaktionsteilnehmer dazu, sich ebenfalls wie Homines 
Oeconomici zu verhalten, weil die zur Kooperation bereiten Teilnehmer wissen, dass sie die 
bedingungslosen Eigennutzmaximierer nicht bestrafen können und das Ausgebeutetwerden 
somit nur verhindern können, wenn sie sich selbst ausbeuterisch verhalten, bzw., wie in den 
oben dargestellten Experimenten, ausbeuterisches Verhalten anderer nicht bestrafen. In den 
Worten der Spieltheorie: Sie betreiben präventive Gegendefektion. 
Nach diesen Vorbemerkungen wollen wir nun zunächst zeigen, dass Fehrs Experimente nicht 
als Beleg für die Auffassung der individualmoralischen Position herangezogen werden können, 
wonach gesellschaftliche Verbesserungen im Kielwasser moralischer Verbesserungen der 
Individuen schwimmen. Der direkteste Weg, diesen Nachweis zu führen, besteht darin, sich zu 
überlegen, ob eine Erhöhung des Anteils der moralischen Akteure unter allen Akteuren das 
Ergebnis der Interaktionssituation moralischer machen würde. Ein moralischeres Ergebnis der 
Interaktionssituation würde in Einklang mit weitverbreiteten moralischen Intuitionen darin 
bestehen, eine höhere Gleichverteilung der Geldeinheiten zwischen Spieler A und dem bzw. 
den Spieler(n) B herzustellen.8 In diesem Sinn ist das Ergebnis des Spiels mit einem 
potentiellen Annehmer moralischer als das mit zwei potentiellen Annehmern, und letzteres 
wiederum moralischer als das mit fünf potentiellen Abnehmern. Bei den von Fehr 
unterschiedenen Akteurstypen ist der bedingungslose Altruist – auch hier folgen wir nicht 
unumstrittenen aber doch sehr weitverbreiteten moralischen Intuitionen – als moralischer 
anzusehen als der Homo Reciprocantes, und letzterer wiederum als moralischer als der Homo 
                                                          
8
  Sogar Robert Nozick, einer der heftigsten Kritiker des Egalitarismus, würde hier zustimmen, da dies ein 
typischer ‚Manna-vom-Himmel-Fall‘ ist, in welchen auch nach Nozicks Dafürhalten absolute Gleichheit ein 
entscheidendes Gerechtigkeitsprinzip ist (1974: 198). 
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Oeconomicus. Hätten die Verfechter der Individualmoral recht, müsste ein Steigen des Anteils 
an bedingungslosen Altruisten auf Kosten des Anteils an Homines Reciprocantes oder auf 
Kosten des Anteils an Homines Oeconomici sowie ein Steigen des Anteils an Homines 
Reciprocantes auf Kosten des Anteils an Homines Oeconomici ein moralischeres Ergebnis der 
Interaktionssituation mit sich bringen. Dies zieht drei zu untersuchende Fälle nach sich, wobei 
jeder dieser drei Fälle in zwei Typen unterteilt werden muss, je nachdem, ob ein 
Bestrafungsmechanismus vorhanden ist oder nicht. (Zur Vereinfachung nehmen wir an, dass 
A, der Anbieter der Geldeinheitenverteilung, ein Homo Oeconomicus ist, womit ausschließlich 
der/die potentielle(n) Annehmer den Unterschied in Bezug auf die Fairness des Ergebnisses 
der Interaktionssituation ausmacht/en.) 
Fall 1_Homines Reciprocantes mehr, Homines Oeconomici weniger: Das Steigen von 
Homines Reciprocantes auf Kosten des Anteils an Homines Oeconomici (der Anteil an 
bedingungslosen Altruisten bleibt gleich) hätte ceteris paribus eindeutig positive 
Auswirkungen auf das Ergebnis der Interaktionssituation. Bei Vorhandensein eines starken 
Bestrafungsmechanismus, also in der Ausgangssituation des Ultimatumspiels mit nur einem 
potentiellen Annehmer des Angebots, würde eine derartige Erhöhung des Anteils an 
Akteurstypen eine höhere Gleichverteilung hervorbringen, weil A wüsste, bzw. mit der Zeit 
merken würde, dass sich seltener ein Akteur findet, der eine als unfair empfundene Verteilung 
annehmen wird. Wäre B ein Homo Oeconomicus, könnte A auch mit einem unfairen Angebot 
durchkommen, da B nicht bereit ist, sich die Bestrafung von As unkooperativem Verhalten 
etwas kosten zu lassen. B würde auch ein Angebot von 99 zu 1 GE annehmen, da er seinen 
Nutzen durch die eine GE ja erhöht, was seinen etwaigen Ärger über das unfaire Verhalten As 
aufwiegt. Wäre hingegen die Wahrscheinlichkeit erhöht, dass B ein Homo Reciprocans ist, 
müsste A fairere Angebote unterbreiten, um seinen Nutzen zu maximieren, da er fürchten muss, 
dass B ein als unfair empfundenes Angebot ablehnt, weil Homines Reciprocantes ja bereit sind, 
unfaires Verhalten zu bestrafen. Im Fall, in dem bei Vorhandensein eines starken 
Bestrafungsmechanismus der Anteil von Homines Reciprocantes auf Kosten des Anteils an 
Homines Oeconomici steigt – die Menschheit also moralischer geworden wäre –, ist die 
Annahme der Verfechter der Individualmoral bestätigt, wonach die Erhöhung der Moralität 
von Individuen die moralische Qualität der Ergebnisse von Interaktionssituationen mit sich 
bringt. 
Im Fall derselben Verschiebung des Anteils an Akteuren und bei Abwesenheit eines starken 
Bestrafungsmechanismus, also bei der Ausprägung der Interaktionssituation, in der neben B 
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noch einer oder gar vier potentielle Annehmer anwesend sind, gilt dasselbe, wenn auch ein 
wenig abgeschwächt. Je höher der Anteil an Homines Reciprocantes auf Kosten des Anteils an 
Homines Oeconomici, desto höher die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass bei Vorhandensein von zwei 
oder gar vier potentiellen Annehmern gar kein Homo Oeconomicus unter ihnen verweilt und 
ein unfaires Angebot As damit abgelehnt wird, was A zu einem faireren Angebot veranlassen 
wird. Freilich müssen hierzu auch die Bs wissen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit hoch ist, dass 
unter ihnen kein Homo Oeconomicus ist und jeder B muss wissen, dass auch die anderen Bs 
dies wissen. Auch hier also gilt, wenn auch durch zusätzlich einzuführende intersubjektive 
Wissensannahmen ein wenig abgeschwächt, der von den Verfechtern der Individualmoral 
prognostizierte Effekt.  
Fall 2_Bedingungslose Altruisten mehr, Homines Oeconomici weniger: Der nächste zu 
betrachtende Fall ist der, in dem eine moralische Verbesserung der Menschen dadurch erreicht 
wird, dass einige Bs von Homines Oeconomici zu bedingungslosen Altruisten konvertieren. In 
Bezug auf das Ergebnis der Interaktionssituation würde sich nun aber paradoxerweise nichts 
ändern, sprich, es würde keine höhere Gleichverteilung der GE resultieren. Der Anbieter einer 
Verteilung A kommt mit unfairen Angeboten genauso gut durch, wie wenn kein einziger Homo 
Oeconomicus konvertiert wäre. Sowohl in der Ausprägung der Interaktionssituation mit 
starkem Bestrafungsmechanismus als auch in der mit schwachem Bestrafungsmechanismus 
werden unfaire Angebote As mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit angenommen. Unterschiede 
werden sich lediglich im Motiv der Annehmer ergeben. Während die Homines Oeconomici ein 
unfaires Angebot, z.B. das Angebot einer 99 zu 1 Verteilung, annehmen, weil es sie immer 
noch ein wenig besser stellt, werden die bedingungslosen Altruisten ein derartiges Angebot 
annehmen, weil sie auch bei einem unfairen Angebot kooperieren wollen oder anders 
ausgedrückt, dem A nicht verderben wollen, dass er seine 99 GE erhält. Der Anbieter A würde 
diesen Unterschied im Motiv gar nicht bemerken, da er genauso viele Annahmen seiner 
unfairen Angebote erhält, wie vor der Konversion einiger Homines Oeconomici zu 
bedingungslosen Altruisten. Der von den Verfechtern der Individualmoral prognostizierte 
Effekt einer moralischen Verbesserung gesamtgesellschaftlicher Ergebnisse durch eine 
moralische Verbesserung der Individuen bleibt in diesem Fall aus, was unabhängig von der 
Existenz eines starken oder schwachen Bestrafungsmechanismus gilt, weil ein solcher ja weder 
von Homines Oeconomici noch von bedingungslosen Altruisten genutzt werden würde. 
Fall 3_Bedingungslose Altruisten mehr, Homines Reciprocantes weniger: Schließlich steht 
noch der Fall aus, in dem sich einige Homines Reciprocantes zu bedingungslosen Altruisten 
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bekehren lassen. Auch dies wäre ja eine moralische Verbesserung der Individuen. Bei Bestehen 
eines starken Bestrafungsmechanismus (nur ein potentieller Annehmer B) führt dies dazu, dass 
A mit unfaireren Angeboten durchkommt, die Ungleichverteilung der GE also zunimmt. 
Während ein Homo Reciprocans ein als unfair empfundenes Angebot As ablehnt und den 
Homo Oeconomicus A damit dazu bringt, fairere Angebote zu unterbreiten, wird ein 
bedingungsloser Altruist dies nicht tun. Der bedingungslose Altruist wird jede, auch die 99 zu 
1 Verteilung als die unfairste aller möglichen Verteilungen annehmen, weil er den Zugewinn 
des A aus altruistischen Motiven nicht verhindern will. Der bedingungslose Altruist ist im 
Gegensatz zum Homo Reciprocans nicht bereit, den ihm zur Verfügung stehenden 
Bestrafungsmechanismus zu nutzen. Der Anbieter A wird darauf reagieren, indem er immer 
unfairere Angebote unterbreitet, denn mit der Ersetzung von Homines Reciprocantes durch 
bedingungslose Altruisten steigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Annahme unfairer Angebote. 
Es ist leicht zu sehen, dass sich, wie auch schon in den beiden vorherigen Fällen, das gleiche 
Resultat für die Situation mit zwei oder gar mit vier potentiellen Annehmern ergibt. Auch hier 
wird das Ansteigen der bedingunglosen Altruisten den zwar im Gegensatz zum Ausgangsfall 
schwächeren, aber dennoch vorhandenen Bestrafungsmechanismus abschwächen. In diesem 
Fall ergibt sich mithin das Gegenteil zur von den Verfechtern der Individualmoral 
prognostizierten Verbesserung der Gesellschaft durch Verbesserung der Individuen. Die 
moralischeren Individuen führen unmoralischere gesellschaftliche Ergebnisse herbei. 
 
Der Test des der individualmoralischen Position zugrundeliegenden Anspruchs, wonach 
moralischere Individuen eine in den Ergebnissen ihrer Interaktionssituation moralischere 
Gesellschaft hervorbringen, ist geprüft an den Experimenten des Teams um Fehr ernüchternd. 
Nur in einem Fall, nämlich in dem Fall, in dem Homines Reciprocantes an die Stelle von 
Homines Oeconomici treten, führt eine Erhöhung der individuellen Moralität zu einer 
Erhöhung der moralischen Qualität des Ergebnisses der Interaktionssituation. Sobald der 
Anteil der bedingungslosen Altruisten als dem moralischsten der drei Interaktionstypen erhöht 
wird, bleibt der erhoffte Effekt einer Verbesserung der moralischen Qualität des Ergebnisses 
der Interaktionssituation aber entweder aus (der Fall, in dem aus Homines Oeoconomici 
bedingungslose Altruisten werden) oder verdreht sich gar in sein Gegenteil (der Fall, in dem 
Homines Reciprocantes bedingungslose Altruisten werden). Die Ergebnisse der 
Verhaltensökonomik entscheiden den Kampf zwischen den Verfechtern der Individualmoral 
und denjenigen der Rahmenordnung also keineswegs zugunsten der ersteren. Die Gleichung 
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geht nicht auf, wonach die von der Verhaltensökonomik gestreuten Zweifel an der 
Sinnhaftigkeit des Homo-Oeconomicus-Konzepts das Gewicht in Richtung der Verfechter der 
Individualmoral verschieben würden. 
Vielmehr unterstreichen die Ergebnisse Fehrs die Annahme, dass Veränderungen in der 
Rahmenordnung den entscheidenden Einfluss auf die moralische Qualität der Ergebnisse von 
Interaktionssituationen ausüben. Je nach Rahmenbedingung dominieren entweder die Homines 
Reciprocantes die Interaktionssituation oder die Homines Oeconomici. Ist ein gut 
funktionierender Bestrafungsmechanismus für ausbeuterisches Verhalten vorhanden, zwingen 
die Homines Reciprocantes mit ihrer Nutzung dieses Bestrafungsmechanismus die Homines 
Oeconomici dazu, sich moralisch zu verhalten, ergo, fairere Angebote zu unterbreiten. Ist kein 
solcher Mechanismus vorhanden, bringen die Homines Oeconomici die Homines 
Reciprocantes dazu, auch unfaire Angebote anzunehmen, Angebote, die sie sonst bestrafen 
würden (siehe den Fall mit vier potentiellen Annehmern). Letzterer Fall wird von Karl 
Homann, dem Verfechter der Rahmenordnung, antizipiert, wenn er schreibt, dass der Homo 
Oeconomicus unter bestimmten Rahmenbedingungen das Ergebnis der Interaktionssituation 
dominiert, selbst „wenn es ihn empirisch gar nicht ‚gibt‘“ (1997: 20) – bzw., in Bezug auf Fehrs 
Experimente, selbst wenn er in der Unterzahl ist.9 
Die Position, wonach der Rahmenordnung eine hohe Relevanz für das Ergebnis von 
Interaktionssituationen zukommt, wird bestätigt, insofern selbst kleine Modifikationen der 
Randbedingungen von Interaktionen große Auswirkungen auf die moralische Qualität des 
Ergebnisses von Interaktionssituationen nach sich ziehen können. Dies wird erreicht, ganz ohne 
auf eine Veränderung im relativen Anteil der drei verschiedenen Interaktionstypen angewiesen 
zu sein. Fehrs Modifikationen des Ultimatumspiels legen die Richtigkeit der Überzeugung 
nahe, Interaktionssituationen dürften nicht so eingerichtet werden, dass sie anfällig für 
Ausbeutung durch Homines Oeconomici sind.10 Bei der Einrichtung von 
Interaktionssituationen muss daher Sorge dafür getragen werden, dass selbige nicht ausbeutbar 
durch unmoralisch agierende Akteure sind. Auch dies wird von Homann vorweggenommen, 
wenn er fordert: „Nur wenn institutionelle Arrangements homo-oeconomicus-resistent 
                                                          
9
  Diese Übereinstimmung mit der Verhaltensökonomik gesteht auch Panther dem Homannschen Ansatz zu 
(2005: 87). 
10
  Alternativ könnte auch gefragt werden, ob Fehrs Ergebnisse nicht zeigen, dass der bedingungslose Altruist 
keineswegs der moralischste Akteur ist. Immerhin sorgen die altruistic Fools, wie man die bedingungslosen 
Altruisten in Anlehnung an Sens Redeweise von den Rational Fools zu nennen geneigt ist, dafür, dass die 
Ergebnisse von Interaktionssituationen moralisch unerwünscht sind. Diese alternative Betrachtungsweise würde 
hier aber zu weit führen und ist darüber hinaus für die vorgenommene Argumentation unproblematisch, da sie 
ohnehin eher die Verfechter der Rahmenordnung weiter stärken würde. 
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ausgestaltet werden können, sind sie in der Lage, die gewünschte Rolle zu spielen. Wie man 
nur TÜV-geprüfte Autos in den Verkehr lässt, so kann der Ökonom nur solche Regeln und 
Institutionen empfehlen, die den – gedanklichen – Homo-oeconomicus-Test bestanden haben. 
Andernfalls mutet er gerade den moralischen Akteuren die Ausbeutung durch die weniger 
moralischen Akteure zu“ (1997: 21).  
Anstatt – wie auf den ersten Blick anzunehmen – die Verfechter der Individualmoral zu stärken, 
affirmieren die Experimente Fehrs in vielerlei Hinsicht die Verfechter der Rahmenordnung. 
Ohne angesichts der Vielzahl der Experimente in der Verhaltensökonomik auch nur annähernd 
den Anspruch vertreten zu können, den wirtschaftsethischen Streit zwischen Verfechtern der 
Individualmoral und denjenigen der Rahmenordnung entscheiden zu können, hat die 
vorliegende Arbeit u.E. gezeigt, dass die moralische Qualität der Ergebnisse von 
Interaktionssituationen mit Veränderungen in den Rahmenbedingungen erstaunlich verlässlich 
erreicht werden kann. Dies bedeutet im Umkehrschluss freilich nicht, dass Maßnahmen zur 
moralischen Verbesserung von Individuen irrelevant wären. Zu Recht könnten die Verfechter 
der Individualmoral – und zwar auch in Bezug auf das Ergebnis von Interaktionssituationen – 
reklamieren, dass es zumindest den Fall zu verhindern gilt, in dem sich alle Akteure wie 
Homines Oeconomici verhalten. Die hier vorgenommene Untersuchung legt aber nahe, dass 
die Wirtschaftsethik sich vor allem fragen sollte, welche Implikationen die 
Verhaltensökonomik in Bezug auf die Einrichtung wirtschaftlicher Rahmenbedingungen und 
die richtige Setzung von Anreizen mit sich bringt. In diesem Sinn würde die Wirtschaftsethik 
ihre Rolle darin sehen, die besten Ergebnisse der Wissenschaft ihrer Zeit für die Einrichtung 
moralischerer Ergebnisse von Interaktionssituationen zu instrumentalisieren und damit, im 
besten Fall, die Eintracht in Bezug auf das ‚Wie‘ der moralischen Erhöhung von Moral in der 
Wirtschaft erhöhen. 
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This paper examines the sustainability disclosure in the banking industry with respect to 
potential greenwashing. We build a theoretical framework to assess the sustainability 
disclosure along materiality criteria in the banking industry and apply this framework to the 
corporate sustainability reporting of two global systemically important banks. The results of 
our case study point toward the existence of greenwashing, mainly in the most material areas 
of the sustainability disclosure of our sample banks, but also highlight the shortcomings of 
existing disclosure guidelines to adequately account for material sector-specific sustainability 
issues. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decades, reporting on corporate sustainability has evolved from focusing 
primarily on environmental issues to the triple bottom line approach of environmental, social 
and financial performance (see Elkington 1997). Corporate sustainability disclosure today is 
no longer only the domain of those firms that belong to environmentally sensitive industries 
but has become common practice for firms of all types of industries regardless of their 
ecological impact. Firms are expected to operate responsibly toward their environment and 
demonstrate their conformance with these expectations through non-financial disclosure. 
Previous research has shown that establishing legitimacy is a primary motive for a company’s 
voluntary sustainability disclosure (see e.g. Cho et al. 2012; Cho/Patten 2007). Firms disclose 
information on non-financial topics to ensure that their actions are perceived as legitimate, i.e., 
in accordance with society’s expectations on sustainable business conduct (see e.g. Suchman 
1995). Since detailed and legally binding regulations on non-financial reporting are currently 
missing in most countries, companies are granted leeway in determining both quantity and 
quality of their sustainability reporting. Due to this leeway, companies may use sustainability 
disclosure rather as a tool for positive self-presentation than for the presentation of objective, 
comparable and comprehensible information on their true sustainability performance. 
Practitioners and academics term this disclosure style “greenwashing” and “bluewashing”, 
respectively.  
While there is a substantial amount of research in the area of corporate sustainability disclosure 
in general (for a recent literature review across industries see Fifka 2012; for studies 
particularly focused on the banking industry see Herzig/Moon 2013; Herzig et al. 2012; 
Scholtens 2009), research on the precise nature and determinants of greenwashing is relatively 
scarce. This paper fills this research gap by providing a comprehensive framework for the 
assessment of sustainability disclosure with respect to greenwashing utilizing an industry-
specific materiality focus. We apply this framework to an in-depth analysis of the sustainability 
disclosure of two global systemically important banks. In addition, we perform a structured 
media search to identify third-party criticism of these two banks with respect to the issues 
covered by our framework and exemplarily link this criticism to the banks’ sustainability 
disclosure. 
There are basically two reasons why we focus on the banking industry. Firstly, in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis in 2007/2008, the banking industry faced significant increases in 
mandatory risk disclosure regulations (see Bischof/Daske 2013; Herz 2010). However, 
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research has mainly neglected the consequences of this regulation on corporate sustainability 
disclosure although information and communication on these risks are of substantial 
importance to all groups of stakeholders. Secondly, the assessment of materiality as a basic 
principle for the determination of both content and focus of a firm’s corporate sustainability 
report is particularly important for (financial) service companies. Commonly applied 
sustainability disclosure guidelines, in particular the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
sustainability reporting guidelines (GRI 2011a; 2011b), focus on environmental and social 
impacts of a company which are generally less material for (financial) service companies. 
Drawing on a framework for the materiality assessment of sustainability-related issues in the 
banking industry we assess the disclosed information with respect to its materiality to 
stakeholders. Our framework thereby distinguishes between three main disclosure areas: 
financial and economic system stability, sustainable business activities and sustainable 
workforce and infrastructure. For each area, we analyze the banks’ sustainability disclosure 
against the background of materiality and regulatory guidelines which yields valuable insights 
into the existence and nature of greenwashing in banks’ corporate sustainability reporting.  
Although our findings point toward the existence of greenwashing mainly in the highly material 
areas of the sustainability disclosure of our sample banks, it is important to interpret these 
findings against the (self-)regulatory background in the banking industry. Notably, the most 
commonly used standards on corporate sustainability disclosure, the reporting guidelines 
published by the GRI, offer only limited guidance for the reporting of material sustainability-
related issues in the banking industry. The GRI Financial Services Sector Supplements (FS-
SS) refer to very specific product and service impacts and are thereby limited in their scope of 
reflecting a complete picture of sustainable business conducts of diversified banks (see GRI 
2013c; GRI 2011b). The disclosure guidelines on market discipline (Pillar 3 of the Basel II 
accord) by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision offer more detailed guidance with 
respect to risk disclosures which are material for the core business of globally operating banks. 
However, these regulatory guidelines mainly apply to banks’ financial reports with investors 
as the major group of audience and clear legal boundaries. They may therefore not be sufficient 
with respect to both the broader scope as well as the longer timeframe targeted by sustainability 
reporting. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical background of our 
study. Based on a brief review of related disclosure literature a framework for the materiality 
assessment of sustainability-related issues in the banking industry is presented. This framework 
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guides our case study on the sustainability disclosure of two global systemically important 
banks. The methodology, sample as well as results from this case study along with a discussion 
of our major findings are described in the third section. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Sustainability Disclosure and Greenwashing 
There are primarily two theoretical concepts in the literature which explain the existence of 
sustainability reporting. Following voluntary disclosure theory, it is argued that firms disclose 
information on their corporate sustainability performance to increase their market value (see 
Verrecchia 1983). Socio-political theories, in particular the legitimacy theory, on the other 
hand, posit that firms engage in sustainability reporting to ensure that their actions are 
perceived as legitimate, i.e., in accordance with stakeholders’ expectations on sustainable 
business conduct (see e.g. Suchman 1995; Dowling/Pfeffer 1975; Davis 1973). Both theories 
offer explanations of why companies’ sustainability disclosure differs in both quantity and 
quality. For instance, Hummel and Schlick (2015) show that particularly poor sustainability 
performers provide low-quality sustainability disclosure to disguise their true performance and 
to maintain a sustainable image at the same time. Building on previous research (see 
Lyon/Maxwell 2011: 9) we extend the applicability of the concept of greenwashing beyond its 
original focus on environmental aspects and define greenwashing as a company’s selective 
disclosure on sustainability issues without full reporting of material sustainability issues to 
overstate its true sustainability performance. Thus, our definition is linked to the concept of 
materiality and does not merely distinguish the pure type of information (negative vs. positive).  
Due to the huge body of research on sustainability disclosure, our literature review is focused 
on two primary areas of interest: studies on sustainability disclosure in the banking industry 
and studies on greenwashing. The first area of research is characterized by predominantly 
descriptive investigations on banks’ sustainability disclosure regarding environmental and 
social issues (see e.g. Khan et al. 2011; Evangelinos et al. 2009; Scholtens 2009). None of these 
studies address the banks’ role and disclosure with respect to the stability of the overall 
financial system, despite its emphasis by both stakeholders and financial regulators. To the best 
of our knowledge, there are currently only two studies that examine banks’ sustainability 
disclosure against the background of the financial crisis. Herzig et al. (2012) investigate the 
sustainability reporting of ten German banks for the reporting year 2007/2008. The authors 
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show that reporting on bank-specific sustainability issues is relatively poor and conclude that 
“a structural reform with the aim of a ‘strongly embedded’ sustainability” (p. 204) is needed. 
Although the authors discuss the importance of sustainability reporting for the re-building of 
trust and confidence in the financial sector, they do not consider the overall financial system 
stability for their analysis. This aspect is more explicitly addressed in Herzig’s and Moon’s 
(2013) discourse analysis of newspaper articles on the financial crisis. The study reveals four 
distinct discourses on corporate social responsibility in the financial sector and the economic 
crisis, yet the authors do not match the external perspective of media coverage with the banks’ 
own disclosure. Taken together, while previous studies provide valuable insights into 
sustainability disclosure in the banking industry, none of these studies systematically address 
the issue of greenwashing against the background of the materiality of banks’ own 
sustainability disclosure. 
The second area of research on the nature and determinants of greenwashing includes 
normative approaches (see Bowen/Aragon-Correa 2014; Laufer 2003) as well as empirical 
studies (see Mahoney et al. 2013; Kim/Lyon 2011; Ramus/Montiel 2005).1 Empirical research 
yields ambiguous findings with respect to the existence of greenwashing which may primarily 
stem from difficulties in the measurement of greenwashing. For instance, Mahoney et al. 
(2013) concentrate on the relationship between corporate sustainability performance and the 
decision to issue a stand-alone sustainability report as an indicator for the existence of either 
greenwashing (indicated by a negative relationship) or signaling (indicated by a positive 
relationship). They report evidence for signaling. On the other hand, Kim and Lyon (2011) 
compare reported reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to actual GHG emissions for 
participants of a voluntary GHG registry. They interpret differences between reported and 
actual emissions as evidence for greenwashing activities. Analytical studies (see e.g. 
Lyon/Maxwell 2011: 23) recommend extending the empirical setting to additional drivers of 
disclosure behavior, such as enforcement pressure. This approach of studying the explicit effect 
of regulatory enforcement has lately gained ground in the empirical literature of bank 
disclosure regulation (see Bischof et al. 2015). Disclosure regulation of banks encompasses the 
specificity that banks have to prepare their reporting according to two different regulators with 
non-identical reporting goals. Goldstein and Sapra (2014) report a trade-off between providing 
                                                          
1
 In addition, Boiral (2013) investigates the existence of “simulacra”, a concept that is closely related to, yet not 
identical with, greenwashing. 
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decision-useful information for the capital market and reassuring a broad set of stakeholders 
on the long-term stability of the financial system. 
While a broad set of stakeholders is typically addressed by corporate sustainability disclosure, 
research has so far neglected the role of both voluntary and mandatory disclosure regulations 
with respect to corporate sustainability disclosure and greenwashing. In addition, research in 
the field of greenwashing is primarily concentrated on firms that belong to environmentally 
sensitive industries, although corporate sustainability disclosure has become common practice 
for firms of all types of industries.2 In particular, the banking industry yields an interesting 
setting for an in-depth investigation of the existence of greenwashing against the background 
of mandatory and voluntary disclosure regulations on material issues. A framework for the 
assessment of sustainability disclosure in the banking industry is presented in the next section. 
 
2.2 Framework for the Assessment of Sustainability Disclosure in the Banking Industry 
Due to their role as financial intermediaries, banks are central for the functioning of a modern 
economy. Through their capacity to make loans to the private, public and corporate sector, 
banks are able to fund the growth of the real economy. In this role, banks serve a very diverse 
group of stakeholders who need the credit provided by the banks or are indirectly linked with 
the borrowers of the banks’ credit. Banks themselves mainly borrow the funds they need for 
the credit creation business. This distinguishes banks from most other business sectors as these 
are mainly funded by shareholder’s equity rather than debt. Bank debtors include private 
depositors, corporations, governments or other financial institutions with surplus funds. Banks 
are therefore special for having a very large group of stakeholders with very diverse 
information needs. Despite their central role in the economy, there is – to the best of our 
knowledge – no widely accepted materiality assessment of sustainability-related issues for the 
banking industry.3 According to the GRI (2013a: 7; 2013b: 11) material aspects “reflect the 
                                                          
2
  In 2013, 93 percent of the largest 250 companies worldwide published stand-alone or integrated sustainability 
reports (see KPMG 2013: 22). 
3
 The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has recently published industry-specific reporting 
guidelines for sustainability disclosure (see SASB 2015). However, these reporting standards define materiality 
according to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s definition of materiality focusing on investor decision-
useful information. This approach therefore differs from the broader and more long-term oriented materiality 
concept applied in this paper. 
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organization’s significant economic, environmental and social impacts; or substantively 
influence the assessments and decisions of stakeholders”.4  
Figure 1 provides a framework for assessing global banks’ sustainability disclosure that builds 
on the GRI (2013a) definition of materiality.5 We identify three major areas of sustainability 
disclosure: financial and economic system stability, sustainable business activities, and 
sustainable workforce and infrastructure. The first area particularly relates to significant 
economic impacts, the second area comprises economic, environmental and social impacts, and 
the third area includes primarily environmental and social impacts. Along these three areas the 
materiality of topics decreases from a high materiality of financial and economic system 
stability, to a moderate materiality of sustainable business activities to a low materiality of 
sustainable workforce and infrastructure. Within each area we identify four major disclosure 
categories that guide our assessment of sustainability disclosure in the third section of the 
paper.6 These disclosure categories are closely linked to commonly used disclosure guidelines 
thereby ensuring the existence of quantitative indicators and measures for each category.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
The first area of the materiality framework – financial and economic system stability – refers 
to the measures taken and reported by a bank with respect to fostering the stability of the overall 
financial system. As banks play a major role in facilitating the credit demand and supply of the 
real economy, the stability of the financial system has a direct impact on the stability of the 
total economy. This holds true especially for global systemically important banks which are 
particularly prone to market risk through their investment bank’s trading activities (see 
Freixas/Rochet 2008). We argue that the sustainability disclosure on financial and economic 
system stability is highly material. The externality potential of this area is high due to the high 
monetary as well as fiscal costs which have to be borne by the society in case of a breakdown 
                                                          
4
  Under the newest version of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines (G4), which were launched in May 2013, 
organizations have to report on the process and outcome of the assessment of material aspects and boundaries 
(see GRI 2013a: G4-17 to G4-23). 
5
 With respect to disclosure guidelines we concentrate on the version G3.1 of the GRI sustainability reporting 
guidelines (see GRI 2011a; 2011b) because only few companies have already adopted the latest version G4 in 
their 2013 sustainability reporting and there are no substantial differences in the performance indicators with 
respect to the disclosure categories addressed in our framework. 
6
 While we consider the four categories in each area as particularly material and comprehensive with regard to 
the topics covered in the sustainability reports, there are many additional topics which could be addressed within 
each area. 
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of the financial system. Such costs include, but are not limited to, high interest rates on 
mortgages and corporate loans as well as an overall low availability of credit to the economy. 
As a basis for the proper functioning of the whole economy, financial and economic system 
stability concerns all potential stakeholders of a bank. Besides the stakeholders directly 
involved in the business conduct of a bank, there are additional groups of stakeholders such as 
taxpayers and the society at large. Due to their core business to create and trade credit with 
money received by depositors, banks possess a multiplication function which is only limited 
by regulatory imposed reserves which have to be held against the deposits received (see 
Freixas/Rochet 2008). We argue that the disclosed information in this area is very complex 
since it requires the understanding of the banks’ core business processes, their 
interconnectedness with the macro-economy as well as the prevailing national and international 
legislation the bank has to adhere to. There are no mandatory or voluntary disclosure guidelines 
specifically targeted to address financial and economic system stability issues in sustainability 
reports. The regulatory and accounting rules which guide the mandated disclosure of the 
financial report of a bank provide the most suitable quantitative measures for assessing the 
sustainability reporting. In addition to these guidelines, selected economic performance 
indicators of the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines cover parts of the disclosures needed 
in this area (see GRI 2011a). Based on timing and scope of the disclosure our framework 
distinguishes between four disclosure categories. These categories comprise early adherence 
to newly imposed regulation, the disclosure of a long-term focus and a broad stakeholder focus 
as well as the assessment of systemic risk.  
Sustainable business activities refer to the sustainability of a bank’s core business activities. 
Compared to financial and economic system stability, the materiality of topics within this area 
is lower, yet still moderate. Depending on the business model of a bank, this area relates to 
business activities such as corporate and retail banking, wealth and asset management, and 
investment banking. The externality potential of this area is moderate as it comprises mainly 
external benefits, yet costs to society are limited. Such benefits arise for instance from 
providing access to financial services for small businesses in underdeveloped regions (micro-
finance). Similar to financial and economic system stability, this area also concerns the 
multiplication function of a bank and thus affects a high number of stakeholders, such as 
shareholders, investors, customers, NGOs and local communities. The complexity of disclosed 
information is moderate, i.e., a basic understanding of the banking business is needed to be 
able to reach a reflected opinion upon reading the disclosed information. With respect to 
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disclosure categories we distinguish between information on sustainable investment, micro-
finance activities, engagement in problematic sectors and business activities, such as 
conducting business with the defense and armaments industry and agricultural commodity 
trading, and product responsibility and customer satisfaction. Disclosure guidelines in this area 
are voluntary and mainly include the GRI performance indicators on product responsibility 
(see GRI 2011a), the GRI FS-SS (see GRI 2011b) and the Equator Principles (see EP 2013). 
The GRI FS-SS consist of 16 financial services sector-specific disclosures and performance 
indicators that account for sustainability-related issues with respect to the product and service 
portfolio of banks. Besides, they include adjustments on G3.1/G4 guidelines content and 
performance indicators. The Equator Principles (latest version: EP3) are a baseline and 
framework for the management of environmental and social risks which apply to project 
financing by financial institutions (see EP 2013). Signatories commit to implement the Equator 
Principles in their internal policies and procedures and report annually on completed 
transactions.  
The third area – sustainable workforce and infrastructure – relates to a bank’s performance with 
respect to employees and the ecology. The externality potential on society is low since it is 
limited to external costs that stem from banks’ ecological impacts. Compared to production 
industries, banks’ ecological impacts are low as they consume relatively few scarce resources. 
With respect to the employee sub-area we argue that even in case of layoffs the externality 
potential is relatively low due to the high qualification of the workforce, which is a critical 
success factor in the job search. Therefore, we assess a higher materiality for the employee sub-
area compared to the ecological sub-area. Overall, only few groups of stakeholders, in 
particular employees and NGOs, are concerned. Both sub-areas do not involve any multiplier 
effect as they are not related to the core financial intermediary business of banks. With respect 
to the disclosed information we assess a low complexity because the information can be easily 
understood by economic laymen. In each sub-area we consider four core disclosure categories 
that are included in the GRI performance indicators on labor practices and on the environment 
(see GRI 2011a) and (partly) in the United Nations Global Compact. 
 
3. Case Study on Sustainability Disclosure in the Banking Industry 
 
3.1 Sample and Methodology 
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Our sample consists of two global systemically important banks, namely Credit Suisse (CS) 
situated in Switzerland and Deutsche Bank (DB) situated in Germany. These two banks are 
typical representatives of the 30 global systemically important banks (see FSB 2014) and 
exemplary both for their involvement in the global financial crisis and for their detailed 
sustainability reporting. We assess and record the bank’s sustainability disclosure for the 
reporting year 2013 with respect to the disclosure categories of our materiality framework. In 
addition, for each bank we perform a Factiva search of major German and Swiss newspapers 
for the same year.7 In total, the results list includes 418 news entries for DB and 268 news 
entries for CS.8 We manually assess the content of each news entry and exclude news that do 
not directly relate to the respective banks. The remaining news is linked to one of the three 
areas of our framework or to the categories “general financial information and company 
strategy” or “information regarding the Kirch scandal”9. Overall, the distribution of news 
across the three areas of our framework is consistent with the materiality assessment provided 
in the framework. In particular, 43 (DB) and 55 percent (CS) of the news concern the first area 
(financial/economic system stability), 20 percent (DB) and 15 percent (CS), respectively, 
concern the second area (sustainable business activities), and 1 percent (DB) and 4 percent 
(CS) concern the third area (sustainable workforce and infrastructure). With respect to the other 
categories, 22 percent (DB) and 26 percent (CS) relate to “general financial information and 
company strategy” and 14 percent of the news on DB concern the “Kirch scandal”. Based on 
the results of this media search we identify material cases of third-party criticism which target 
both sample banks and assess the banks’ disclosure with respect to this criticism.  
The sustainability disclosure taken into account includes the corporate sustainability report as 
well as references to additional resources within the report. The baseline for a comprehensive 
assessment within each (sub-) area is defined as the disclosure of both quantitative and non-
quantitative (verbal) information. Quantitative information is particularly necessary to 
facilitate comparability across different companies. Such quantitative information needs to be 
                                                          
7
 Factiva is a proprietary international news database that covers worldwide news from 200 countries in 28 
languages. German newspapers include Berliner Zeitung, Die Welt, Die Zeit, Der Tagesspiegel, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, der Spiegel, Stuttgarter Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung. Swiss 
newspapers include Aargauer Zeitung, Basler Zeitung, Die Weltwoche, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, NZZ am 
Sonntag, Sonntagszeitung, Tages-Anzeiger and wirtschaft.ch. 
8
 An overview of the evaluated news reports as well as a detailed description of the news concerning the main 
area of financial/ economic system stability of the two sample banks can be found in the Appendix. A detailed 
description of all evaluated news reports is available as an Excel-Appendix on request. 
9 The “Kirch scandal” accused Deutsche Bank’s senior management to deliberately foster the collapse of the 
Kirch media empire. It has been settled in 2014 when DB announced a legal settlement payment of more than 
€775 million to Kirch’s heirs. 
 36  
accompanied by verbal explanations and discussions. The necessity of this verbal information 
increases with the materiality of the disclosure areas and thus with the complexity of the 
information. We argue that the sustainability disclosure is free from greenwashing if 
quantitative and non-quantitative (verbal) information are tailored to the specific reporting 
needs of each disclosure category with the intent to provide a true and full picture of its 
sustainability performance.  
 
3.2 Results 
 
3.2.1 Overview 
Both banks’ sustainability reports follow the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines G3.1. 
Their disclosure levels are classified as “A+” thereby indicating comprehensive reporting 
according to the GRI guidelines (application level A) and external assurance of the 
sustainability report (indicated by “+”). The reports differ in their overall length (CS: 66 pages; 
DB: 106 pages), yet the shorter CS sustainability report includes references to websites that 
provide additional in-depth information on certain topics. While the reports’ structures do not 
adhere to our distinction of the three major disclosure areas, both reports contain information 
with respect to these disclosure areas. DB’s report is organized into an introduction, containing 
the report’s contents, a foreword and some general information on the bank’s divisional 
structure, strategy and values, a chapter “Our Controls”, a chapter “Our Business”, a chapter 
“Our Commitment” as well as supplementary information. The CS report consists of an 
introduction, including the report’s contents, a foreword and some general information on 
corporate responsibility, a chapter “Responsibility in Banking”, a chapter “Responsibility in 
Society”, a chapter “Responsibility as an Employer”, a chapter “Responsibility for the 
Environment” as well as supplementary information. Besides information that falls into one of 
our three disclosure areas, both banks additionally provide comprehensive information on 
corporate citizenship and sponsorship. Remarkably, none of the reports contain a section that 
explicitly deals with the banks’ responsibility with respect to the stability of the financial and 
economic system. Thus, information with respect to the financial and economic system stability 
is spread over the whole report. However, the CS report contains information on the process 
and outcome of a materiality assessment. While the materiality assessment of sustainability-
related issues is predominantly in accordance with our framework, in particular with regard to 
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highest materiality being assigned to financial system stability, the content and structure of the 
reports do not adequately reflect this assessment.  
 
3.2.2 Financial and Economic System Stability 
Figure 2 summarizes the sample banks’ disclosures in the area of financial and economic 
system stability according to the four disclosure categories of our framework. As many 
disclosures which are material for the assessment of the financial and economic system stability 
of the two banks are potentially reported in their annual reports rather than their sustainability 
reports, the assessment of this area of our framework is based on an integrated view of the 
information provided in both these reports.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
The focus of the two banks with respect to the first disclosure category, early adherence to 
rules, differs widely. In their annual reports, both banks refer to the Basel framework’s 
supplementary requirements for systemically relevant banks which they have to adhere to (CS 
AR 2013: 5; DB AR 2013: 23). CS’s annual report generally includes very detailed descriptions 
of proposed as well as newly implemented regulation and supervision, including the Basel III 
framework and the comparably stricter Swiss “Too Big to Fail” legislation. The legislation 
includes capital, liquidity, leverage and large exposure requirements, and rules for emergency 
plans designed to maintain systemically relevant functions in the event of threatened 
insolvency. (CS AR 2013: 24) DB’s annual report stresses its commitment of early compliance 
with the Basel III capital framework. In addition, in its sustainability report, CS provides 
quantitative as well as verbal information on its early transition to the new Basel III guidelines 
and the thereby applicable, national capital regulation six years before they will actually 
become effective (see e.g. CS 2013: 4f., 11f., 59). DB on the other hand does not report any 
quantitative information on its compliance with proposed new banking regulation in the 
sustainability report, but concentrates the discussion on internal measures taken to monitor 
potential legal and reputation risks as well as to adapt its business strategy to their new code of 
conduct (see e.g. DB 2013: 4ff., 12, 19).  
Both sample banks also emphasize different topics and vary in the way of reporting this 
information in the second disclosure category, long-term focus. Standard financial and risk 
reporting is by construction backwards oriented, either describing various risks which had 
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occurred in the past or qualitatively assessing potential future risks which may occur within the 
existing bank’s business model (see e.g. CS AR 2013: 34-42; DB AR 2013: 29-37). The 
market, liquidity and operational risk reports in the annual reports of the two sample banks 
cover all required risk metrics as well as scenario analyses and stress testing based on historical 
as well as hypothetical assumptions. Nevertheless, all analyses are based on the assumption of 
the banks’ current business model and taking the banks’ client behavior as given. (see e.g. CS 
AR 2013: 35; DB AR 2013: 190) Hence, both banks tend to be silent about detailed, future-
oriented objectives regarding the mitigation of the bank’s long-term risk contribution in a case-
study or stress-test setting. CS discloses that Standard & Poor’s lowered CS’s long-term 
counterparty credit rating and warns of potential detrimental effects of further downgrades as 
these could negatively affect their funding costs and business transaction possibilities. (CS AR 
2013: 35) On the other hand, CS reports quantitatively on its strategic actions to reduce 
regulatory costs and mitigate costs arising from systemic risk in its sustainability report. 
However, quantitative as well as verbal information is limited to the alignment of CS’s business 
model to the changing regulatory environment: “As part of the bank’s growth strategy, we aim 
to achieve a balanced distribution of capital between our two divisions” (CS 2013: 4). DB 
discusses new performance indicators for measuring DB’s long-term value creation to clients, 
but does not explain how value is created for shareholders “by putting long-term success over 
short-term gain” (DB 2013: 12).  
In line with the target group of annual reports, risk governance and management descriptions 
of the two banks are mainly focusing on shareholders’ interest, rather than taking a broad 
stakeholder focus, e.g. “The primary objectives of risk management are to protect our financial 
strength and reputation, while ensuring that capital is well deployed to support business 
activities and grow shareholder value.” (CS AR 2013: 115) Furthermore, all ratios presented 
in the annual reports which assess the systemic relevance of the two sample banks are limited 
to the institution view and are based on legally required measures (see e.g. CS AR 2013: 102-
105; DB AR 2013: 204). In its sustainability report, CS presents general facts about its role as 
a financial intermediary providing credit to their clients, whereas DB provides detailed verbal 
information of how they implement a client-centric business focus. DB also expounds its new 
client centricity and the change in corporate culture in the qualitative introduction of the annual 
report (see e.g. “Cultural change – laying the foundations for our future success” and “Creating 
Value for Our Stakeholders”). DB also presents illustrative examples on its product assessment 
process (see DB 2013.: 24) as well as its customer protection programs (see ibid.: 42). 
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However, without any quantitative information, the reader cannot assess the materiality or the 
efficiency of these measures.  
The sample banks’ information provided with respect to the forth disclosure category 
(assessment of systemic risk) is again very heterogeneous. Both CS’s as well as DB’s annual 
reports describe market volatility risk and its potential adverse effects for their trading and 
investment activities in great detail. CS discloses the potential impact from market fluctuations 
and volatility on the fair value of their trading positions as well as adverse effects on their total 
net revenues and profitability. (CS AR 2013: 18; 35) At the same time, DB makes clear that 
too low market volatility is disadvantageous for their trading revenues, especially in foreign 
exchange trading, due to margin compression (DB AR 2013: 42) However, both banks’ 
statements of objectives to manage market risk are very limited. CS states that they continue 
to “reduce [their] balance sheet and accelerate the implementation of [their] client-focused, 
capital-efficient strategy in 2013” (CS AR 2013: 35). DB is confident that factors such as 
higher market volatility and a stricter regulatory environment will “favour large managers […] 
to exploit scale and efficiency to provide clients with sophisticated investment solutions.” (DB 
AR 2013: 52) In its sustainability report, DB reports quantitatively about its employee training 
programs covering a wide range of risk awareness, financial crime and compliance topics (see 
DB 2013: 17–22). As in the other three disclosure categories, CS emphasizes its risk 
management approaches in line with applicable and proposed laws and regulations. Whereas 
CS discusses the management and ongoing monitoring approach of its credit risk exposure, DB 
focuses merely on non-financial risks such as reputation risk as it suggests that “traditional 
financial risks (are) intrinsic to our business” (ibid.: 25) and therefore monitored by law. Same 
as in their annual reports, both banks do not provide any explanation about their control 
measures to manage market risk, even though both CS (2013: 29) and DB (2013: 25) 
acknowledge their active role in managing this risk measure. 
Furthermore, the discrepancy between disclosure and materiality becomes even more apparent 
when analyzing the banks’ reporting with respect to third-party criticism. The major cases of 
third-party criticism in the area of financial and economic system stability of the two banks are 
highlighting outright violations of national legislation and international standards. Scandals, 
such as the manipulation of benchmark interest rates and foreign exchange rates (see e.g. 
Tages-Anzeiger 2013)10 or the misrepresentation of the performance of securities (see e.g. Die 
                                                          
10
 In March 2014, international media (Bloomberg: 2014; Reuters 2014; WSJ 2014) publish that Credit Suisse as 
well as Deutsche Bank are among 16 of the world’s largest banks sued by the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation for their alleged role in manipulating the London interbank offered rate from 2007 to 2011. In case 
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Welt 2013) have led to financial and economic instability as they have enriched the colluding 
banks to the detriment of the global economy. Both sample banks selectively disclose their 
positive achievements with regards to fraud and corruption awareness trainings and highlight 
their participation in industry standards which should prevent future misconducts (see CS 2013: 
6, 14, 57; DB 2013: 18ff.). However, both banks remain silent about the reasons why their 
membership in voluntary self-regulation initiatives against fraud and corruption is needed to 
prevent them not only from unsustainable, but also from presumably unlawful business 
conduct. Corporate scandals are disclosed only when legal litigation is already ongoing. There 
is no ex-ante disclosure or assessment of systemic risk which may arise from financial 
innovations and interbank relationships.  
Misconduct, such as fraud and corruption, is treated as “legacy” (CS 2013: 13) which has to be 
resolved, but is not reported as material risk for the future: "Furthermore, the bank is actively 
involved in the ongoing development of industry standards that are designed to safeguard the 
integrity of the financial system. One example is Credit Suisse’s participation in the Wolfsberg 
Group (see page 57) – reflecting our commitment to implementing its anti-money laundering 
and anti-bribery standards while also staying abreast of important current developments." 
(ibid.: 14). Deutsche Bank as well reports to “strengthen [its] control framework and confront 
legacy issues, including significant legal matters such as the European Commission’s probe 
into Interbank Offered Rates.” (DB: Foreword). However, any explanation on the measures 
applied in the enhanced control framework as well as its ability to mitigate systemic 
misconduct risks are missing. 
 
3.2.3 Sustainable Business Activities 
Figure 3 presents an overview of the banks’ disclosures with respect to sustainable business 
activities. For the first disclosure category, sustainable investments, both sample banks provide 
some quantitative and verbal information. However, quantitative information for this 
disclosure category is very limited and precise definitions are missing. Moreover, only DB 
additionally provides relative values indicating the importance of sustainable investments 
relative to the bank’s total investments. Without such information it is difficult for the reader 
                                                          
of Credit Suisse, this news about their conviction for manipulating the London interbank offered rate proved to 
be a deficiency report. Negative media news can create material reputational risk for the involved companies at 
the time of their issuance, even though some of them may prove to be overstated or even outright wrong at a 
later stage.  
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to assess statements such as: “At Credit Suisse, we offer a broad range of products and services 
that give investors access to sustainable investment opportunities” (ibid.: 22). Similar findings 
are obtained for the second disclosure category. Both banks provide predominantly cumulative 
and no yearly information on their micro-finance activities. Only DB provides this information 
for a reporting period of more than one year, thereby allowing for an assessment of the recent 
development in this area. Despite this lack of comparable quantitative information, both banks 
emphasize their pioneering role in microfinance: “Credit Suisse has been a leader in 
microfinance since 2002 (…)” (ibid.: 23). “We were the first global bank to launch an 
investment fund supporting the microfinance sector in 1997, and since then we have pioneered 
standards to promote ethical behavior in the industry and protect its clients” (DB 2013: 54). 
Disclosure in the third disclosure category of this area – problematic sectors and business 
activities – is very heterogeneous. While CS is a signatory of the Equator Principles and thus 
reports pre-defined quantitative information on project finance transactions in accordance with 
the Equator Principles, DB’s disclosure primarily concentrates on the management of 
reputational, environmental and social risks. In addition, both banks provide verbal information 
on problematic sectors and business activities. Such information includes statements11 as well 
as policies, guidelines (see CS 2013: 21 with reference to website) and key positions (see DB 
2013: 33). Many guidelines are detailing the increased scrutiny and in-depth due diligence 
processes in the business continuance case. CS exemplifies its policy regarding hydraulic 
fracturing (see CS 2013: 18). DB illustrates its risk review process for two exemplary 
environmental and social sensitive projects, mono-cultural farming and coal mining. 
Explaining both its critics’ standpoints and its internal review process as well as actions taken 
forward, DB provides a transparent learning process towards a more sustainable business 
conduct (see DB 2013: 31). At the same time, both banks are not very explicit on their process 
of how they decide and go about discontinuing such sensitive businesses. Remarkably, DB 
explicitly reports having ceased to adhere to self-imposed restrictions with regards to 
agricultural commodities trading beyond regulatory boundaries in 2013 (see ibid.: 33). With 
respect to the fourth disclosure category, both banks present only general verbal information 
on product responsibility, such as: “We regularly review the suitability and appropriateness of 
the advice we offer clients as part of our efforts to inspire them with confidence.” (CS 2013: 
14) and “We do not offer incomprehensible product bundles or products that do not include 
                                                          
11
 Such as: “We are not involved in proprietary trading in agricultural commodities” (CS 2013: 21) and “[…] we 
support increased transparency and appropriate regulation” (DB 2013: 33). 
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clear benefits for the client” (DB 2013: 44). With respect to customer satisfaction, CS presents 
only very limited verbal information as part of their stakeholder dialogue while DB discloses 
and discusses findings from a client satisfaction survey for 2011–2013. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Taken together, the sustainability disclosure of both banks in the area of sustainable business 
activities is predominantly general and critical reflections are provided only with respect to 
some distinct issues. Therefore, it is difficult to assess from an outsider’s perspective to what 
extent third-party criticism is related to certain business decisions such as the temporary (and 
later revoked) ban of soft commodity speculation at DB in the year 2013 (see ibid.: 33). Similar 
to the sample banks’ disclosures, media news in the area of sustainable business activities is 
characterized by controversial, non-conclusive viewpoints. Some news articles highlight the 
advantages of commodity speculation, such as increased liquidity and decreased price volatility 
which might even reduce risks (see e.g. Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2013a). Other news articles 
criticize speculation on agricultural commodities for their potential to contribute to food 
shortages and price increases in third-world countries (see e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
2012). By the time of publication of CS’s and DB’s sustainability reporting, academics and 
financial regulators have not agreed on any common rules regarding those problematic business 
activities. Both banks therefore pronounce their achievements in unanimously sustainable 
business activities such as sustainable investments and micro-finance. In contrast, both CS and 
DB are less explicit about their sustainability objectives in those controversial business areas 
that are mainly discussed by the media. 
 
3.2.4 Sustainable Workforce and Infrastructure 
An overview of the banks’ disclosures in the employee-related sub-area of sustainable 
workforce and infrastructure is provided in Figure 4. Overall, the disclosures in each category 
are very similar between the two sample banks. With respect to the first disclosure category 
CS provides information on both voluntary and non-voluntary turnovers for 2012 and 2013 by 
region while DB provides information on voluntary turnover for 2011–2013. In both cases, 
definitions of the indicators are missing and there is no verbal discussion of the quantitative 
information. In addition, both banks provide rough quantitative information on employee 
commitment along with a brief discussion. However, for DB information is only provided for 
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the years 2011 and 2012. Quantitative information in the second disclosure category is very 
limited and only provided for the country of domicile. In both cases, there is no additional 
discussion of the quantitative information. With respect to the third disclosure category, the 
information provided by CS is in accordance with the GRI reporting guidelines, yet the 
disclosure covers only the current reporting year 2013 and thus a chronological comparison of 
the information is not possible. The information provided by DB on this indicator does not 
correspond to the GRI performance indicator. Both banks provide additional verbal 
information as well as statements on training. However, a discussion, which is clearly related 
to the disclosed quantitative information, is only present for the fourth disclosure category, 
gender equality. Both banks report the information on LA13 in accordance with the GRI 
guidelines, yet none of them report quantitative information on the ratio of remuneration of 
women to men (LA14).  
Results from the Factiva search reveal the controversial fact that there are no female members 
on DB’s Management Board in 2013 (see e.g. Die Zeit 2013). However, the sustainability 
disclosure of the bank itself does not address this critical issue. On the other hand, CS appears 
to respond to media criticism about cost savings programs which involve significant employee 
layoffs (see e.g. Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2013b). In particular, CS highlights its endeavor to 
minimize the impact of cost reduction measures on employees through internal transfers (see 
CS 2013: 47). However, the bank does not disclose the reasons why the involuntary turnover 
rates still remain relatively high (see ibid.: 44). 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
With respect to disclosure in the ecological sub-area, both banks provide comprehensive and 
detailed quantitative information for a reporting period of three years (2011–2013) in each 
disclosure category. The quantitative information is in accordance with the GRI performance 
indicators and is presented both on an absolute as well as per employee basis which facilitates 
comparability across companies of different sizes. In both cases, the quantitative information 
is accompanied by additional verbal information with a strong focus on climate change and 
GHG emissions. Both banks are GHG-neutral, i.e., offset remaining GHG emissions through 
the purchase of emissions reduction certificates. While the environmental section of the DB 
sustainability report prominently starts with “neutralizing our carbon footprint” (DB 2013: 82), 
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CS presents this information only on the second page of the environmental section of the report 
and not in the headline (see CS 2013: 51).  
The results from media search reflect the low materiality of the direct ecological impact. The 
results list contains not one single news post related to the ecological disclosure categories 
energy, water, greenhouse gas emissions and waste. This finding stands in contrast to the 
detailed reporting of both banks on ecological aspects of their infrastructure. Third-party 
criticism on environmental issues exclusively relates to banks’ indirect impact through 
investments and financing of ecologically questionable projects and business sectors which 
belong to the area of “sustainable business activities”. For instance, DB has been criticized for 
funding South-East Asian rubber planting corporations which do not consider any ecological 
aspects in their production lines and are therefore responsible for environmental disasters (see 
e.g. Der Spiegel 2013). Indirect impact on the environment through the banks’ core business 
activities is mentioned only briefly by CS (see ibid.: 50) and not at all by DB. Similar to their 
reporting strategy in the area of sustainable business activities, both CS and DB pronounce 
their commitments to voluntary initiatives such as the “Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO)” (see ibid.: 57) or achievements in sustainability rankings like the “Climate 
Performance Leadership Index” (see DB 2013: 82) while failed controls in their ecological 
supply chain are not disclosed at all. 
 
3.3 Discussion of Major Findings 
Our findings on the banks’ reporting in the first area of financial and economic system stability 
are ambiguous. Despite the high materiality of this area for sustainability reporting we find 
only limited disclosure of both quantitative and qualitative information. Overall, neither CS 
nor DB report comprehensively in this most material area of sustainability which indicates the 
existence of greenwashing. Instead, both banks highlight their endeavors for “compliance” or 
“cooperation towards regulatory reforms” as material objectives. This result becomes even 
more apparent when linking third-party criticism to the reporting of both banks. While the news 
search reveals the involvement of both banks in major corporate scandals, such as the 
manipulation of benchmark interest rates in the case of DB and interest rate derivative collusion 
and tax evasion in the case of CS, the banks’ own reporting on these scandals is very brief and 
remains rather boilerplate.  
It is important to interpret these findings against the regulatory background of mandatory as 
well as voluntary disclosure guidelines. The GRI sustainability guidelines along with its sector 
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supplements for financial service companies offer very limited assistance with respect to the 
integration of financial and economic system stability into banks’ sustainability reporting. The 
mandatory disclosures in this area which are required by bank regulators as well as 
international accounting standards for banks’ financial reports are not compulsory for 
sustainability reporting and explicitly focus on the information needs of financial investors. 
Due to this lack of disclosure guidelines targeted at sustainability reporting, the two sample 
banks choose very different reporting approaches in the area of financial and economic system 
stability. The CS sustainability disclosure in this area is focused on the compliance with 
mandatory rules, while the DB sustainability report predominantly concentrates on internal 
procedures to enhance systemic stability. As a result of missing homogeneous quantitative 
measures, a comparison of the two banks along the pre-set disclosure categories is difficult. In 
addition, both reports demonstrate the importance of verbal information with respect to a 
bank’s reporting on financial and economic system stability due to the high complexity of the 
disclosed information. CS highlights its early adopter’s role of newly proposed regulation 
without explaining its own business misconduct which may have contributed to this new rule 
set. The reporting of DB, on the other hand, pronounces its focus on putting “the client” at the 
center of its business model without providing a clear definition of who this client actually is 
and whether this client would potentially have the market power to actively affect the bank’s 
business model. Both banks mainly concentrate their sustainability reporting on non-financial 
risk factors, such as measures to mitigate reputational risk, while completely leaving out more 
complex information on material market risk issues which arise from the banks’ involvement 
with global investment banking activities. Taken together, these findings do not suggest an 
adequate disclosure in the highly material area of sustainability as none of the banks provide a 
true and full picture of its sustainability performance. 
Similarly, our findings point toward the existence of greenwashing activities by both banks 
with respect to sustainable business activities. Although this disclosure area covers the banks’ 
core business, disclosure with respect to sustainable business activities is predominantly 
qualitative in nature, while quantitative reporting on key performance indicators is limited. This 
discrepancy partly reflects greenwashing activities, but also limited guidance by the GRI 
sustainability reporting sector supplements. Even if there is quantitative information, 
information is often presented for a single reporting year only, thereby hampering an 
assessment of the progress. Moreover, definitions on the reported figures are often imprecise 
or missing, which hinders comparisons across companies. While both banks explicitly address 
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and discuss some distinct critical issues, mainly litigation cases, the results from our news 
search reveal further criticism the banks remain silent about.  
We find the most detailed and comprehensive information in the area of sustainable workforce 
and infrastructure which is remarkable considering the relatively low materiality of this 
disclosure area. This low materiality is also consistent with the results from our news search 
that reveal only a limited number of articles on employee-related issues and no articles at all 
on ecological issues. Overall, the banks’ ecological disclosures comprise quantitative 
information in line with the GRI performance indicators while disclosures with respect to the 
workforce are limited and do not fulfill the scope recommended by the GRI performance 
indicators. Given the higher materiality impact of employee-related information, this result is 
at odds with the materiality assessment of the two sub-areas. Although we concentrate on core 
GRI performance indicators in each sub-area, quantitative information in the employee sub-
area is limited in scope, imprecise or missing which hampers the comparability of the disclosed 
information. Moreover, explanations and discussions on the quantitative information are 
limited and third-party criticism is only partly addressed by the banks. Taken together, these 
discrepancies between actual reporting and disclosure requirements in the employee sub-area 
point toward some greenwashing activities by our sample banks. 
 
4. Conclusions  
This paper presented the results of an in-depth analysis of the sustainability disclosure of two 
global systemically important banks. By this, we were able to detect potential greenwashing, 
i.e., a company’s selective disclosure on sustainability issues without full reporting of material 
sustainability issues to overstate its true sustainability performance. Drawing on a framework 
for the assessment of sustainability disclosure along materiality criteria in the banking industry, 
we distinguished three major disclosure areas: financial and economic system stability, 
sustainable business activities, and sustainable workforce and infrastructure. Based on the 
externality potential on society, the group of stakeholders involved and the multiplication 
function of banks we concluded that the materiality of sustainability disclosure is highest in the 
financial and economic system stability area, moderate in the area of sustainable business 
activities and low in the area of sustainable workforce and infrastructure. For each disclosure 
area we assessed the banks’ sustainability disclosure along four disclosure categories by taking 
into account mandatory and voluntary disclosure guidelines. Each disclosure category thereby 
comprised both quantitative and qualitative (verbal) information. While quantitative 
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information is particularly necessary for an objective and comparable assessment of a bank’s 
sustainability activities in each area, we argued that the necessity of related qualitative 
information, i.e., explanation and discussion of the quantitative information, increases with the 
materiality of each area and thus with the complexity of the disclosed information. Hence, the 
complexity of information is highest with respect to the financial and economic system stability 
since it requires a deeper understanding of the banks’ interconnectedness with the macro-
economy, moderate with respect to sustainable business activities and lowest with respect to 
sustainable workforce and infrastructure. In addition, we conducted a structured news search 
to capture third-party criticism on the two sample banks in the reporting year 2013. The 
distribution of articles among the three areas of our framework is consistent with the materiality 
assessment of each area. Based on the results from this news search we exemplarily identified 
third-party criticism in each area of sustainability and investigated the sustainability disclosure 
with respect to these critical issues. 
We found evidence for greenwashing in each disclosure area which also has to be interpreted 
against the background of existing mandatory and voluntary disclosure guidelines. Despite the 
high materiality of the first disclosure area, none of the reports contain a comprehensive 
reporting on financial and economic system stability. Moreover, both banks only briefly 
comment on their role in major corporate scandals, such as the manipulation of benchmark 
interest rates in case of DB and client tax evasion help in case of CS. This discrepancy between 
disclosure and materiality indicates greenwashing, but it also reflects the current state of 
voluntary sustainability reporting guidelines. In particular, we found that the GRI sustainability 
reporting guidelines offer no guidance on the integration of financial and economic system 
stability into banks’ sustainability reporting. In addition, our analysis indicates that mandatory 
disclosure rules under banking regulation and financial reporting regulation may not be helpful 
for determining the content of sustainability reporting since they do not address all groups of 
stakeholders. Our analysis also revealed that reporting of quantitative information in the second 
disclosure area is very limited, yet mainly accompanied by further discussions and 
explanations. Banks respond more openly toward third-party criticism, yet the disclosure is 
rather general in nature. We interpreted this finding as a further indication for greenwashing 
by our sample banks, but also accounted for the absence of a broad set of GRI performance 
indicators on banks’ sustainable business activities. Only with respect to the third disclosure 
area, sustainable workforce and infrastructure, we found detailed and comprehensive 
information which is in contrast to the low materiality of this disclosure area. Hence, this 
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disclosure style which overstates an immaterial disclosure area points toward greenwashing 
but also reflects the banks’ adherence to the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines. Overall, 
our findings highlight the fact that these voluntary guidelines do not account for the 
sustainability disclosure specificities needed for the banking industry, despite the existence of 
sector-specific reporting adjustments. Our critical evaluation of banks’ disclosure in this area 
is also supported by the banks’ limited responsiveness with respect to third-party criticism, 
such as turnover or gender equality issues. 
From a regulatory perspective, our findings therefore suggest that the integration of financial 
and sustainability reporting as recommended by the International Integrated Reporting Council 
may especially help mitigate greenwashing endeavors of banks and foster banks’ transparent 
self-reflection on financial stability and sustainability. Besides this integrated reporting form, 
a focus on material sector-specific sustainability topics as targeted by the new G4 sustainability 
reporting guidelines may avoid boilerplate disclosure statements. By aligning sustainability 
ratings and indices with these material sustainability guidelines, it may become easier to screen 
companies which highlight material areas in their sustainability disclosure and thereby go 
beyond pure compliance with mandatory and voluntary reporting rules.  
While an in-depth assessment of banks’ sustainability disclosure is particularly appropriate for 
studying the existence and nature of greenwashing, some caveats apply to this case study 
approach. Our findings may be limited to service companies with generally lower material 
impact with respect to employees- and ecology-related issues. Moreover, our framework for 
the assessment of sustainability disclosure in the banking industry is particularly useful for 
global systemically important banks. We have shown that the sustainability reporting 
guidelines are especially detailed in subject areas with low materiality for these type of banks. 
Further studies may utilize the framework of our study and investigate the research question 
for a larger sample or time period. Moreover, a comparison between the sustainability 
disclosure in the banking sector and other financial service providers across different countries 
might enable researchers to explicitly assess the costs and benefits of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure guidelines on the quality of sustainability disclosure. The efficiency of voluntary, 
industry-specific sustainability networks with regards to a high-quality sustainability 
disclosure as well as enforcement capability in cases of business misconducts may thereby 
provide an interesting venue for further research. Generally, a better understanding of the 
drivers behind sustainability reporting of financial service companies is needed to be able to 
assess the applicability of voluntary disclosure theory and legitimacy theory for this business 
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sector. This, ultimately, enables an efficient combat of greenwashing activities and 
implementation of a true and full reporting on companies’ sustainability performance. 
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Figure 1: Framework for the assessment of sustainability disclosure along  
  materiality criteria in the banking industry  
 
 
Financial and  
Economic 
System 
Stability 
Sustainable 
Business 
Activities 
Sustainable 
Workforce and 
Infrastructure 
Materiality 
high materiality: 
 high externality 
potential on society 
 
 all groups of 
stakeholders are 
concerned 
 multiplication 
function 
moderate materiality: 
 moderate 
externality potential 
on society 
 many groups of 
stakeholders are 
concerned  
 multiplication 
function 
low materiality: 
 low externality 
potential on society 
 
 few groups of 
stakeholders are 
concerned  
 limited 
multiplication 
function 
Disclosure 
categories 
high complexity: 
 early adherence to 
rules  
 long-term focus  
 broad stakeholder 
focus  
 assessment of 
systemic risk  
moderate complexity: 
 sustainable 
investment 
 micro-finance 
 problematic sectors 
and business 
activities  
 product 
responsibility and 
customer 
satisfaction 
low complexity: 
employees: 
 turnover and 
satisfaction 
 health and safety 
 training 
 gender equality 
ecological: 
 energy 
 water 
 greenhouse gas 
emissions 
 waste 
Disclosure 
guidelines 
mandatory (for 
financial report): 
 Basel accords 
 Accounting rules 
voluntary: 
 GRI sustainability 
reporting guidelines 
voluntary: 
 GRI sustainability 
reporting guidelines  
 GRI Financial 
Services Sector 
Supplements 
 Equator Principles 
voluntary: 
 GRI sustainability 
reporting guidelines 
 United Nations 
Global Compact  
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Figure 2: Overview of disclosures in the area of financial and economic system 
stability by disclosure category and sample bank  
 
 CS DB 
Early  
adherence 
to rules  
 quantitative information on early 
compliance with capital 
requirements under new Basel III 
framework and Swiss regulations 
for 2013 
 limited discussion of measures 
taken to adapt business model 
besides adherence to regulatory 
requirements 
 definitions according to Basel 
Accord 
 general verbal information on 
adoption of new (self-)regulation 
 very limited verbal information on 
litigation cases due to former non-
compliance 
 no quantitative information on 
early compliance with capital 
requirements under new Basel III 
framework 
 
 some discussion of measures 
taken to adapt business model 
(e.g. examples of embedding 
values and beliefs) 
 definitions according to internal 
Code of Conduct 
 some verbal information on 
adoption of voluntary risk 
controls 
 very limited verbal information on 
litigation cases due to former non-
compliance 
Long-term 
focus 
 some quantitative information on 
strategic actions to reduce costs 
and potential damages due to 
systemic risk 
 no quantitative information on 
strategic actions to use systemic 
stability for positive value creation 
 verbal information on alignment 
of business model to changing 
regulatory environment 
 very limited verbal information on 
strategic growth opportunities 
 no quantitative information on 
strategic actions to reduce costs 
and potential damages due to 
systemic risk 
 some discussion of new key 
performance indicators for 
measuring long-term performance 
for clients 
 verbal information on alignment 
of business model to new long-
term strategy 
 limited verbal information on 
strategic growth opportunities 
Broad 
stakeholder 
focus 
 general verbal information on 
main business focus of credit 
supply to clients 
 brief discussion of engagement in 
stakeholder dialogue 
 detailed information on negative 
consequences of tight regulation 
 very limited verbal information on 
active business alignment for 
broad stakeholder benefit 
 detailed verbal information and 
explanation of client-centric 
business focus 
 brief discussion of engagement in 
stakeholder dialogue 
 very limited information on non-
financial factors for value creation 
 detailed examples on product 
assessment process and customer 
protection 
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Assessment 
of systemic 
risk 
 
 detailed verbal information of risk 
management in compliance with 
mandatory regulation 
 discussion of monitoring of credit 
risk exposure 
 brief verbal information on 
employee risk management 
training and assessment 
 no explanation of control 
measures to manage market risk 
 quantitative information on 
employee risk and compliance 
training 
 no discussion of monitoring of 
credit risk exposure 
 detailed verbal information on 
employee risk management 
training and assessment 
 no explanation of control 
measures to manage market risk 
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Figure 3: Overview of disclosures in the area of sustainable business activities by 
disclosure category and sample bank 
 CS DB 
Sustainable  
investment 
(FS7, FS8, 
FS11)* 
 quantitative information on 
volume of “assets under 
management with high social and 
environmental benefits” for 2012 
and 2013 
 rough definition is provided 
 no discussion of quantitative 
information 
 additional verbal information 
 quantitative information on “ESG 
assets under management” by 
active management, passive and 
alternative investments for 2011–
2013 
 quantitative information on 
proportion of “ESG assets under 
management” relative to total 
assets under management for 
2013 
 rough definition is provided 
 discussion of quantitative 
information  
 additional verbal information 
Micro-
finance 
(FS13)* 
 quantitative information on 
volume of “assets under 
management in the area of 
microfinance” for 2013 
• quantitative information on “local 
employees trained”, “people with 
access to improved financial 
services” and “electronic 
transactions completed” for 2013 
 definitions and estimations not 
provided  
 brief discussion of quantitative 
information 
 additional verbal information 
 quantitative information on 
“estimated cumulative financing 
to micro-borrowers since 1997” 
for 2011–2013 
 quantitative information on 
“estimated cumulative number of 
microloans financed since 1997” 
for 2011–2013 
 quantitative information on 
volume of “assets under 
management in the area of 
microfinance” for 2013 
 definitions and estimations not 
provided 
 brief discussion of quantitative 
information 
 additional verbal information 
Problematic 
sectors and 
business 
activities 
(FS1, FS2, 
FS3, FS9)* 
 quantitative information on 
number and volume of project 
finance transactions to be 
reported according to the Equator 
Principles (by risk category, 
sector, region etc.) for 2012 and 
2013  
 definitions according to the 
Equator Principles 
 brief discussion of problematic 
sectors and business activities 
 detailed information on sector 
policies and guidelines provided 
on webpage 
 quantitative information on 
“transactions escalated due to 
reputational risks” for 2011–2013  
 quantitative information on 
“transactions assessed within ES 
Risk Framework” for 2011–2013 
 definitions are partly provided 
 discussion of selected problematic 
sectors  
 key positions on problematic 
sectors and business activities 
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Product 
responsibility 
(PR3, PR4, 
FS15)* and 
customer 
satisfaction 
(PR5)* 
 
 general verbal information on 
product responsibility 
 very limited verbal information on 
customer satisfaction 
 general verbal information on 
product responsibility  
 quantitative information on 
“client loyalty index” for 2011–
2013 
 rough definition provided 
 discussion of quantitative 
information 
 additional verbal information 
* GRI sustainability reporting guidelines performance indicators in parentheses (see GRI 2011a; 2011b). 
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Figure 4: Overview of disclosures in the sub-area of employees by disclosure 
category and sample bank 
 CS DB 
Turnover 
(LA2)* 
and  
satisfaction  
 quantitative information on 
voluntary and non-voluntary turn-
over rates for 2012 and 2013 by 
region 
 definition not provided 
 no discussion of quantitative 
information 
 quantitative information on 
employee commitment for 2013 
only; brief general discussion 
 quantitative information on 
voluntary turnover rates for 2011–
2013 
 
 definition not provided 
 no discussion of quantitative 
information 
 quantitative information on 
employee commitment for 2011 
and 2012 only; brief general 
discussion 
Health and 
safety (LA7)* 
 quantitative information on 
absenteeism for 2011–2013, only 
provided on webpage, only for 
Switzerland 
 no discussion of quantitative 
information 
 quantitative information on lost 
working days for 2011–2013, only 
provided for Germany 
 
 no discussion of quantitative 
information 
Training 
(LA10)* 
 quantitative information on 
average hours of training per year 
per employee for 2013 by 
employee category 
 discussion of quantitative 
information  
 additional verbal information on 
training 
 quantitative information on total 
training expenses for 2011–2013 
 
 
 no discussion of quantitative 
information 
 brief verbal statements on training 
Gender  
equality  
(LA13, 
LA14)* 
 quantitative information on 
proportion of female employees 
by category for 2013 
 discussion of quantitative 
information 
 additional verbal information 
 no quantitative information on 
LA14 (ratio of remuneration of 
women to men) is provided 
 quantitative information on 
proportion of female employees 
by category for 2011–2013 
 discussion of quantitative 
information 
 additional verbal information 
 no quantitative information on 
LA14 (ratio of remuneration of 
women to men) is provided 
* GRI sustainability reporting guidelines performance indicators in parentheses (see GRI 2011a). 
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APPENDIX: News Reports 
 
 CS DB 
Financial / economic system 
stability  
 
89 news (55%) 
 
131 news (43%) 
Sustainable business activities 
 
24 news (15%) 
 
61 news (20%) 
Sustainable workforce and  
infrastructure 
 
7 news (4%) 
 
2 news (1%) 
General financial information 
and company strategy 
 
42 news (26%) 
 
68 news (22%) 
Kirch scandal 
 
0 news (0%) 
 
43 news (14%) 
Subtotal 
 
162 news  
 
305 news  
 
Table 1: Overview of news related to sustainability assessment by disclosure category 
and sample bank (source: Factiva) 
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 CS DB 
Personnel matters   
 
10 news (4%) 
 
55 news (13%) 
Relationships with other 
companies 
 
52 news (19%) 
 
42 news (10%) 
Real Estate issues 
 
7 news (3%) 
 
0 news (0%) 
Other non-sustainability related 
news 
 
37 news (14%) 
 
15 news (4%) 
Subtotal 
 
106 news  
 
112 news  
Total 
 
268 news 
 
417 news 
 
Table 2: Overview of other news unrelated to sustainability assessment by disclosure 
category and sample bank (source: Factiva) 
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CS: 
Financial/ 
economic 
system 
stability 
News Title News Source 
Anti-
competitive 
behavior 
• Neue Schadenersatzklagen gegen CS und 
UBS wegen Liborskandal 
 
• Die Amerikaner wollen noch mehr Geld 
von den Grossbanken 
• Schweizer Banken halten sich bedeckt 
 
• Nach dem Libor bahnt sich ein neuer 
Skandal um manipulierte Zinsen an 
• Wie «fest» ist der Zins einer Festhypothek? 
 
• Der Gebührentrick 
• Wirtschaft 
• TA, 2 
November 2013 
 
• TA, 2 
November 2013 
• TA, 8 August 
2013 
• TA, 8 August 
2013 
• TA, 5 August 
2013 
• TA, 18 Juli 2013 
• NZZ am 
Sonntag, 13 
Januar 2013 
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Systemic risk 
contribution   
• New Jersey verklagt Credit Suisse wegen 
Hypothekargeschäften 
• Immobilienexperten erwarten höheren 
Kapitalpuffer für BankenTitel (max. 2-
zeilig) 
• Europas Banken setzen auf Coco-
Bonds; Zur Stärkung des Eigenkapitals 
placieren Banken immer mehr 
Pflichtwandelanleihen 
• Bonds als Sorgenkinder der 
Pensionskassen; Die Chancen und 
Risiken neuer Anlageklassen – Höhere 
Kosten drohen 
• Wie sich UBS und Credit Suisse für die 
Zukunft rüsten; Die Grossbanken 
stellen sich neu auf. Sie dürften dabei 
Kapital einsparen. 
• Wirtschaft 
 
• CS konkretisiert den Notfallplan ; 
Regulatorisch induzierte 
Verselbständigung des Schweizer 
Geschäfts 
• «Eine ‹neue› Credit Suisse ist erpressbar 
wie jede andere Bank» 
• Neue Struktur CS teilt Konzern auf 
 
• Die Bank soll effizienter werden 
 
• CS rüstet sich für den Ernstfall; 
Schweizer Geschäft wird ausgelagert 
• Späte Einsicht der Grossbanken; Die 
neuen Regeln für Grossbanken führen 
zu einer Renationalisierung des 
Geschäfts. Im Fall des Bankwesens... 
• Auch die Credit Suisse prüft eine 
Abspaltung 
 
• Mehr Sicherheit für die Bankkunden; 
Die Systemrelevanz der Zürcher 
Kantonalbank wird von den politischen 
Parteien durchwegs positiv beurteilt 
• Wachsende Zweifel an der 
Krisenfestigkeit der grossen Schweizer 
Banken; Ausweitung des Blickfelds auf 
stark im Hypothekargeschäft 
engagierte... 
• Weiterer Verkauf der Credit Suisse 
  
• UBS und Credit Suisse mit starken 
Kursverlusten; Ängste um eine weitere 
Verschärfung der Kapitalanforderungen 
• UBS und CS mit herben Verlusten 
 
• Notfall-Pläne der CS und UBS  
 
• NZZ, 19 
Dezember 2013 
• TA, 10 Dezember 
2013 
 
• NZZ, 6 Dezember 
2013 
 
 
• NZZ, 28 
November 2013 
 
 
• NZZ am Sonntag, 
24 November 2013 
 
 
• NZZ am Sonntag, 
24 November 2013 
• NZZ, 23 
November 2013 
 
 
• TA, 22 November 
2013 
• TA, 22 November 
2013 
• TA, 22 November 
2013 
• NZZ, 22 
November 2013 
• NZZ, 22 
November 2013 
 
 
• TA, 21 November 
2013 
 
• NZZ, 12 
November 2013 
 
 
• NZZ, 9 November 
2013 
 
 
 
 
• NZZ, 8 November 
2013 
• NZZ, 5 November 
2013 
 
 
• NZZ, 5 November 
2013 
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• Die Finma gibt allen Beteiligten Rätsel 
auf 
• Finma will Transparenz und 
Verhaltensregeln; Schweizer 
Vermögensverwalter kämpfen mit Flut 
an drohenden neuen Vorschriften 
• Paukenschlag für UBS ; Verfügung der 
Finma überrascht den Markt 
• Ein enttäuschendes Ergebnis und zwei 
Bad Banks 
• In der Regulierungswelle 
 
• Die Credit Suisse verabschiedet sich von 
der globalen Bank 
• Die Aufspaltung der Grossbanken ist 
schon fast wieder vom Tisch 
• Zu hartes deutsches Pflaster; Credit 
Suisse prüft Teilverkauf des Private 
Banking 
• Die Tür für eine staatliche 
Bankenrettung bleibt offen 
• Credit Suisse placiert Coco-Bond 
 
• Rasch weg mit den Altlasten; Die 
Grossbanken sind gezwungen, die 
Vergangenheit möglichst schnell zu 
bereinigen 
• Europas Banken als Sorgenkinder; UBS 
und CS stehen gut da 
• Anpassung an das neue Umfeld; Die 
Credit Suisse versucht, die 
Geschäftsrisiken zu reduzieren 
• Europas Banken als Sorgenkinder; Im 
Vergleich mit vielen Wettbewerbern in 
der Euro-Zone stehen UBS und CS gut 
da 
• Bankaktien unter Verkaufsdruck; 
Rückstufung des Ratings der Credit 
Suisse – Höhere Kapitalanforderungen 
in den USA 
• Joachim Oechslin neuer Risiko-Chef 
der Credit Suisse; Know-how im 
Versicherungsgewerbe und alte Bande 
zur Bank 
• Die Grossbanken und des Kaisers neue 
Kleider; Die Credit Suisse und die UBS 
können sich nicht mehr hinter ihren 
vergleichsweise hohen... 
• Anstrengende neue Bankenwelt; UBS 
und Credit Suisse sind operativ gut ins 
neue Jahr gestartet. Der Umbau ihrer 
Geschäftsmodelle greift... 
• CS kauft Kredite belgischer Bad Bank 
• Warum die CS im Vorteil ist 
 
• Sonntagszeitung, 3 
November 2013 
• NZZ am Sonntag, 
3 November 2013 
• NZZ, 2 November 
2013 
 
 
• NZZ, 30 Oktober 
2013 
• TA, 25 Oktober 
2013 
• Die Weltwoche, 3 
Oktober 2013 
• TA, 24 September 
2013 
• NZZ, 20 
September 2013 
• NZZ, 17 
September 2013 
• Sonntagszeitung, 
15 September 2013 
• NZZ, 24 August 
2013 
• NZZ, 31 Juli 2013 
 
 
 
• NZZ, 26 Juli 2013 
 
• NZZ, 26 Juli 2013 
 
 
 
• NZZ, 26 Juli 2013 
 
 
 
• NZZ, 4 Juli 2013 
 
 
 
• NZZ, 2 Juli 2013 
 
 
 
• NZZ, 21 Juni 2013 
 
 
 
• NZZ, 2 Mai 2013 
 
 
 
• TA, 30 April 2013 
• NZZ, 29 April 2013 
• NZZ, 27 April 2013 
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• Warum die Credit Suisse im Vorteil ist; 
Vorangetriebene Anpassung an die 
neuen Rahmenbedingungen 
• Credit Suisse passt Bonus-Modell an; 
Berücksichtigung von «Basel III» 
• Credit Suisse auf Kurs; Komfortable 
Kapitalausstattung 
• Alles wird besser, nichts wird gut; Die 
UBS und die Credit Suisse tun sich 
schwer mit der Bewältigung der 
Finanzkrise. Die bisher erzielten 
Fortschritte sind eher bescheiden. Von 
Ermes Gallarotti 
• Schwer verdaulicher 
Eigenkapitalquoten-Salat; Vielfalt von 
Werten erschwert Vergleich der 
Schweizer Grossbanken Credit Suisse 
und UBS  
• Verkauf von Immobilien, Firmen, ETF-
Geschäft 
 
• NZZ, 1 März 2013 
 
• NZZ, 9 Februar 
2013 
• NZZ, 8 Februar 
2013 
 
 
 
• NZZ, 8 Februar 
2013 
 
 
 
• NZZ am Sonntag, 
13 Januar 2013 
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Legal & tax 
issues 
• Royal Park verklagt die Credit Suisse  
 
• Hypomarkt als Hauptsorge der 
Nationalbank 
• CS blitzt vor Bundesgericht ab 
 
• Bund ermittelt gegen Credit Suisse wegen 
Spionage 
• CS darf Namen nicht nennen 
 
 
• So sortiert Washington die Banken 
 
 
• SP fordert 1:15 für Post, SBB und 
Swisscom  
• Steuerstreit: Einigung verzögert sich weiter 
 
• Die Jagd auf Datendiebe 
 
• Erste Leaver-Listen wurden dem US-
Justizministerium übermittelt 
• Wie die US-Behörden die Banken 
kategorisieren 
 
• Erste Leaver-Liste ist verschickt; Bewegung 
im Steuerstreit: Die erste im Visier der US-
Justiz stehende Bank hat ihre Abschleicher-
Liste... 
• Improvisation total im US-Steuerstreit; Der 
Bundesrat hat den Banken erste 
Bewilligungen zur Lieferung von 
«Abschleicher»-Listen an die USA... 
• CS: Viel Arbeit mit den Abschleichern 
• Ein Lastwagen voller Daten 
• Nach hundert Jahren am Ende; Rufmord-
Kampagnen, Datenklau, Druckversuche: 
Das rigide Schweizer Bankgeheimnis ist 
schon seit dem Ersten... 
• CS-Kunden-Namen an die USA; 
Amerikanische Gruppenanfragen sind 
prinzipiell zulässig 
• Die guten Verbindungen der Credit Suisse 
in den Ständerat 
• Banken im Gegenwind ; Börsenagenda 
Schweiz von David Strohm 
 
• Auch CS hat Problem mit Frankreich 
 
• Credit Suisse Während über den 
automatischen Datenaustausch heftig 
diskutiert wi 
• Bankdaten werden längst getauscht 
• CS: Daten an USA geliefert 
 
• Neue Ermittlungen gegen die CS 
 
• NZZ, 28 Sep- 
tember 2013 
• TA, 21 Juni  
2013 
• TA, 11 Januar  
2013 
• TA, 10 Januar  
2013 
• TA, 19 Dezem- 
ber 2013 
 
• NZZ am  
Sonntag, 1 De- 
zember 2013 
• TA, 26 Novem- 
ber 2013 
• Sonntagszeitung 
6 Oktober 2013, 308 Wörter,  
• TA, 23 August  
2013 
• Sonntagszeitung 
11 August 2013 (Deutsch) 
• NZZ am Sonn- 
tag, 11 August  
2013 
• NZZ am  
Sonntag, 11  
August 2013 
 
• NZZ, 27 Juli  
2013 
 
 
• TA, 26 Juli 2013, 188 Wörter, (Deutsch) 
• TA, 26 Juli 2013, 633 Wörter, (Deutsch) 
• NZZ am Sonn- 
tag, 14 Juli 2013 
 
 
• NZZ, 6 Juli  
2013 
 
• TA, 19 Juni  
2013 
 
• NZZ am Sonn- 
tag, 16 Juni  
2013 
• TA, 10 Juni  
2013 
• TA, 5 Juni 2013 
 
 
• TA, 5 Juni 2013 
• Sonntagszeitung 
26 Mai 2013 
• TA, 17 April  
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• Der deutsche Druck auf Schweizer Banken 
hält an 
• Deutschland kauft erneut Bankdaten-CD; 
Razzien bei Kunden 
• Deutsche Behörden machen weiter Jagd 
auf Steuersünder; Razzien aufgrund einer 
neuen Bankdaten-CD aus der Schweiz 
• UBS taucht oft auf in Offshore-Leaks-
Datenbank 
• Mit prallen Geldkoffern nach Andorra – 
und zur Credit Suisse  
• Bankkunden in der Pflicht; Schweizer 
Banken wollen von deutschen Kunden 
einen Beweis der Steuerehrlichkeit 
• Hintergrund 
 
• Panama-Bezug CS-Chef Urs Rohner war 
früher im Steuerparadies 
• Die nächste Bank am Pranger 
 
• «Banker sollen keine Angst haben müssen» 
 
• CS blitzt vor US-Gericht ab 
 
• Steuersünder sollen sich selber anzeigen 
 
• CS liefert USA weitere Daten 
2013 
• TA, 17 April  
2013 
• NZZ, 17 April  
2013 
• NZZ, 17 April  
2013 
 
• Sonntagszeitung 
14 April 2013 
• TA, 10 April  
2013 
• NZZ, 10 April  
2013 
 
• NZZ am Sonn- 
tag, 7 April 2013, 19 Wörter, (Deutsch) 
• TA, 6 April  
2013 
• Sonntagszeitung 
10 März 2013 
• TA, 6 Februar  
2013 
• Sonntagszeitung 
27 Januar 2013 
• TA, 26 Januar  
2013 
• Sonntagszeitung 
13 Januar 2013 
 
 
 
Table 3: Overview of news concerning financial/ economic system stability of CS 
(source: Factiva) 
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DB: 
Financial/ 
economic 
system 
stability 
News Title News Source 
Anti-
competitive 
behavior 
• „Unverhältnismäßig“; Deutsche Bank muss 
entlassene Händler wieder einstellen 
• Zu Unrecht gekündigt 
 
 
• Rüge für Deutsche Bank in Libor-Affäre; 
Finanzaufsicht Bafin moniert mangelhafte 
Kontrolle 
• Rüge für Deutsche Bank ; Bafin-Bericht zur 
Libor-Manipulation 
• Finanzen Kompakt 
 
• Neuer Verdacht gegen deutsche Banken 
 
• Klage gegen Deutsche Bank  
• Bank der Baustellen // Von Libor bis 
Steueroasen: Die Deutsche Bank steht 
unter Dauerverdacht. Für juristische 
Risiken hat sie Milliarden zurückgestellt 
• Frohe Ostern für Libor-Betrüger; Eine 
Richterin in New York weist 
Schadensersatz-Klagen gegen die Deutsche 
Bank und andere Institute ab, die den 
Zinssatz manipuliert haben sollen 
• Gericht weist Klage gegen Banken ab 
 
• Riskante Zinswetten 
 
 
• Monte dei Paschi; Geldhaus verklagt 
Deutsche Bank 
 
• DEUTSCHE BANK - Schon wieder 
Zwietracht 
• SZ, 12 
September 2013 
• Berliner Zei-
tung, 12 
September 2013 
• SZ, 13 August 
2013 
 
• FR, 13 August 
2013 
• Die Welt, 13 
August 2013 
• SZ, 6 August 
2013 
• FR, 19 Juli 2013 
• Der 
Tagesspiegel, 6 
April 2013 
 
• SZ, 2 April 2013 
 
 
 
• Die Welt, 2 
April 2013 
• Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, 6 März 
2013 
• Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, 2 März 
2013 
• Der Spiegel, 25 
Februar 2013 
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Systemic risk 
contribution   
• Weg mit den Altlasten; Kurz vor 
Jahresende einigt sich die Deutsche Bank 
mit den US-Behörden im Streit um 
Hypotheken. Die Frankfurter zahlen 1,4 
Milliarden Euro.  
• Deutsche Bank muss in den USA zahlen // 
Vergleich um Rechtsstreit um dubiose 
Hypothekenkredite kostet 1,4 Milliarden 
Euro 
• Deutsche Bank einigt sich mit US-Behörde 
 
 
• Deutsche Bank schließt ihren teuersten 
Vergleich 
• Monte dei Paschi; Deutsche Bank legt 
Rechtsstreit bei 
 
• Finanzskandale; Deutsche Bank beruft 
Kontrolleur 
 
• Ein Mann räumt auf; Die Deutsche Bank 
installiert einen Risikobeauftragten 
 
• Menschen & Märkte 
 
• Die Macht der Mega-Banken 
 
• Deutsche Bank in Japan unter Verdacht 
 
 
• Noch mehr Ärger; Festnahme in Japan: Die 
Deutsche Bank kommt nicht zur Ruhe 
 
• Ein lohnender Abstieg; Deutsche Bank 
stellt inzwischen geringere Gefahr für die 
Weltwirtschaft dar 
• FINANZEN; Deutsche Bank stabiler 
 
 
• Späte Abrechnung 
 
• Bankenaufsicht; EU-Parlament stimmt zu 
 
 
 
• DEUTSCHE BANK 
 
 
• Anshu Jain verteidigt Groesse der 
Deutschen Bank // "Die Krise ist noch 
nicht überwunden" 
• Sparkassen attackieren die Deutsche Bank 
 
• FINANZEN; Deutsche Bank lässt warten 
 
 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 21 
Dezember 2013 
 
 
• Der 
Tagesspiegel, 21 
Dezember 2013 
 
• Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, 21 
Dezember 2013 
• Die Welt, 21 
Dezember 2013 
• Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, 20 
Dezember 2013 
• Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, 10 
Dezember 2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 10 
Dezember 2013 
• Die Welt, 10 
Dezember 2013 
• Der Spiegel, 9 
Dezember 2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 6 
Dezember 2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 6 
Dezember 2013 
• Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 13 
November 2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 12 
November 2013 
• DIE ZEIT, 24 
Oktober 2013 
• Die Welt, 13 
September 2013 
• Der 
Tagesspiegel, 5 
September 2013  
• Der 
Tagesspiegel, 5 
September 2013 
• Die Welt, 5 
September 2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 22 
August 2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 23 Juli 
2013 
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• Deutsche Bank macht sich klein; Das 
Geldhaus will seine Bilanz um ein Fünftel 
kürzen – Hintergrund sind Vorgaben der 
Bankenaufseher.  
• Deutsche Bank reduziert ihre Bilanzsumme 
- Verschuldungsquote soll verbessert 
werden 
• Gegenwind für Banken; Ratingagenturen 
sehen das Investmentbanking kritisch 
 
• Blackbox Deutsche Bank ; Wo sind sie – die 
Zeitbomben in den Bilanzen der 
Geldhäuser? Sind die Risiken nach der 
Krise wirklich verschwunden?  
• Banken sollen sich selbst retten; Bail-in-
Bonds gleichen Verluste aus, wenn 
Finanzinstitute in Not geraten  
• Deutsche Bank will keine starre 
Risikobremse 
 
• Regulierungspoker; Deutschland prescht 
vor: Ob es um das Trennbankensystem 
geht oder um die Abwicklung von 
Finanzinstituten  
• Deutsche Bank // Verrechnet 
 
 
• Der Zahlen-Trick // Die Deutsche Bank 
soll unter Josef Ackermann ihre Bücher 
frisiert haben. Jetzt prüft die Aufsicht den 
Fall 
• Bilanzaffäre brockt Deutscher Bank 
Sonderprüfung ein 
• Rechenprobe; Die Finanzaufsicht 
untersucht angebliche Milliardentricks der 
Deutschen Bank 
• Neuer Ärger für Deutsche Bank 
 
• Sonderprüfung in New York 
 
 
• Sonderprüfung in New York - Vorwurf der 
Verschleierung: Bundesbank schaut sich 
Bilanzen der Deutschen Bank genauer an 
• FINANZEN; Deutsche Bank droht Klage 
 
 
• Einigung auf Bankenaufsicht 
 
• FINANZEN; Deutsche Bank muss zahlen 
 
 
• Zoff in Übersee 
 
 
 
• Berliner 
Zeitung, 23 Juli 
2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 4 Juli 
2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 29 Juni 
2013 
 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 6 Juni 
2013 
• Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, 29 Mai 
2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 23 Mai 
2013 
 
• Der 
Tagesspiegel, 6 
April 2013 
• Der 
Tagesspiegel, 5 
April 2013 
 
• Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, 5 April 
2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 5 April 
2013  
• Die Welt, 5 
April 2013 
• Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 5 
April 2013 
• Berliner 
Zeitung, 5 April 
2013 
 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 30 
März 2013 
 
• Die Welt, 20 
März 2013 
• Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 15 
März 2013 
• Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 5 
März 2013 
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• Trennungsschmerz - Europas Politiker 
wollen große Kreditinstitute spalten. Die 
Banker jammern 
• Berliner 
Zeitung, 28 
Januar 2013 
Legal & tax 
issues 
• Wirtschaft Kompakt 
 
• Prinzlinge bei Deutscher Bank? Institut soll 
in China Kinder hoher Beamter eingestellt 
haben 
• Zu wenig Verantwortung für den Staat; Vor 
der Euro Finance Week wirft Attac der 
Deutschen Bank Steuervermeidung vor 
• FINANZEN; „Null Toleranz“ für 
Betrüger 
• Banken sortieren Steuerflüchtlinge aus 
 
• Banken gehen auf Distanz 
 
• Steueroasen; Die Steuersparer 
• Die Welt, 23  
Dezember 2013, 854 Wörter, (Deutsch) 
• SZ, 11 Dezem- 
ber 2013 
 
• FR, 18 Novem- 
ber 2013 
 
 
• SZ, 29 April  
2013 
• Die Welt, 29  
April 2013 
• Berliner Zeitung 
    29 April 2013 
• DIE ZEIT, 18  
April 2013 
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Legal & tax 
issues 
• Die Deutsche Bank zahlt gern // Jain und 
Fitschen begrüßen Vergleich mit der EU 
und betonen Integrität 
• FINANZEN; Dubai gegen Deutsche Bank 
• Weitere Klage gegen die Deutsche Bank 
 
• Wirtschaft Kompakt 
 
• 4,1 Milliarden gute Gründe 
 
• Teure Bank-Altlasten 
 
 
• Die Last der Vergangenheit; Deutsche 
Bank muss wegen juristischer Verfahren 
Milliarden zurücklegen 
• Prozessflut überrollt Deutsche Bank 
 
 
• Beste Unterhaltung; Deutsche Bank gerät 
ins Visier japanischer Aufsichtsbehörden 
• Vergangenheit belastet Deutsche Bank // 
Aufarbeitung von Skandalen und hohe 
Rückstellungen für Rechtsstreitigkeiten 
zehren den Gewinn auf 
• Prozesse belasten die Deutsche Bank 
 
 
• Deutsche Bank kämpft mit der 
Vergangenheit 
 
• Prozessrisiken kosten Rendite 
 
• Regelverstöße schwächen Deutsche Bank - 
Institut legt weitere 630 Millionen für 
Prozessrisiken zur Seite. Anleger schicken 
Aktie in den Keller 
• Rechtsstreit ohne Folge für Deutsche Bank 
- Geldhaus war falscher Adressat für 
Slumlord-Klage 
• Deutsche Bank und L. A. beenden Streit 
Institut haftet nicht für Zwangsräumungen 
 
• Deutsche Bank ; Streit über Slums in USA 
beigelegt 
• Wirtschaft Kompakt 
 
• Klage abgewiesen; Deutsche Bank kommt 
ungeschoren davon 
• Streit über Verslumung beendet; Deutsche 
Bank einigt sich 
• Finanzen Kompakt 
 
• FINANZEN; Deutsche Bank unter Druck 
• Deutsche Bank muss vor US-Gericht // 
Los Angeles will Institut wegen 
• Der Tagesspie- 
gel, 5 Dezem- 
ber 2013 
• SZ, 19 Novem- 
ber 2013 
• Die Welt, 19  
November 2013, 69 Wörter, (Deutsch) 
• Die Welt, 9  
November 2013, 710 Wörter, (Deutsch) 
• DIE ZEIT, 31  
Oktober 2013 
• Stuttgarter Zei- 
tung, 30 Okto- 
ber 2013 
• FR, 30 Oktober 
2013 
 
• Berliner Zeitung 
30 Oktober  
2013 
• SZ, 10 Septem- 
ber 2013 
• Der Tagesspie- 
gel, 31 Juli 2013 
 
 
 
• Stuttgarter Zei- 
tung, 31 Juli  
2013 
• Die Welt, 31  
Juli 2013 
• Die Welt, 31  
Juli 2013 
 
• Berliner Zeitung 
    31 Juli 2013 
 
• Berliner Zeitung 
1 Juli 2013 
 
• Der Tagesspie- 
gel, 1 Juli 2013 
• Stuttgarter Zei- 
tung, 1 Juli 2013, 171 Wörter, (Deutsch) 
• Die Welt, 1 Juli 
    2013 
• FR, 1 Juli 2013 
 
• FR, 20 Juni  
2013 
• Die Welt, 20  
Juni 2013 
• SZ, 5 Juni 2013 
• Der Tagesspie- 
gel, 26 April  
2013 
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Zwangsräumungen zur Verantwortung 
ziehen 
• Deutsche Bank vor Gericht; Los Angeles 
wirft Geldinstitut vor, zahllose Häuser 
verfallen zu lassen 
• Deutsche Bank vor Gericht 
 
• DEUTSCHE BANK - Ärger mit der 
Aufsicht 
• NACHRICHTEN 
 
• DEUTSCHE BANK - Teure Affären 
 
• Milliardengewinn ade; Deutsche Bank 
korrigiert Ergebnis wegen höherer Kosten 
für Rechtsstreitigkeiten 
• Klagen belasten Deutsche Bank 
 
 
• Klagen pulverisieren Deutsche-Bank -
Gewinn 
• Deutsche Bank muss mehr Geld 
zurücklegen 
• Wirtschaft Kompakt 
 
• DEUTSCHE BANK - Post aus Nigeria 
 
• Miserable Stimmung 
 
• FINANZEN; Deutscher Bank droht Strafe 
 
 
• SZ, 26 April  
2013 
• SZ, 26 April  
2013 
• Der Spiegel, 15  
April 2013 
• Berliner Zeitung 
15 April 2013 
• Der Spiegel, 25  
März 2013 
 
• SZ, 21 März  
2013 
 
• Stuttgarter Zei- 
tung, 21 März  
2013 
• Die Welt, 21  
März 2013 
• FR, 21 März  
2013 
• Die Welt, 2  
März 2013 
• Der Spiegel, 9  
Februar 2013 
• FR, 1 Februar  
2013 
• SZ, 14 Januar  
2013 
 
 
Table 4: Overview of news concerning financial/ economic system stability of DB 
(source: Factiva) 
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Voluntary Standards versus Mandatory Regulations – What Works Best for Corporate 
Sustainability Disclosure?  
 
KATRIN HUMMEL* DIANA FESTL-PELL** 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the effect of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations on the 
sustainability disclosure level of firms by exploiting the fact that mandatory sustainability 
disclosure regulations differ across European countries. We are particularly interested in how the 
interaction between mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations and the adherence of firms to 
voluntary standards affects the corporate sustainability disclosure of firms. Our research design 
includes panel regressions for a sample of large European firms over a reporting period of five 
years and a difference-in-differences analysis for British firms and matched sample firms before 
and after the introduction of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations in the UK. The results 
of regression analyses reveal a positive relationship between adherence to voluntary standards and 
sustainability disclosure as well as between mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations and 
sustainability disclosure. Furthermore, the interaction between adherence to voluntary standards 
and mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations is negatively associated with the sustainability 
disclosure levels of firms, thus indicating that the effect of mandatory disclosure regulations is less 
pronounced among firms that adhere to voluntary standards. We obtain similar results from the 
difference-in-differences analysis, but the substitutive effect of mandatory regulations in the 
treatment group relative to the control group is not significant. Taken together, although the 
findings suggest a positive effect of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations on the 
sustainability disclosure level of firms, this effect is reduced if firms voluntarily adhere to 
sustainability disclosure standards.   
Keywords: Sustainability Disclosure; Mandatory Regulations; Voluntary Standards; Interaction 
Effect 
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1. Introduction 
There is a strong tradition of voluntarism in the field of corporate sustainability disclosure. 
According to KPMG (2013, p. 22) approximately 70 percent of the 100 largest companies in each 
of the 41 countries studied provide information regarding their sustainability performance and 
thereby follow voluntary standards. In addition, since the beginning of the 21st century, an 
increasing number of countries have already introduced or are currently in the process of 
introducing mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations. However, the consequences of 
mandatory disclosure regulations with respect to sustainability disclosure are ambiguous for two 
major reasons. First, sustainability is a multi-dimensional construct (Elkington, 1997), with its 
material factors varying considerably across different industries and business models (Eccles, 
Krzus, Rogers, & Serafeim, 2012; Hummel & Festl-Pell, 2015). Hence, a uniform set of material 
disclosure items across all industries does not exist, which makes the design of explicit 
sustainability disclosure standards difficult. Second, little is known about the interplay between 
mandatory regulations and the adherence of firms to voluntary disclosure standards, although 
voluntary disclosure standards have a strong tradition in the field of corporate sustainability 
disclosure, and it is likely that the introduction of mandatory regulations affects the disclosure-
inducing role of these voluntary standards. This interaction effect could be positive, thereby 
reinforcing the impact of the adherence to voluntary standards on firm disclosure, or negative if 
the positive effect of voluntarism is crowded-out by the introduction of mandatory disclosure 
regulations. It is thus important to account for the interaction between voluntary adherence to 
standards and mandatory disclosure regulations when investigating the effect of mandatory 
disclosure regulations on the sustainability disclosure level of firms. 
 
This paper addresses this research question by investigating the effect of adherence to voluntary 
standards, mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations and the interaction between the two on 
the sustainability disclosure level of firms. We exploit the fact that there is substantial variation in 
the sustainability disclosure frameworks across European countries and concentrate on a sample 
of large European firms. For the measurement of the sustainability disclosure levels of firms, we 
rely on the Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) disclosure score provided by 
the Bloomberg database. The Bloomberg ESG disclosure score is a measure that is commonly 
used in sustainability research as a proxy for the sustainability disclosure level of firms (e.g. Eccles, 
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Serafeim, & Krzus, 2011; Iannou & Serafeim, 2014). Our study design is twofold. First, for a 
sample period of five years, we run panel regressions to investigate the impact of adherence to 
voluntary standards, mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations and the interaction between 
the two variables on firms’ sustainability disclosure. Second, we use a difference-in-difference 
design to investigate sustainability disclosure before and after the introduction of mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations in the UK for a sample of British firms and a matched control 
group. Findings from both analyses reveal a positive and significant impact of both adherence to 
voluntary standards and mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations on firms’ sustainability 
disclosure level. However, we find that combining voluntary standards with mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations negatively affects the level of sustainability disclosure, thus 
suggesting that these two sustainability frameworks act as substitutes in our setting. With respect 
to this interaction effect, the results of the difference-in-differences estimation reveal that 
introduction of mandatory regulations induced a crowding-out effect in both the treatment group 
and the control group, but this effect does not significantly differ between the two groups. Our 
findings are robust to a number of model variations and pass additional robustness tests. Moreover, 
additional country-by-country analyses in our robustness section enable us to draw conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness of mandatory sustainability reporting regimes in different countries 
and thus with respect to different types of regulations. Although these findings need to be 
interpreted cautiously, they could pave the way for more in-depth studies of the impact and 
effectiveness of different regulatory design features. 
 
The present study aims to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, this is the first large-
scale empirical study regarding the effect of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations in a 
European setting. Previous research in this area has mostly relied on hand-collected data that offer 
the opportunity to investigate firms’ disclosure behavior in more detail at the expense of small 
sample sizes and limited generalizability of the results (Hummel & Festl-Pell, 2015; Larrinaga, 
Carrasco, Correa, Llena, & Moneva, 2002). Second, in contrast to previous research, we are 
interested in not only the effect of mandatory regulations on firms’ sustainability disclosure level 
but also the effect of adherence to voluntary standards and the interaction between the two 
variables. While our study is most closely related to Ioannou and Serafeim (2014), we differ in 
that we analyze both voluntary standards and mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations as 
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well as investigate the interaction between the two. Our findings therefore emphasize the 
importance of both variables and their interaction for firms’ sustainability disclosure. In particular, 
the negative interaction effect that is revealed in our study substantiates the scarce previous 
findings in the literature (Bebbington, Kirk, & Larrinaga, 2012; Fallan & Fallan, 2009). Third, our 
paper may send a cautionary signal to policy makers and regulators in charge of sustainability 
governance. Our paper suggests that the disclosure-enhancing effects of voluntary standards may 
be crowded-out by mandatory regulations. Therefore, policy-makers need to be aware of this effect 
when discussing implementation of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical 
background of the paper and the related literature and develops the main hypotheses. In section 
three, the research design is explained. In particular, an overview of mandatory sustainability 
disclosure regulations in Europe is presented, and the empirical model and main variables of 
interest are introduced. Section four provides the descriptive statistics, the main findings from our 
panel regression analyses and a number of robustness checks. The final section concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. Theoretical Background, Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
As Fallan and Fallan (2009, p. 472) noted, there is no “universal notion of voluntarism.” In this 
paper, we draw on the participation in the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) and the 
adherence to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) sustainability reporting guidelines as proxies 
for firms’ adherence to voluntary sustainability disclosure standards. The literature regarding 
voluntary sustainability disclosure (for a recent literature review, see Fifka (2013)) mainly refers 
to legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and voluntary disclosure theory to explain firms’ 
voluntary reporting behavior. Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” This abstract concept of society is 
more precisely delineated by Freeman’s (1984) definition of stakeholders as “any group […] who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Wood, 1991). 
According to Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers (1995), legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are “two 
(overlapping) perspectives” on the same issue. Legitimacy can be understood as an operational 
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resource that is provided by stakeholders to a company, and companies attempt to actively 
influence their legitimacy through corporate sustainability disclosure (O’Donovan, 2002; Sethi, 
1978). Previous research has demonstrated that sustainability disclosure is positively associated 
with legitimacy-related variables, in particular firm size (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Chauvey, 
Giordano-Spring, & Patten, 2015; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011) and affiliation to industries that face 
high public scrutiny (Chauvey et al., 2015; Cho & Patten, 2007; Patten, 2002). Another explanation 
for why companies voluntarily disclose sustainability information is offered by voluntary 
disclosure theory. Subject to a number of conditions, especially truthful and costless disclosure 
and investors’ rational interpretations of firms’ disclosures, the equilibrium constitutes an 
“unraveling” of private information, i.e., full disclosure. However, if one or more of these 
conditions do not hold, less-than-full disclosure is likely to occur. In particular, if disclosure is not 
costless, the new equilibrium is described by the cost associated with the disclosure equaling the 
information’s effect on the price of the company (Verrecchia, 1983). If the costs from disclosing 
(potentially harmful) information differ between different firm types, the model offers an 
explanation for why firms with superior sustainability voluntarily disclose sustainability 
information. Taken together, these theories suggest that there are a number of incentives for firms 
to voluntarily disclose sustainability information. These incentives are reflected in a strong 
tradition of firms’ adherence to voluntary standards and initiatives. We therefore expect a positive 
relationship between firms’ adherence to voluntary standards and firms’ corporate sustainability 
disclosure, which is formally stated in H1. 
H1: There is a positive relationship between firms’ adherence to voluntary sustainability 
disclosure standards and firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure level. 
 
However, previous research has demonstrated that without legally binding regulations, some firms 
create an overly positive image of their sustainability performance through selective and biased 
sustainability disclosure (Cho, Guidry, Hageman, & Patten, 2012; Cho & Patten, 2007; Hummel 
& Schlick, 2015). As a consequence, an increasing number of countries have introduced 
mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations (KPMG, Centre for Corporate Governance in 
Africa, Global Reporting Initiative, & UNEP, 2013). Fallan and Fallan (2009, p. 475) argue that 
regulations can ensure a minimum disclosure level across all companies regardless of their size 
and industry affiliation. Similar reasons are considered by the regulator. For instance, the European 
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Union refers to enhancements in “the consistency and comparability of non-financial information” 
as the primary reason for mandatory disclosure regulations (No. 6 2014/95/EU). Likewise, the 
OECD (2010, p. 6) argues: “Stronger regulatory governance is the key to success.” Such a positive 
relationship between mandatory disclosure regulations and firms’ sustainability disclosure is 
documented in some previous empirical studies (Barbu, Dumontier, Feleagă, & Feleagă, 2014; 
Iannou & Serafeim, 2014; Patten, 2000). In addition, mandatory sustainability disclosure is 
regarded as an important step in the development towards a more sustainable economy. In this 
respect, the European Union states, “Indeed, disclosure of non-financial information is vital for 
managing change towards a sustainable global economy by combining long-term profitability with 
social justice and environmental protection.” (No. 3 2014/95/EU) The French government, which 
introduced sustainability reporting regulations in 2001, followed by more extensive regulations in 
2009 and 2010, even aims at creating competitive advantages for French companies on the global 
market as a result of sustainability reporting requirements (Delbard, 2008, p. 400). Taken together, 
advocates for mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations argue that such regulations 
positively impact firms’ sustainability disclosure. This reasoning is formally stated in hypothesis 
H2a. 
H2a: There is a positive relationship between mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations and 
firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure level. 
 
However, because mandatory regulations are associated with substantial direct and indirect costs, 
there is an ongoing debate regarding the necessity and economic consequences of mandatory 
disclosure regulations, in the areas of both financial disclosure (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008) and non-
financial disclosure (Fallan & Fallan, 2009). In the area of non-financial disclosure, a considerable 
number of empirical studies reveal no significant or even a negative relationship between 
mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations and firms’ sustainability disclosure (Bebbington 
et al., 2012; Chauvey et al., 2015; Fallan & Fallan, 2009; Larrinaga et al., 2002). Recently, 
Chauvey et al. (2015) examined the sustainability disclosure quantity and quality of 81 French 
firms for the reporting years 2004 and 2010, i.e., after the French sustainability disclosure 
regulations became effective. Although the authors observed increases in the space, breadth and 
informational quality of firms’ sustainability disclosure between 2004 and 2010, they conclude 
that these increases are “largely driven by legitimacy concerns” and that the French regulations 
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have not been able “to lead to a proliferation of high-quality CSR reporting packages by French 
corporations” (Chauvey et al., 2015, p. 13). Larrinaga et al. (2002) investigated the environmental 
disclosure of Spanish companies between 1997 and 1999. Despite the introduction of an 
environmental disclosure standard, approximately 80 percent of the examined companies do not 
comply with the standard. In a follow-up study, Bebbington et al. (2012) compared the 
environmental disclosure of Spanish and United Kingdom (UK) companies between 1997 and 
2001. The authors conclude that informal law (as in the UK) was more effective with respect to 
firms’ environmental disclosure than formal law (as in Spain). Moreover, Fallan and Fallan (2009), 
who investigated the disclosure behavior of Norwegian companies between 1987 and 2005, 
demonstrated that the introduction of mandatory disclosure standards led to a decrease in the 
overall environmental disclosure, which was driven by a decrease in voluntary disclosure that was 
not compensated by a corresponding increase in mandatory disclosure. Fallan and Fallan (2009, 
pp. 484-485) conclude, “The firms might discover that their voluntary reporting so far had been 
more extensive than the modest legal requirements as from 1989. Consequently, modest 
regulations might legitimate the companies to decrease voluntary environmental disclosure 
volume.” From a theoretical perspective, such a negative relationship arises from cost-benefit 
considerations if the mandatory disclosure level is associated with lower costs1 and firms do not 
expect to obtain extra benefits from additional disclosures that exceed the mandatory disclosure 
level. Because mandatory disclosure regulations lower the signaling potential of voluntary 
disclosure (Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, & LaGore, 2013; Sinclair-Desgagné & Gozlan, 2003), firms 
align their disclosure level with the mandatory disclosure requirements, which results in a decrease 
in the overall non-financial disclosure. This negative relationship is formally stated by the 
following hypothesis: 
H2b: There is a negative relationship between mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations 
and firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure level. 
 
In addition to the isolated effects of firms’ adherence to voluntary sustainability disclosure 
standards (H1) and mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations (H2a, H2b) on corporate 
sustainability disclosure, an interaction between the two variables is likely to exist. Such an 
                                                          
1
 The disclosure level of mandatory regulations is often rather modest because it is the result of compromises in 
majority-winning democracies. 
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interaction could affect firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure either positively or negatively. 
In the case of a positive effect, the introduction of mandatory regulations would reinforce the 
positive relationship between firms’ adherence to voluntary sustainability disclosure standards and 
corporate sustainability disclosure. Such a reinforcing effect could occur if firms interpret the 
introduction of mandatory regulations (regardless of its content) as evidence for a change toward 
a more sustainable economy. Firms increase their efforts in voluntary sustainability disclosure to 
avoid impending legitimacy gaps that arise from such a change in societal expectations 
(O’Donovan, 2002, p. 347). In addition, particularly superior sustainability reporters could 
enhance their sustainability disclosure after the introduction of mandatory disclosure regulations 
to protect the competitive advantages that result from their leading position. Moreover, the 
requirements defined in mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations are in general compatible 
with those of voluntary sustainability disclosure regulations, and some mandatory sustainability 
disclosure regulations even encourage the use of voluntary guidelines. Another reason for a 
reinforcement effect is revealed by Patten (2000). He argues that sustainability disclosure 
regulations come with increased public exposure and public pressure. He finds that firms increase 
not only environmental litigation disclosures but also non-litigation environmental disclosures. 
The reinforcing effect of the interaction between firms’ adherence to voluntary sustainability 
disclosure standards and mandatory regulations is summarized by the following hypothesis: 
H3a: There is a positive relationship between the interaction of firms’ adherence to voluntary 
sustainability disclosure standards and mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations and firms’ 
corporate sustainability disclosure level. 
 
However, there could also be a substitutive relationship of mandatory disclosure regulations and 
firms’ adherence to voluntary sustainability disclosure standards with respect to the effects of these 
determinants on firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure. In this case, the effect of mandatory 
disclosure regulations would be less pronounced among firms that voluntarily adhere to 
sustainability disclosure standards and more pronounced among firms that are voluntarily engaged 
to a lesser extent. The positive effect of adherence to voluntary standards on the sustainability 
disclosure level would thus be crowded-out by the introduction of mandatory disclosure 
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regulations.2 Without regulations, firms determine the level of voluntary disclosure based on 
voluntary standards, implicit norms and society’s expectations. These implicit norms become 
explicit through the introduction of mandatory disclosure regulations, and mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations act as a substitute for voluntary standards. The total effect of 
mandatory disclosure regulations consists of a direct and an indirect effect and could be negative, 
notwithstanding a positive direct effect of mandatory regulations on sustainability disclosure. 
Utilizing a case-based approach, Bebbington et al. (2012) demonstrated that voluntary reporting 
regimes can have a stronger impact on firms’ disclosure behavior than mandatory reporting 
regimes if voluntary reporting regimes are internalized as social norms. Fallan and Fallan (2009, 
p. 486) conclude that voluntarism is essential for improving the variety of environmental 
disclosure. The authors revealed a decrease in firms’ overall environmental disclosure after the 
introduction of mandatory disclosure regulations because of substantial decreases in voluntary 
disclosure. This finding indicates a negative effect of the interaction between voluntary standards 
and mandatory disclosure regulations on firms’ sustainability disclosure level. Such a crowding-
out effect has been documented in the literature in a variety of different settings (Deci et al., 1999; 
Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). We formally state this crowding-out 
effect by the following hypothesis: 
H3b: There is a negative relationship between the interaction of firms’ adherence to voluntary 
sustainability disclosure standards and mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations and firms’ 
corporate sustainability disclosure level. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Voluntary Sustainability Standards 
Companies that report regarding their environmental, social and governance achievements can 
conduct this reporting in accordance with voluntary sustainability standards. These standards differ 
in terms of their applicability to industries, countries and market specificities. We use participation 
in the UNGC and adherence to the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines as proxies for firms’ 
adherence to voluntary sustainability disclosure standards because both standards involve 
                                                          
2
 Such a crowding-out of voluntary behavior is described by the theory of prosocial behavior (Bénabou & Tirole, 
2006) and documented in a variety of different settings, such as child day-care (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000), 
external rewards (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999), and acceptance of a nuclear waste repository (Frey & Oberholzer-
Gee, 1997). 
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disclosure regarding sustainability-related issues, are applicable across different countries and 
industries and are well-established among large companies (KPMG, 2013). The UNGC is a United 
Nations initiative to encourage companies to integrate sustainability principles into their 
businesses and report about them. It was founded by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 
and is today “the world’s largest corporate sustainability initiative” (UNGC, 2015b). Participation 
in the UNGC requires disclosure regarding ten fundamental principles in the areas of human rights, 
labor, environment and anti-corruption. In contrast to the disclosure requirements of the UNGC, 
the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines are more precise, providing well-defined indicators for 
each aspect of firms’ sustainability performance. With respect to the reporting scope, the current 
GRI standard G4 distinguishes between only “core” and “comprehensive” reporting, whereas 
former versions use an “application level” system to indicate the “extent of application or coverage 
of the GRI Reporting Framework” (GRI, 2011, 2013). The GRI guidelines are the most 
comprehensive and widely accepted voluntary guidelines in the field of sustainability disclosure 
(KPMG, 2013). 
 
3.2 Mandatory Sustainability Disclosure Regulations in Europe 
Sustainability disclosure regulations in Europe began in 2001, when the European Commission 
published its recommendation “on the recognition, measurement and disclosure of environmental 
issues in the annual accounts” (2001/453/EC). In 2003, this non-binding recommendation was 
followed by the EU Modernization Directive, which stipulates that companies’ disclosure “to the 
extent necessary for an understanding of the company’s development, performance or position, 
[…] shall include both financial and, where appropriate, non-financial key performance indicators 
[…] including information relating to environmental and employee matters” (2003/51/EC 
amending Article 46 of Directive 78/660/EC). Because of the vague phrasing, no direct legal 
obligation for non-financial reporting arises from this directive. It was only in December 2014 that 
the European Union issued a directive that mandated the “disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information” for large companies from 2017 onwards (2014/95/EU). Thus, until 2017, mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations have been left to the national regulators in Europe, resulting 
in a variety of regulatory actions across European countries. 
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For the purpose of this study, national legislation has to meet the following requirements to qualify 
for mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations3: 
- the legislation is issued by the government of a country, 
- the legislation covers the reporting of sustainability information to the public, 
- the legislation is generally binding, 
- the legislation is applicable to listed companies, and 
- the legislation covers a broad understanding of sustainability, including both 
environmental and social issues. 
 
Following this understanding, legislation issued by stock exchanges, legislation that requires 
reporting on sustainability-related issues only to the government (such as in the Netherlands), 
legislation that entails only non-binding recommendations and guidelines (such as in Austria), 
legislation that is applicable to only state-owned companies (such as in Sweden and Finland) and 
legislation that addresses only environmental factors (such as in Spain) do not qualify as 
“mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations” in this study. Based on these requirements, we 
identify four European countries that had mandatory disclosure regulations in place in 2013 (the 
last reporting year of our sample): Denmark, France, Norway and the UK (Initiative for 
Responsible Investment, 2015; KPMG et al., 2013; van Wensen, Broer, Klein, & Knopf, 2011). 
Table 1 provides an overview of the mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations in these 
countries.  
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Denmark 
In October 2008, the Danish parliament adopted an amendment to the Danish Financial Statement 
Act (Arsregnskabsloven) that requires large companies to “supplement their management’s review 
                                                          
3 Because the literature does not provide such a list of criteria, these requirements are defined by the two authors 
for the purpose of this study. Albeit theoretically reasonable, the identification of countries with mandatory 
regulations that satisfies the list of criteria was not always clear-cut. We address this ambiguity in the robustness 
section of the paper. 
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with a report on social responsibility” (section 99a.(1) Danish Financial Statement Act). This 
report must contain information regarding “the policies of the business on social responsibility,” 
“how the business realizes its policies on social responsibilities” and an “assessment of the 
business on achievements” (section 99a.(2) Danish Financial Statement Act). Large companies are 
firms that satisfy at least two of the following three criteria: total assets of more than DKK 143 
million, net revenues of at least DKK 286 million and an average number of full-time employees 
of at least 250. The explanatory notes for the amendment explicitly refer to the GRI sustainability 
reporting guidelines and the UNGC as potential guidelines for firms’ sustainability disclosure. The 
amendment became effective for the financial year starting on January 1st, 2009 or later. Fines for 
non-compliant reporting can be imposed. 
 
France 
France has a very long tradition of sustainability disclosure regulations. In 2001, the New 
Economic Regulation (Les Nouvelles Régulations Économiques, NRE) was introduced. This 
legislation mandates disclosure regarding social and environmental issues in the annual reports of 
companies listed on French stock exchanges from 2003 onwards. In a subsequent 2002 decree, 32 
social, environmental and governance indicators were defined. The scope of the law is not clearly 
defined, and there are no sanctions for non-compliance (Delbard, 2008). To overcome some 
weaknesses of the NRE, in particular its flexibility, and extend the applicability to non-listed 
companies, the Grenelle I and Grenelle II Acts were developed and promulgated in 2009 and 2010, 
respectively. The new law was implemented in 2012 and become immediately applicable to all 
listed companies, and it became applicable to non-listed companies by 2013 or 2014, depending 
on firm size. Article 225 of the Grenelle II Act specifies 42 sustainability-related indicators about 
which companies must provide information in their annual reports. These indicators are generally 
consistent with the indicators required by voluntary reporting guidelines, although voluntary 
standards are not referenced. In addition, companies must disclose all sustainability-related 
actions, and comparability of the data with the previous year is recommended. Similar to the NRE, 
the Grenelle I and II Acts are “orientation laws” with no sanctions in the case of non-compliance.4 
 
                                                          
4
 However, because the Grenelle I and II Acts are part of the Commercial Code, shareholders may take legal actions 
in case of non-compliance. 
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Norway 
In July 1998, the Norwegian Parliament adopted the Norwegian Accounting Act, which requires 
all Norwegian-listed companies to provide information about their environmental and social 
“environment” within the Director’s report. In addition, the report must inform regarding measures 
to prevent or reduce negative impacts on the environment. The corresponding “Standard on 
Director’s Report” specifies the required information in more detail. In 2013, the Norwegian 
Parliament passed the “Act amending the Accounting Act and certain other Acts (Social 
Responsibility Reporting)”, which requires companies to disclose information on how they 
integrate social responsibility into their business strategies. Companies that already provide 
sustainability information based on the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines are exempt from 
this obligation. This amendment became effective for reporting years from 2013 onwards. 
 
UK  
In October 2013, “The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 
2013” came into force. This legislation requires all large- and medium-sized UK incorporated 
companies to provide a “Strategic Report” (replacing the formerly required business review) and 
additional sustainability-related information within the Directors’ Report. The specific 
requirements depend on the size and listing status of the companies. Within the strategic report, 
listed companies have to provide information about human rights and employee issues “to the 
extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the 
company’s business” (The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) 
Regulations 2013/ 414C (7) Contents of strategic report). Despite this conditional applicability, 
companies must explicitly note if they do not provide this information, which is similar to a 
“comply or explain” approach. Moreover, companies have to disclose their annual amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Additional guidance is provided by the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) regarding the Strategic Report and by the Department for Environment Food & Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) regarding the reporting of environmental impacts. The guidance by DEFRA 
includes reference to the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines. The regulations became effective 
“for periods ending on or after 30 September, 2013” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). 
According to the Act, directors of the applicable companies who do not comply with the reporting 
requirements of the strategic report become personally liable and may face corresponding fines 
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(The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013/ 414A (5)(6) 
Duty to prepare strategic report). 
 
Taken together, the regulations in all four countries require disclosure not of a comprehensive 
sustainability report but rather sustainability-related information within the annual report. Except 
for France, the regulations are rather broad and do not require disclosure of concrete sustainability-
related indicators. Even the French regulations define only the disclosure indicators but leave the 
companies leeway in choosing the presentation format and level of detail regarding these 
indicators. Although the regulations in France and the UK contain references to the GRI 
sustainability reporting guidelines, such references are not included in the French regulations and 
are included in only the amendment to the Norwegian regulations. Enforcement of the regulations 
appears to be weak in all countries, particularly in France, where the regulations have the character 
of an “orientation law,” and the UK, where the disclosure is conditional on the materiality of the 
sustainability information for each company. 
 
3.3 Empirical Model and Variables 
Our research design includes panel regressions and a difference-in-differences analysis of the 
introduction of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations in the UK. We use the following 
panel regression model to test our hypotheses regarding whether firms’ voluntarism, mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations and the interaction between the two are related to firms’ 
sustainability disclosure level: 
 
A graphical depiction of our model of corporate sustainability disclosure is provided in Figure 1: 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
In the above equation, subscript j denotes the bank and t denotes the year. Our proxy for firms’ 
sustainability disclosure level is based on the ESG disclosure score provided by the Bloomberg 
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database, which “is by a large margin the most widely used data provider for stock market, 
financial and other corporate data.” (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014) This disclosure score measures a 
firm’s disclosure regarding environmental, social and governance issues based on 100 of 219 raw 
data points. This disclosure score ranges in the interval between 0.1 and 100 and is tailored to 
different industries based on the materiality of the disclosure items. Our variable CSD is calculated 
as the standardized value of the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score for each reporting year and thus 
has a mean value of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 for each reporting year. 
 
Our main variables of interest are firms’ adherence to voluntary sustainability disclosure standards 
(VOL), mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations (MREG) and the interaction between the 
two variables. We use participation in the UNGC and adherence to the GRI sustainability reporting 
guidelines to construct an index variable that measures firms’ adherence to voluntary standards. 
Other sustainability-related disclosure standards are rather new and thus not yet well-established 
(e.g., the sustainability accounting standards provided by the Sustainability Accounting Standards 
Board), industry-specific (e.g., the Equator Principles for the management and disclosure of 
environmental and social risk in project finance) or country-specific (the German Sustainability 
Code by the German Council for Sustainable Development). Although voluntary adherence to both 
of these standards requires disclosure regarding some fundamental aspects of sustainability, the 
reporting scope is still determined by the firm. VOL takes the value 1 if a firm voluntarily 
participates in the UNGC, 2 if a firm voluntarily adheres to the GRI sustainability reporting 
guidelines and 3 if a firm is engaged in both voluntary initiatives. For each sample firm and 
reporting year, we manually check participation in the UNGC and adherence to the GRI 
sustainability reporting guidelines based on the UNGC signatory list (UNGC, 2015a) and GRI 
reports list database (GRI, 2015), respectively. 
 
MREG is a binary variable that takes the value 1 for each country and reporting year if mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations exist, as described in section 3.2 of this paper. Hence, MREG 
takes the value 1 starting in the first year of our study, 2009, for firms domiciled in Denmark, 
France or Norway and starting in 2013 for firms domiciled in the UK. A time structure for the 
mandatory sustainability disclosure regulation for these four countries is provided in Figure 2. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
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Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
As Figure 2 displays, mandatory requirements have been introduced but never abolished during 
our sample time. Similarly, firms have moved from lower to higher disclosure standards, but not 
vice versa. We cannot measure the disclosure effects of firms which do not adhere to any voluntary scheme 
(VOL=0) and are not required to any mandatory disclosure (MREG=0) as these firms do not provide any 
measurable data for CSD. This issue of a one-way variation over time for the two main variables 
may affect the results of our empirical estimation. The measured explanatory power of the 
estimations might be biased upwards by this peculiarity of the data. We try to mitigate this issue 
by placing more emphasis on the interpretation of the type of relationship between the interaction 
of firms’ adherence to voluntary sustainability disclosure standards and mandatory sustainability 
disclosure regulations and firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure level, rather than the absolute 
disclosure effects of low versus high VOL and no versus existing MREG. 
 
CONTROLSi refers to a number of firm-level control variables: corporate sustainability 
performance (CSP), firm size (SIZE), financial performance (ROA), leverage (LEV) and Tobin’s 
Q (TOBIN). Previous research regarding corporate sustainability disclosure has demonstrated that 
corporate sustainability performance is an important determining variable for the level of 
(voluntary) corporate sustainability disclosure (e.g., Cho & Patten, 2007; Clarkson, Li, 
Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008; Clarkson, Overell, & Chapple, 2011; de Villiers & van Staden, 
2011; Hummel & Schlick, 2015). Our variable CSP indicates a firm’s level of corporate 
sustainability performance and is proxied by the arithmetic mean of the environmental, social and 
governance performance scores provided by the ASSET4 database (Thomson Reuters, 2015).5 
These three scores are based on more than 500 data points, which are aggregated into key 
performance indicators regarding the three pillars of environment, social and corporate 
governance. The aggregated score ranges in the interval between 0 (worst sustainability 
performance) and 100 (best sustainability performance). Following voluntary disclosure theory, 
firms with superior sustainability are more likely to provide a high sustainability disclosure level 
to reveal their superior performance to the market (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, & Hughes, 2004; 
                                                          
5
 Since the launch of the database in 2004, data from the ASSET4 database have been increasingly used in research, 
for instance by Trumpp, Endrikat, Zopf, and Guenther (2015) and Ziegler, Busch, and Hoffmann (2011). 
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Clarkson et al., 2008; Hummel & Schlick, 2015). Consequently, we expect to observe a positive 
relationship between CSP and CSD.6 Firm size is measured as the logarithm of total employees7 
for each reporting year. In accordance with previous studies, we expect to observe a positive 
relationship between SIZE and CSD due to economies of scale with respect to information 
production costs and higher public visibility of large companies (Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson 
et al., 2011; Patten, 2002). Financial performance (ROA) is measured as the return on total assets 
for each reporting year. Some researchers argue that financial performance is positively related to 
corporate sustainability disclosure because of enhanced financial capacity (Cormier, Magnan, & 
van Velthoven, 2005; Ullmann, 1985), whereas others argue that sustainability disclosure serves 
as a means to demonstrate long-term competitive advantage during unprofitable years (Neu, 
Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998). As a consequence, we do not predict the sign for the relationship 
between ROA and CSD. We also account for the financial leverage of a company (LEV), which 
is measured as a firm’s average total assets divided by the firm’s average total common equity. 
Financial leverage serves as a proxy for creditors’ influence, and we expect that highly leveraged 
firms provide a higher level of sustainability disclosure to meet creditors’ informational needs 
(Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2011; Hummel & Schlick, 2015). Similar to previous 
studies, we control for Tobin’s Q (TOBIN), which is measured as the sum of the market value of 
common equity and the book value of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by the book 
value of total assets. Tobin’s Q typically serves as a proxy for information asymmetry (Clarkson 
et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2011), and we expect to find a positive relationship between Tobin’s 
Q and CSD. 
 
FIXED_EFFECTSk denotes year, country, industry, or firm fixed effects to account for time-
invariant (potentially unobservable) factors particular to a year, country or firm that may impact 
the corporate sustainability disclosure behavior between firms. We implement a country fixed 
effect structure as our binary variable MREG does not capture any differences in the mandatory 
                                                          
6
 Other studies – in accordance with legitimacy theory – have revealed a negative relationship between sustainability 
performance and sustainability disclosure (e.g., Cho et al., 2012; Clarkson et al., 2011; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011). 
(Hummel & Schlick, 2015) argue that these mixed findings can be reconciled by “moving the focus of inquiry from 
the quantity of sustainability disclosure towards its quality.” Because our CSD measure captures not only quantity 
but also quality, we expect to observe a positive relationship between CSP and CSD. 
7
 We choose logarithm of total employees as a proxy for firm size as our model includes very diverse industries, 
such as the asset-intense financial industry and the sales-intense consumer goods industry. Hence, other common 
proxies for size, such as total assets or sales, are less meaningful and comparable in our setting. 
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regulations which could possibly influence the sustainability disclosure behavior of firms – for 
example, firms in countries where disclosure enforcement is tougher are likely to exhibit higher 
quality sustainability disclosure once compared to firms from countries where enforcement is 
weaker. We estimate several versions of equation (1).8 All specifications are estimated using 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. 
 
In addition, we perform a difference-in-differences estimation in which we analyze firms’ 
sustainability disclosure before and after the introduction of the British mandatory regulations 
based on the following regression specification: 
CSD, VOL, and CONTROLSi are identical to the variables used in equation (1). POST is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 beginning in the period of mandatory regulations (i.e., the year 2013) 
and 0 before this period. TREATED is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm is domiciled 
in the UK. FIXED_EFFECTSk includes year, industry, and country fixed effects.  
3.4 Sample Selection and Description 
Our sample period starts in 2009, the year that mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations 
became effective in Denmark, and runs through 2013, the last year with sufficient data available 
in the databases. Our initial sample includes 1,240 firms that are domiciled in a European country9 
and for which the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score is available for the reporting year 2013. 
Because of missing values for our control variables, our final sample consists of 3,836 firm-year 
observations over 5 years. An overview by country and year is provided in Table 2, Panel A. This 
sample is named “full sample” and used for the estimation of equation (1).  
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
                                                          
8
 We use a fixed effects model at different stages (year, industry, country) rather than a random effects model as we 
want to allow the individual-specific effect of CSD to be correlated with the explanatory variables. The Durbin-Wu-
Hausman Test also rejects the null hypothesis and hence, confirms the consistency and preference of the fixed 
effects model over a random effects model. 
9
 We exclude Turkey and countries for which the disclosure score is available for less than ten firms per country in 
2013 (for instance, Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania). 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
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In addition, we use propensity score matching to construct a “matched sample” that consists of 
firms that are domiciled in the four countries with mandatory regulations in place and a control 
group of matched firms. We match firms in France, Denmark, and Norway in 2009 and firms in 
the UK in 2012 in terms of sustainability performance, adherence to voluntary standards and 
whether the firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry (Chauvey et al., 2015; Cho & 
Patten, 2007; Patten, 2002). We use a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching procedure 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) based on the following logit regression model:  
TREATMENT is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm belongs to the treatment group 
(i.e., is domiciled in France, Denmark, Norway, or the UK) and 0 if a firm belongs to the control 
group. We estimate the logit regression model for each of the four countries separately and use the 
estimated probabilities of treatment for each firm-year in the sample to perform a nearest-neighbor 
match. Our “matched sample” consists of all treated firms and matched control firms and is 
described in more detail in Table 2, Panel B. In total, we obtain 2,709 firm-year observations. We 
use this sample to alternatively estimate equation (1). Moreover, we use the sub-sample of firms 
domiciled in the UK and their matched pairs to estimate equation (2).  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest, namely CSD, VOL, and 
MREG, by year and country for the full sample. There are substantial differences in corporate 
sustainability disclosure among the sample countries. On average, firms domiciled in Spain and 
Finland exhibit the highest disclosure scores, whereas firms domiciled in Poland and Luxembourg 
(3) εββββ ++++= ESIDUMMYVOLCSPTREATMENT tjtjtj _3,2,10,  
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obtain the lowest disclosure scores. Regarding countries with mandatory regulations in place, only 
France and Norway obtain above-average disclosure scores, whereas Denmark and the UK obtain 
disclosure scores that are below the year-average. Hence, the mere existence of mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations is not automatically associated with higher disclosure scores, 
which supports the reasoning that there are other important factors that impact firms’ corporate 
sustainability disclosure. As expected, firms’ adherence to voluntary standards seems to be related 
to the disclosure level because countries with higher values for VOL (greater than 1.5, with 
Denmark defining the threshold level) also obtain above-average disclosure scores.  
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
This relationship can also be observed in the correlation statistics of our regression variables (Table 
4, Panel A). There is a positive and significant relationship (at the 1% level) between firms’ 
adherence to voluntary standards and corporate sustainability disclosure and a weak positive and 
significant relationship (at the 1% level) between the existence of mandatory regulations and 
corporate sustainability disclosure. The relationship between VOL and MREG is also positive and 
significant, which is a weak indication of a reinforcing effect of MREG on the relationship between 
voluntarism and corporate sustainability disclosure. However, since the effect of other variables is 
not controlled for and MREG is a binary variable, this finding has to be interpreted cautiously. 
Regarding the control variables, most relationships are in accordance with our expectations (except 
for TOBIN). In particular, there is a strong positive relationship between CSP and CSD, which 
indicates that superior sustainability performance is related to higher sustainability disclosure 
scores. We also observe positive relationships between SIZE and CSD and between LEVERAGE 
and CSD and negative relationships between ROA and CSD and between TOBIN and CSD. 
 
4.2 Findings of Panel Regressions 
Table 5 documents the findings of the panel regression analyses for predicting firms’ corporate 
sustainability disclosure. We present stepwise regression models, gradually introducing our main 
variables of interest, the interaction between these two variables and the control variables. The 
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results presented in Column IV and Column V correspond to our full regression model, i.e., 
equation (1). The results for the full sample (Panel A) and the matched sample (Panel B) are almost 
identical. 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Regarding firms’ adherence to voluntary standards, all model specifications reveal a positive and 
significant relationship (at the 1% level) with CSD, thereby supporting hypothesis H1. Firms’ 
engagement in voluntary reporting regimes is positively associated with firms’ corporate 
sustainability disclosure. Our results are therefore in line with existing literature (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008; Chauvey, Giordano-Spring, & Patten, 2015; Cho & Patten, 2007; Dawkins & 
Fraas, 2011; Patten, 2002), which suggests that there are a number of incentives for firms to 
voluntarily disclose sustainability information. 
 
The existence of mandatory disclosure regulations is also in almost all specifications positively 
and significantly associated with firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure. Thus, we find support 
for hypothesis H2a, which is in line with prior literature that also found a positive relationship 
between mandatory regulation and sustainability disclosure, such as Barbu et al. (2014) and 
Ioannou and Serafeim (2014). This finding also supports regulation advocates who call for 
sustainability disclosure regulations as a means to improve firms’ corporate sustainability 
disclosure.10  
 
Finally, we introduce the interaction between VOL and MREG, which is negatively and 
significantly related to CSD in all specifications, thereby supporting hypothesis H3b. This negative 
interaction effect reduces the positive effects of VOL and MREG on firms’ sustainability 
disclosure level. Hence, we find empirical evidence for a substitutive relationship between 
                                                          
10
 Likely because of low within-firm variation in MREG, the positive relationship becomes insignificant when we 
include firm-fixed effects and suppress country-fixed effects. We test this altered relationship in panel regression 
analyses by country in the robustness tests. 
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adherence to voluntary standards and mandatory regulations with respect to the sustainability 
disclosure level, which is in line with existing literature on crowding-out effects (see e.g. Deci et 
al., 1999; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). Depending on the model 
specification, the total effect of MREG (β2+ β3) remains positive (specification IV), indicating that 
the crowding-out effect is smaller than the regulatory effect, i.e., regulation still has a marginal 
positive net effect, or even becomes negative (specification V, which includes firm-fixed effects). 
Hence, in the latter case, which includes firm-fixed effects, but suppresses country-fixed effects, 
the crowding-out effect exceeds the regulatory effect, the net effect of which being less disclosure. 
This finding of a negative crowding-out effect is remarkable, given that some of the regulations 
explicitly refer to the UNGC and the GRI reporting guidelines.  
 
In addition, the results indicate positive and significant relationships between CSP and CSD (at 
the 1% level) and between SIZE and CSD (at the 10% level), which is consistent with the findings 
of previous research (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Hummel & Schlick, 2015; 
Patten, 2002). In agreement with the reasoning of voluntary disclosure theory, firms with superior 
sustainability demonstrate their superior performance to the market through high sustainability 
disclosure. Moreover, larger firms are associated with higher disclosure scores because of 
economies of scale and higher public visibility.  
 
4.3 Findings from the Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
Next, we apply a standard difference-in-differences design to study firms’ sustainability disclosure 
before and after the introduction of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations in the UK. We 
choose the UK as the domicile country to examine the difference in sustainability disclosure 
because one-third of all sample firms are domiciled in the UK and this country introduced 
mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations during our sample period. Our sample consists of 
firms domiciled in the UK (i.e., the treatment group with TREATED=1) and their matched pairs 
(i.e., the control group with TREATED=0) and includes only observations of the year before and 
the year of the introduction of mandatory regulations, i.e., 2012 and 2013, resulting in a total of 
752 firm-year observations. The results of the stepwise regression analyses are presented in Table 
6, with Columns IV, V and VI corresponding to the full model, as described by equation (2).  
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Insert Table 6 about here 
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Results for the isolated effects are presented in Column I (VOL and TREATED), Column II (VOL 
and POST) and Column III (POST and TREATED). Consistent with our findings from the panel 
regression analyses, β1 is positive and significant in all models, thereby indicating that firms’ 
adherence to voluntary standards is positively related to CSD. In Column I, the coefficient of 
VOLxTREATED is significantly negative, thus indicating a substitutive relationship between 
firms’ adherence to voluntary standards and membership in the treatment group with respect to 
affecting sustainability disclosure. This result implies that the impact of adherence to voluntary 
standards on the sustainability disclosure level is higher for non-treated firms. Similarly, in 
Column II, we obtain a negative and significant coefficient of VOLxPOST, which is another 
indication for crowding-out effects. More precisely, the impact of adherence to voluntary standards 
on the sustainability disclosure level is marginally higher11 (for both treatment and control firms) 
before mandatory regulations become effective. Regarding the introduction of mandatory 
regulations, we find no impact on corporate sustainability disclosure in our reduced models. In 
particular, the coefficient of POSTxTREATED is not significant if the impact of firms’ adherence 
to voluntary sustainability disclosure standards is not accounted for (Column III).  
 
Columns IV, V and VI present the results for the full model according to equation (2). These results 
are almost identical across the three specifications. Again, we find support for hypothesis H1 
because there is a positive and significant impact of firms’ adherence to voluntary sustainability 
standards on firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure. The results of the difference-in-differences 
specification also supports hypothesis H2a because there is a positive and significant effect of the 
introduction of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations on firms’ sustainability disclosure 
(the coefficient for POSTxTREATED
 
is positive and significant). In addition, the results indicate 
that firms in the treatment group generally have higher disclosure scores than firms in the control 
group (the coefficient for TREATED
 
is positive and significant). We also find marginal evidence 
                                                          
11
 The magnitude of VOLxPOST is comparably low, with values between -0.0519 in specification VI and -0.0922 in 
specification II. 
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for crowding-out effects because we obtain negative and significant coefficients for VOLxPOST
 
(except for Column VI) and VOLxTREATED. Therefore, the positive effect of firms’ adherence 
to voluntary corporate sustainability disclosure standards is crowded-out when mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations become effective and if the firm belongs to the treatment 
group. However, the crowding-out effect of mandatory regulations and firms’ adherence to 
voluntary standards for the treated firms relative to the control firms, i.e., the difference-in-
difference estimator β7, is not significant. The results for the control variables slightly differ from 
the results obtained for the full sample (Table 5). In particular, SIZE becomes insignificant, 
whereas we obtain a positive relationship between ROA and CSD and a negative relationship 
between TOBIN and CSD in some model specifications (Columns IV and V). Regarding 
sustainability performance, we again obtain positive and significant results in all models.  
 
Taken together, the results of this quasi-experimental analysis indicate that even a general 
sustainability disclosure regulation that does not mandate comprehensive disclosure on all 
(material) sustainability-related topics, as is the case for the UK regulations, has a positive impact 
on firms’ sustainability disclosure. Moreover, we do not obtain a crowding-out effect for the 
treatment group that is significantly different from that in the control group. 
 
4.4 Robustness 
We perform several robustness tests to substantiate our results. First, we soften the list of criteria 
for the identification of countries with mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations in place 
(section 3.2) and include countries with mandatory environmental disclosure regulations in place, 
namely Spain (Bebbington et al., 2012).12 Because sustainability disclosure includes both 
environmental and social disclosures, one may argue that our findings are biased if we do not 
account for countries with mandatory environmental regulations in place. Indeed, the descriptive 
statistics in Table 3 reveal that firms domiciled in Spain are among the companies with the highest 
average disclosure scores. Our new variable, MESREG, takes the value 1 starting in 2009 for firms 
domiciled in Denmark, France, Spain, and Norway and starting in 2013 for firms domiciled in the 
UK. We adjust the matching procedure and re-run the regression analyses including MESREG 
                                                          
12
 Although the Netherlands also requires listed companies to publish annual environmental reports, these reports do 
not need to be disclosed to the public. We thus do not include the Netherlands in this robustness check.   
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instead of MREG. The new matching procedure results in a slightly reduced matched sample of 
2,633 firm-year observations. The results are presented in Table 7 and are similar to the main 
findings presented in Table 5. Thus, our findings remain stable if we account for both mandatory 
sustainability and mandatory environmental disclosure regulations, which, again, supports 
hypotheses H1, H2a and H3b. 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Next, we investigate whether our results change if we exclude the governance disclosure 
dimension from our dependent variable CSD. Although the ESG concept is the prevailing concept 
in the capital market for addressing sustainability-related issues (Eccles et al., 2011), the concept 
of sustainability as described by the triple-bottom-line approach does not explicitly include the 
corporate governance dimension. However, both the UNGC and the GRI guidelines include 
governance-related disclosure items, and researchers increasingly rely on data provided by 
databases that are typically tailored to the needs of the capital market participants rather than the 
academic community. Therefore, we are confident that our CSD measure captures the key aspects 
of sustainability disclosure. Our new variable ESD is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the 
environmental and social disclosure score provided by the Bloomberg database. Similarly, our new 
variable ESP is also calculated as the arithmetic mean of the environmental and social performance 
score provided by the Thomson Reuters database. We adjust the matching procedure13 and re-run 
the regression analysis with ESD and ESP instead of CSD and CSP. Because the subcategories of 
the ESG disclosure score are not provided for all firms, the full sample is reduced to 3,562 firm-
year observations, and the matched sample is reduced to 2,434 firm-year observations. The results 
are presented in Table 8 and are almost identical to the results of our main regression analyses 
(Table 5). Therefore, the inclusion of the governance dimension in both our CSD and CSP 
variables does not bias our findings. 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
                                                          
13
 We match firms based on ESP instead of CSP, VOL and DUMMY_ESI. 
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Insert Table 8 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Finally, we rerun the regression analyses (equation (1)) for each country with mandatory 
regulations in place and its matched control group separately. This analysis enables us to check 
whether our findings substantially differ among the different countries with mandatory regulations 
in place. Moreover, the results enable us to draw some very preliminary conclusions regarding the 
consequences of different types of mandatory regulations with respect to firms’ sustainability 
disclosure level. The results are presented in Table 9. 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Although the positive effect of firms’ adherence to voluntary sustainability standards prevails for 
all countries, the positive impact of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations prevails only 
for Norway and the UK. Similarly, the interaction between voluntarism and mandatory disclosure 
regulations is significant only for Norway and the UK. The findings are in line with our prior 
results of positive net effects of regulation when country-fixed effects are included, but negative 
net effects of regulation when they are suppressed. These results therefore provide initial 
indications of which type of disclosure regulation is the most effective in stimulating firms’ 
sustainability disclosure level. In both cases, the regulations are rather broad and not focused on 
specific sustainability-related performance indicators. Moreover, both regulations mandate the 
disclosure of sustainability-related information in firms’ director’s/strategic reports within the 
annual report. Therefore, it appears that more general sustainability disclosure regulations seem to 
be more effective with respect to firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure. Remarkably, whether 
the mandatory regulations explicitly refer to the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines does not 
seem to affect the impact of VOLxMREG on firms’ sustainability disclosure level. The findings 
illustrate that further and more in-depth studies are needed to enhance our understanding of the 
impact of different design elements of regulations on firms’ sustainability disclosure. 
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5. Conclusions 
We exploit the fact that mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations vary across European 
countries to study the impact of adherence to voluntary standards and the existence of mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations on the sustainability disclosure level of large European firms. 
Our research design includes panel regressions based on 3,836 European firms and five reporting 
years and a difference-in-differences estimation regarding the introduction of mandatory 
sustainability disclosure regulations in the UK. In addition to the effects of firms’ adherence to 
voluntary standards and the existence of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations on firms’ 
sustainability disclosure level, we are particularly interested in the effects of the interplay between 
these two variables. In line with existing literature about voluntary incentives for disclosure (e.g. 
Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Chauvey, Giordano-Spring, & Patten, 2015; Cho & Patten, 2007; 
Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Patten, 2002), the results reveal positive and significant relationships 
between firms’ adherence to voluntary standards and their sustainability disclosure level.  At the 
same time, we also find positive relationships between mandatory sustainability disclosure 
regulations and firms’ sustainability disclosure level, thereby supporting previous research that 
fosters legally binding regulations to prevent firms from selective and biased sustainability 
disclosure  
(Cho, Guidry, Hageman, & Patten, 2012; Cho & Patten, 2007; Hummel & Schlick, 2015). 
Regarding the interaction between voluntary standards and mandatory regulations, we find a 
negative and significant relationship with firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure level. Hence, 
the impact of adherence to voluntary standards on firms’ sustainability disclosure is lower in 
countries with mandatory regulations, thereby suggesting a substitutive relationship between 
voluntary standards and mandatory regulations. This is therefore the first empirical study which 
supports the crowding-out effect as suggested by the theory of prosocial behavior (Bénabou & 
Tirole, 2006) in the context of sustainability disclosure. Although we also find this effect in the 
difference-in-difference specification, it is not significantly different for firms domiciled in the UK 
compared with matched firms domiciled in countries without mandatory regulations in place.  
 
Taken together, our findings are relevant for policy-makers and practitioners alike. First, our study 
indeed reveals a positive impact of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations on firms’ 
sustainability disclosure, thereby supporting policy advocates who call for mandatory regulations 
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to prompt sustainability disclosure. At the same time, we find a substitutive relationship between 
voluntary standards and mandatory disclosure regulations, thus indicating that the impact of 
voluntary standards on sustainability disclosure is weaker in countries with mandatory disclosure 
regulations. Policy-makers need to account for this substitutive relationship when mandating 
corporate sustainability disclosure, for instance, by explicitly referencing voluntary sustainability 
standards and initiatives in the sustainability disclosure legislation. Moreover, the results of our 
study indicate that adherence to voluntary reporting standards is positively associated with firms’ 
corporate sustainability disclosure level in all model specifications. Therefore, adherence to 
voluntary sustainability disclosure standards is an important lever for enhancing firms’ 
sustainability disclosure level. 
 
Our results are also subject to some limitations, which suggests avenues for future research. First, 
there is substantial variation in mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations in terms of the 
content and scope of sustainability disclosure, the reference to voluntary disclosure guidelines and 
the enforcement mechanisms. This study is a first attempt to empirically assess the impact of 
mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations at an aggregated level. As a consequence, our main 
variable of interest, MREG, cannot account for this variation. Future research could study the 
impact of these differences in more detail, thereby providing recommendations regarding the 
concrete design of mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations. Moreover, because market 
regulators (yet not in Europe) are also introducing sustainability-reporting requirements, another 
interesting research question is which regulator is most effective at improving firms’ sustainability 
disclosure level.14 Second, the generalizability of the findings from our study is limited to countries 
with a generally high level of firms’ sustainability disclosure, namely developed countries. It might 
be an interesting opportunity for future research to test our hypotheses based on sample firms that 
are domiciled in developing countries. Third, because of limitations in data availability and the 
timing of mandatory disclosure regulations, this study reports findings from pre-post-comparisons 
only with respect to the introduction of mandatory disclosure regulations in the UK. A clean setting 
for future research based on pre-post-comparison will be provided by the introduction of 
                                                          
14
 Several stock exchanges, such as those in Brazil, China, Malaysia and South Africa, have introduced 
sustainability disclosure as listing requirements. 
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mandatory disclosure regulations within the European Union member states in 2017 (Directive 
2014/95/EU).  
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Table 1: Overview of Mandatory Sustainability Disclosure Regulations in Europe 
 
 Denmark France Norway UK 
Legislation Amendment of the 
Danish Financial 
Statement Act in 
October 2008 
- New Economic 
Regulations (NRE) 
- Grenelle I and II 
- Norwegian 
Accounting Act 
1998 (No. 56) 
- Amendment to the 
Accounting Act 
Companies Act 2006 
Regulations 2013 
Content of  
legislation 
Supplement the 
management's review 
with a report on 
social responsibility  
 
- NRE: disclose 
information on 32 
environmental and 
social indicators 
- Grenelle I and II: 
disclose 
information on 42 
environmental and 
social indicators 
- No. 56: disclose 
sustainability-
related information 
in the Director's 
report 
- Amendment: dis-
close information 
on how social 
responsibility is 
integrated into 
business strategies 
- Disclose 
sustainability-
related information 
in the strategic 
report 
- Disclose annual 
quantity of 
greenhouse gas 
emissions 
References 
to GRI 
sustainability  
reporting  
guidelines 
YES  NO - No. 56: NO 
- Amendment: YES 
Partly (guidance 
provided by the 
DEFRA) 
References 
to UNGC 
Principles 
YES NO - No. 56: NO 
- Amendment: YES 
NO 
Type of 
companies 
subject to the 
regulations 
Large companies - NRE: companies 
listed on French 
stock exchanges 
- Grenelle I and II: 
listed and unlisted 
companies of 
certain size with a 
physical presence 
in France 
- No. 56: 
Norwegian-
registered 
companies 
- Amendment: large 
companies 
Large and medium 
size UK incorporated 
companies 
Sanctions Fines for non-
compliant reporting 
can be imposed 
No sanctions for non-
compliance 
- No. 56: No 
penalties or fines 
for noncompliance 
Personal liability of 
firm directors and 
corresponding fines 
Date of  
effectiveness 
2009 - NRE: 2003 
- Grenelle I: 2010 
- Grenelle II: 2012 
- No. 56: 1999 
- Amendment: 2013 
2013 
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Table 2: Sample Composition by Country 
 
Panel A: Composition of the “full sample” by country 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Austria 12 14 13 14 12 65 
Belgium 16 21 23 22 21 103 
Switzerland 51 53 61 66 62 293 
Germany 57 67 75 77 74 350 
Denmark 19 24 25 25 25 118 
Spain 33 32 37 40 40 182 
Finland 19 22 22 22 23 108 
France 77 83 84 92 85 421 
UK 235 244 263 266 273 1,281  
Greece 11 12 12 12 10 57 
Ireland 17 18 21 24 21 101 
Italy 34 35 41 40 33 183 
Luxembourg 5 5 6 6 5 27 
Netherlands 18 25 27 30 35 135 
Norway 13 16 16 17 15 77 
Poland 3 12 16 19 13 63 
Portugal 9 9 11 11 9 49 
Sweden 41 43 45 46 48 223 
Total 670 735 798 829 804 3,836  
 
Panel B: Composition of the “matched sample” by country 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Austria 5 5 4 5 4 23 
Belgium 8 9 11 11 11 50 
Switzerland 26 28 30 31 29 144 
Germany 28 32 32 33 32 157 
Denmark 19 24 25 25 25 118 
Spain 12 14 17 17 16 76 
Finland 7 8 8 8 8 39 
France 77 83 84 92 85 421 
UK 235 244 263 266 273 1,281  
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Ireland 11 12 13 13 13 62 
Italy 11 11 13 13 12 60 
Luxembourg 2 2 2 2 2 10 
Netherlands 8 10 8 12 12 50 
Norway 13 16 16 17 15 77 
Poland 0 1 2 3 3 9 
Portugal 5 4 6 6 5 26 
Sweden 20 19 20 21 21 101 
Total 488 523 555 576 567 2,709  
We use propensity score matching to construct a “matched sample” that consists of firms that are domiciled in the 
four countries with mandatory regulations in place (Denmark, France, UK, Norway) and a control group of matched 
firms, i.e. the “matched sample” consists of all treated firms (full sample=matched sample for Denmark, France, 
UK, Norway) and matched control firms. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Year and Country 
 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Austria        
#  12 14 13 14 12 65 
CSD  -0.5893 -0.2771 -0.2249 -0.1104 -0.0796 -0.2519 
VOL  1.0833 1.1429 1.3846 1.2857 1.5833 1.2923 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Belgium        
#  16 21 23 22 21 103 
CSD  -0.1978 -0.2159 -0.2778 -0.5147 -0.5165 -0.3520 
VOL  1.0625 1.2857 1.2174 1.0455 1.0000 1.1262 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Switzerland        
#  51 53 61 66 62 293 
CSD  -0.0669 -0.2512 -0.2219 -0.1779 -0.1486 -0.1748 
VOL  1.0588 1.1321 1.0820 1.1364 1.3226 1.1502 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Germany        
#  57 67 75 77 74 350 
CSD  -0.0073 -0.1034 -0.1254 -0.1099 -0.1389 -0.1014 
VOL  1.5614 1.3433 1.3467 1.4545 1.6622 1.4714 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Denmark        
#  19 24 25 25 25 118 
CSD  -0.2731 -0.1749 -0.2435 -0.1161 -0.2158 -0.2015 
VOL  1.2105 1.5417 1.6400 1.6400 1.5600 1.5339 
MREG  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Spain        
#  33 32 37 40 40 182 
CSD  0.7954 0.8170 0.8417 0.8130 0.7001 0.7915 
VOL  2.4545 2.4063 2.4595 2.4750 2.5750 2.4780 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Finland        
#  19 22 22 22 23 108 
CSD  0.3064 0.4813 0.5523 0.7060 0.7682 0.5719 
VOL  1.4211 1.7727 2.0455 2.2273 2.1739 1.9444 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
France        
#  77 83 84 92 85 421 
CSD  0.2604 0.3537 0.4339 0.4734 0.5400 0.4164 
VOL  1.5195 1.5783 1.7143 1.6848 1.9882 1.7007 
MREG  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
UK        
#  235 244 263 266 273 1281 
CSD  -0.1589 -0.1334 -0.1252 -0.1235 -0.1224 -0.1320 
VOL  0.4766 0.5492 0.5779 0.5639 0.5751 0.5504 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2131 
Greece        
#  11 12 12 12 10 57 
CSD  0.0942 -0.0848 -0.0273 0.1079 0.0561 0.0271 
VOL  2.2727 1.8333 1.7500 1.9167 2.0000 1.9474 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ireland        
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#  17 18 21 24 21 101 
CSD  -0.6289 -0.5662 -0.5137 -0.5707 -0.5611 -0.5658 
VOL  0.4118 0.5000 0.5238 0.4167 0.6667 0.5050 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Italy        
#  34 35 41 40 33 183 
CSD  0.3125 0.3570 0.1566 0.1005 0.0754 0.1970 
VOL  1.4706 1.7429 1.5122 1.6000 1.6061 1.5847 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Luxembourg        
#  5 5 6 6 5 27 
CSD  -0.6305 -0.7573 -0.5780 -0.5733 -0.6009 -0.6241 
VOL  0.6000 0.6000 0.5000 0.8333 1.0000 0.7037 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Netherlands        
#  18 25 27 30 35 135 
CSD  0.1834 0.1162 0.1244 0.0189 -0.1043 0.0480 
VOL  2.0000 1.9600 1.8519 1.9333 1.8571 1.9111 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Norway        
#  13 16 16 17 15 77 
CSD  0.1668 0.1143 0.2608 0.1351 0.0492 0.1455 
VOL  2.3077 1.9375 1.8750 2.0000 2.0000 2.0130 
MREG  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Poland        
#  3 12 16 19 13 63 
CSD  -1.1595 -1.2921 -1.2679 -1.3718 -1.2070 -1.2861 
VOL  1.6667 0.6667 0.6250 0.7368 1.0000 0.7937 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Portugal        
#  9 9 11 11 9 49 
CSD  0.2143 0.4221 0.4569 0.2355 0.4459 0.3542 
VOL  1.5556 1.7778 1.8182 1.3636 2.0000 1.6939 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sweden        
#  41 43 45 46 48 223 
CSD  0.0669 0.2046 0.1649 0.2097 0.1011 0.1500 
VOL  1.3171 1.6744 1.8667 2.0870 2.1250 1.8296 
MREG  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Total (full sample)        
#  670 735 798 829 804 3,836 
CSD  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
VOL  1.1299 1.2000 1.2243 1.2557 1.3470 1.2357 
MREG  0.1627 0.1673 0.1566 0.1616 0.4950 0.4950 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics by country for the main variables of interest.   
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Regression Variables 
 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix for Regression Variables  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) CSD 1.0000        
          
(2) VOL 0.7190 1.0000       
  (0.0000)        
(3) MREG 0.0800 0.0519 1.0000      
  (0.0000) (0.0013)       
(4) CSP 0.7289 0.5453 0.0982 1.0000     
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)      
(5) SIZE 0.4169 0.4028 0.0586 0.4455 1.0000    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000)     
(6) ROA -0.0698 -0.0745 -0.0135 -0.0641 -0.0858 1.0000   
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4032) (0.0001) (0.0000)    
(7) LEV 0.0814 0.0911 -0.0212 0.0433 -0.0159 -0.2073 1.0000  
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1884) (0.0073) (0.3257) (0.0000)   
(8) TOBIN -0.0898 -0.0875 0.0378 -0.0956 -0.1113 0.6729 -0.1200 1.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0193) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
CSD 3,836 0.0000 0.9995 -0.7947 -0.0526 0.8011 
VOL 3,836 1.2357 1.3143 0.0000 1.0000 3.0000 
MREG 3,836 0.2318 0.4220 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CSP 3,836 0.0000 0.9995 -0.6412 0.2667 0.8229 
SIZE 3,836 9.1768 1.8340 8.1709 9.2704 10.4588 
ROA 3,836 4.9041 9.0164 0.8845 3.9356 7.6561 
LEV 3,836 25.3414 19.1715 10.9049 23.8948 36.7431 
TOBIN 3,836 1.6435 1.7626 1.0120 1.2511 1.7923 
Table 4 reports correlation statistics (Panel A) and descriptive statistics (Panel B) for the variables used in the 
regression analysis. Statistics are presented for the full sample of 3,836 firm-year observations. Panel A reports 
bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) for a two-tailed test of statistical 
significance.  
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Table 5: Results of Panel Regression Analyses  
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 I II III IV V 
Main Variables of Interest:      
VOL 0.5873*** 0.5879*** 0.6246*** 0.3981*** 0.1891*** 
 (12.9170) (12.9655) (12.7170) (13.7398) (6.2875) 
MREG  0.1169*** 0.2003*** 0.1294*** 0.0381 
  (4.1105) (4.4849) (3.5757) (1.3169) 
VOLxMREG   -0.1498*** -0.0925*** -0.0688*** 
   (-3.2338) (-3.1161) (-3.4547) 
Control Variables:      
CSP    0.4132*** 0.1552*** 
    (19.4658) (6.0809) 
SIZE    0.0212* 0.0607** 
    (1.9676) (2.1640) 
ROA    0.0002 -0.0013 
    (0.1050) (-1.4594) 
LEV    0.0005 -0.0007 
    (0.9131) (-0.4262) 
TOBIN    -0.0045 0.0047 
    (-0.4675) (1.4054) 
Constant -0.9255*** -0.9174*** -0.9715*** -0.7470*** -0.8435*** 
 (-17.6926) (-16.6627) (-14.0632) (-5.2193) (-3.3003) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY FE YES YES YES YES NO 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5845 0.5849 0.5905 0.6974 0.1824 
 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 I II III IV V 
Main Variables of Interest:      
VOL 0.5331*** 0.5335*** 0.5679*** 0.3826*** 0.1650*** 
 (16.1889) (16.2283) (13.0245) (11.0612) (6.3397) 
MREG  0.0746** 0.1243*** 0.1023** 0.0053 
  (2.8110) (3.2963) (2.5449) (0.1368) 
VOLxMREG   -0.0943** -0.0701** -0.0573*** 
   (-2.3062) (-2.1373) (-2.9459) 
Control Variables:      
CSP    0.3897*** 0.1875*** 
    (24.8469) (8.6395) 
SIZE    0.0230 0.0731 
    (1.6778) (1.3093) 
ROA    -0.0002 -0.0009 
    (-0.1130) (-0.8136) 
LEV    0.0002 -0.0001 
    (0.3492) (-0.0460) 
TOBIN    -0.0062 0.0048 
    (-0.6541) (1.4515) 
Constant -0.7484*** -0.7414*** -0.7914*** -0.7112*** -0.9153* 
 (-17.2578) (-16.3505) (-11.3656) (-4.1839) (-1.7756) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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COUNTRY FE YES YES YES YES NO 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 2,709 2,709 2,709 2,709 2,709 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5459 0.5460 0.5491 0.6640 0.1790 
This table presents the results of (panel) regressions estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. If indicated, the regressions include year-, country-, or firm-fixed 
effects. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed). 
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Table 6: Results of the Difference-in-Differences Analyses 
 
 I II III IV V VI 
Main Variables of Interest:      
VOL 0.6473*** 0.5340***  0.5284*** 0.5096*** 0.5007*** 
 (13.3697) (9.3171)  (9.3319) (8.6477) (8.2015) 
POST  0.0162 -0.0170 -0.0806 -0.0734 -0.0980 
  (0.5432) (-0.4668) (-1.3661) (-1.2716) (-1.5036) 
TREATED 0.6068***  0.0512 0.4578*** 0.4607*** 0.4092*** 
 (6.3490)  (0.7221) (7.3557) (6.5619) (4.8547) 
VOLxPOST  -0.0922***  -0.0706* -0.0713* -0.0519 
  (-3.8884)  (-1.8091) (-1.9070) (-1.1182) 
VOLxTREATED -0.2120***   -0.2123*** -0.2147*** -0.1933*** 
 (-4.3797)   (-3.6293) (-3.2001) (-3.2079) 
POSTxTREATED   0.0069 0.1117* 0.1075* 0.1272* 
   (0.1903) (1.9077) (1.8891) (1.9603) 
VOLxPOSTxTREATED    0.0139 0.0117 -0.0045 
    (0.3537) (0.3065) (-0.0956) 
Control Variables:       
CSP   0.6004*** 0.3459*** 0.3491*** 0.3634*** 
   (6.9870) (13.7560) (16.2306) (10.3547) 
SIZE   0.0345 0.0160 0.0191 0.0179 
   (1.5484) (0.8351) (0.8635) (0.8914) 
ROA   0.0011 0.0039*** 0.0058*** 0.0026 
   (0.5519) (3.0153) (3.6441) (1.4293) 
LEV   0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0.0010 
   (0.8683) (1.2474) (1.1005) (0.9350) 
TOBIN   -0.0011 -0.0144* -0.0186** -0.0105 
   (-0.0983) (-1.9984) (-2.3346) (-1.1643) 
Constant -0.9392*** -0.5261*** -0.5562* -0.9493*** -0.9875*** -0.8974*** 
 (-10.1435) (-4.5749) (-2.1166) (-4.3640) (-3.6158) (-3.8204) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY FE NO NO NO NO YES YES 
INDUSTRY FE  NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 752 752 752 752 752 752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5261 0.4604 0.4651 0.6698 0.6835 0.6494 
This table presents the results of multivariate regressions estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. If indicated, the regressions include year-, country-, or firm-
fixed effects. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed).  
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Table 7: Results of Panel Regression Analyses including MESREG instead of MREG 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 I II III IV V 
Main Variables of Interest:      
VOL 0.5873*** 0.5879*** 0.6233*** 0.3956*** 0.1896*** 
 (12.9170) (12.9655) (12.0778) (12.9789) (6.0971) 
MESREG   0.1861*** 0.1185*** 0.0325 
   (4.3606) (3.6009) (1.1780) 
VOLxMESREG   -0.1249** -0.0731** -0.0595** 
   (-2.3703) (-2.1781) (-2.5779) 
Control Variables:      
CSP    0.4144*** 0.1559*** 
    (19.2211) (6.1007) 
SIZE    0.0210* 0.0616** 
    (1.9448) (2.2040) 
ROA    0.0002 -0.0013 
    (0.1106) (-1.4140) 
LEV    0.0006 -0.0007 
    (0.9923) (-0.4424) 
TOBIN    -0.0051 0.0046 
    (-0.5623) (1.3784) 
Constant -0.9255*** -0.9174*** -0.9693*** -0.7411*** -0.8477*** 
 (-17.6926) (-16.6627) (-13.4485) (-5.1397) (-3.3046) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY FE YES YES YES YES NO 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5845 0.5849 0.5892 0.6967 0.1812 
 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 I II III IV V 
Main Variables of Interest:      
VOL 0.5519*** 0.5526*** 0.5997*** 0.4060*** 0.1527*** 
 (12.7035) (12.7115) (9.8083) (8.3486) (6.0243) 
MESREG  0.1026** 0.1704*** 0.1223** 0.0038 
  (2.5365) (2.9565) (2.4492) (0.0865) 
VOLxMESREG   -0.1255** -0.0948* -0.0495* 
   (-2.2422) (-2.0767) (-2.0255) 
Control Variables:      
CSP    0.3889*** 0.1603*** 
    (19.7562) (6.5677) 
SIZE    0.0283 0.1025 
    (1.5580) (1.3671) 
ROA    0.0002 -0.0013 
    (0.1116) (-1.2989) 
LEV    0.0010 0.0003 
    (1.0858) (0.1691) 
TOBIN    -0.0039 0.0057* 
    (-0.3328) (1.8213) 
Constant -0.6672*** -0.6578*** -0.7298*** -0.7529** -1.1778 
 (-12.5152) (-11.7141) (-7.8706) (-2.8348) (-1.7105) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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COUNTRY FE YES YES YES YES NO 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 2,633 2,633 2,633 2,633 2,633 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5332 0.5335 0.5390 0.6557 0.1586 
This table presents the results of (panel) regressions estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. If indicated, the regressions include year-, country-, or firm-fixed 
effects. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed). 
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Table 8: Results of the Panel Regression Analyses for ES Disclosure and ES Performance 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 I II III IV V 
Main Variables of Interest:      
VOL 8.9401*** 8.9487*** 9.5954*** 6.5159*** 2.7381*** 
 (13.1807) (13.2151) (12.9674) (12.0983) (5.6271) 
MREG  1.2081** 2.6696*** 2.0347*** 0.5811 
  (2.1918) (3.5381) (3.0952) (1.0962) 
VOLxMREG   -2.5902*** -1.7620** -1.2188*** 
   (-3.1482) (-2.5974) (-4.0961) 
Control Variables:      
ESP    0.2567*** 0.1024*** 
    (15.8347) (4.9877) 
SIZE    0.1512 0.2664 
    (0.7608) (0.7199) 
ROA    0.0015 -0.0268* 
    (0.0486) (-1.7975) 
LEV    0.0119 0.0006 
    (0.8616) (0.0218) 
TOBIN    -0.0064 -0.0661* 
    (-0.0407) (-1.8409) 
Constant 20.6752*** 20.7517*** 19.6907*** 3.0077 18.4257*** 
 (17.5025) (17.0306) (12.9414) (0.7977) (4.7200) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY FE YES YES YES YES NO 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 3,562 3,562 3,562 3,562 3,562 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5678 0.5678 0.5741 0.6586 0.2134 
 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 I II III IV V 
Main Variables of Interest:      
VOL 6.0302*** 6.0434*** 6.6947*** 4.6464*** 1.3892*** 
 (14.8284) (14.7114) (13.6074) (11.5509) (4.3633) 
MREG  1.4454** 2.4241** 2.3936*** 0.0229 
  (2.1735) (2.8644) (2.9913) (0.0471) 
VOLxMREG   -1.7432** -1.4939** -0.6049*** 
   (-2.7549) (-2.8145) (-2.9126) 
Control Variables:      
ESP    0.2068*** 0.0740*** 
    (12.0369) (5.4137) 
SIZE    0.1160 0.5949 
    (0.6620) (0.8363) 
ROA    -0.0434 -0.0586** 
    (-1.3610) (-2.6975) 
LEV    -0.0166* -0.0424 
    (-1.8416) (-1.4349) 
TOBIN    -0.1143 0.5234 
    (-1.2666) (0.9973) 
Constant 18.5953*** 18.7263*** 17.7269*** 4.6396*** 12.4480* 
 (38.6010) (36.6524) (17.7279) (3.6264) (1.7975) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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COUNTRY FE YES YES YES YES NO 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3478 0.3480 0.3525 0.4260 0.1687 
This table presents the results of the (panel) regressions estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. If indicated, the regressions include year-, country-, or firm-
fixed effects. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed). 
  
116 
Table 9: Results of the Panel Regression Analyses by Country 
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
VARIABLES Denmark France Norway UK 
Main Variables of Interest:    
VOL 0.4317*** 0.3778*** 0.3836** 0.3757*** 
 (8.1522) (5.3633) (2.8085) (11.7995) 
MReg -0.0097 0.1835 0.7314*** 0.4180*** 
 (-0.1071) (1.4911) (4.0183) (5.8709) 
VOLxMReg -0.0064 -0.0938 -0.4137*** -0.1102** 
 (-0.0919) (-1.4304) (-3.7890) (-2.6700) 
Control Variables:     
CSP 0.2595*** 0.4346*** 0.8200*** 0.4179*** 
 (7.0661) (15.1910) (5.4173) (13.2371) 
SIZE 0.0810** 0.0625*** 0.0664 0.0025 
 (2.8237) (3.9777) (1.3056) (0.4809) 
ROA -0.0047 -0.0040 -0.0115 0.0022*** 
 (-1.2577) (-0.9473) (-1.8032) (3.1666) 
LEV 0.0061*** -0.0011 0.0023 0.0009 
 (3.7529) (-1.3901) (0.3246) (1.0932) 
TOBIN 0.0783*** 0.0299 -0.1567 -0.0122* 
 (5.0571) (0.8178) (-1.0959) (-1.7745) 
Constant -1.7113*** -1.0843*** -1.1171* -0.4303*** 
 (-6.6544) (-5.3496) (-1.9674) (-5.1620) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY FE NO NO NO NO 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO 
Observations 191 704 137 1,826 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6996 0.5918 0.6859 0.6332 
This table presents the results of the (panel) regressions for each country with mandatory regulations in place, 
estimated with robust standard errors. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. If indicated, the regressions include 
year-, country-, or firm-fixed effects. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed). 
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Figure 1: The Model of Corporate Sustainability Disclosure 
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Figure 2: Mandatory Sustainability Disclosure Regulation in Europe 
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1. Introduction 
There is one and only one social responsibility of business — to use its resources and engage in 
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is 
to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud. 
Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman, 1962: 133) 
Friedman’s (1962) argumentation for the primary purpose of business has often been regarded as 
a doctrine of profit maximization. At closer sight, however, it becomes clear that Friedman really 
established clear borders within which this profit orientation of businesses is justified – these are 
“open and free competition” and “without deception or fraud”. If we narrow down our business 
focus to the financial intermediary business conducted by banks, we can follow the public 
revelation that many of the globally operating financial institutions have not been playing “within 
the rules of the game”: they had and still have to pay high prices for legal misconduct, cartelization 
and misleading their own customers. At the same time, the rules of the game have increased in 
today’s society, with climate change and social inequality being on top of the list of global policy-
makers as well as industry leaders. 
The financial industry – because of its intermediary role for the real economy – is thereby often 
the industry most focused on. Many regulators, economists, and bank managers agree that 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors need to be integrated into the strategic and 
operational assessments of financial companies. They suppose that environmental and social 
issues, and especially a disorderly market response to them, represent a material threat to banking 
stability (Alexander, 2014). While many banks have been publishing sustainability reports, 
addressing and disclosing environmental, social and governance risks (see e.g. Hummel and Festl-
Pell, 2015), as of 2015, a majority of them does not take systemic risks from structural changes 
into consideration, but merely concentrates on managing the addressed issues on an operational 
risk level (Alexander, 2014; KPMG and WWF, 2015). At the same time, many large banks run on 
business models that are at least partly disconnected from the fundamental intermediary role of 
banks as the financiers of the real sector. Furthermore, it seems that there are still too many bank 
credits that go to private consumers as opposed to corporations. Moreover, short-term trading 
securities, some of them disentangled from the real sector’s business cycle, still contribute too 
much to the overall fee-generating business of global banks. Both the neglect of the systemic 
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externalities of their business conduct as well as the volatile and short-term business models of 
banks give rise to potential regulatory intervention. 
Upon request of the G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors, the Task Force on Climate-
related Financial Disclosure (TCFD), chaired by Michael Bloomberg, has been set up to make 
sector-specific risks of environmental change explicit, with the financial industry as one of the 
sectors investigated.1 At the December 2015 U.N. Climate Change Conference in Paris, the largest 
U.S. financial institutions published a joint statement in which they announced their willingness 
to contribute to general prosperity and growth (Joint Statement, 2015). The Nobel Prize winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz also underscored the need for accounting for ESG factors in a talk at the 
University of Zurich in early 2016. He emphasized that especially environmental issues will have 
a huge impact on the global economy and that incorporating these issues into banks’ business 
models is more needed than ever. Last but not least, also leaders in the finance industry call for the 
integration of ESG factors. A notable example is the plea of the world’s largest investor, 
BlackRock Chairman and CEO Laurence D. Fink, for companies to focus in their earnings reports 
on the long-term impact of their business decisions. Thereby he singles out ESG factors and 
admonishes companies to realize that these factors are core to their business success (Fink, 2016). 
However, the consensus that companies need to integrate ESG factors into their business models 
is as of today neither followed by suggestions for how to do that nor by suggestions on how to 
monitor the effectiveness of its enforcement. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to contribute 
to the development of an index for measuring environmental, social, and governance issues. As 
this research is today pertinent to the world of finance and as, at the same time, there is only little 
research on how ESG connects to banks in particular, the paper at hand focuses on globally 
operating, large banks. Thereby the paper intends to gain insight into the factors that influence 
banks’ ESG scores. Furthermore, the paper inquires whether banks’ ESG scores have explanatory 
power for the performance of banks. In order to do so, we rely on a dataset that consists of 270 
large, globally operating banks which are domiciled in 50 different countries. The data provide 
                                                          
1
 The task force released its first report on March 31, 2016, setting out fundamental principles for effective 
disclosures, and is currently preparing a report specifically focused on how companies can and should disclose the 
financial impact of climate change (FSB, 2016). 
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information on ESG measures as well as on general performance measures of these banks in the 
period from 2005 to 2014.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section reviews the theoretical 
background of the paper. Subsequently, we provide a literature review and develop the hypotheses 
on the determinants and effects of the ESG Banking Governance Index. The section thereafter 
presents our research design. This is followed by a section on the empirical results of our paper. 
The final section concludes the paper. 
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2. Theoretical Background: Convergence of Public Policy and Market Policy  
There is a long-standing debate over whether the primary goal of companies is to maximize the 
benefits of shareholders only, or the benefits of all stakeholders. However, recent research suggests 
that shareholder- and stakeholder-maximization do not need to be mutually exclusive and that, 
quite the opposite, the two can be mutually enforcing. Especially in the long term, the relationship 
between stakeholders and shareholders can be conceptualized as “a mutually reinforcing, 
interactive network” the total of which needs to be maximized (Freeman et al., 2010, p. 132; see 
also Post, Preston and Sachs, 2002). This development gathers momentum with the ever-growing 
attention to ecological issues – climate change, in particular – and how these issues affect business. 
Environmental concerns, which is one of three factors of the Environmental, Social, and 
Governance Index for the banking sector developed in this paper, provide a fitting example for 
demonstrating that latest research on the relation of shareholders and stakeholders increasingly 
reaches the conclusion that the interests of both groups can and do, indeed, often overlap. We will, 
first, indicate that public policy, which is traditionally related to stakeholder demands, converges 
to the shareholder perspective. Second, we demonstrate that, at the same time, market policy, 
which is traditionally connected to shareholder demands, converges to the stakeholder perspective. 
2.1 Public Policy and Stakeholders 
Marc Carney, the governor of the Bank of England, points out that there is a clash between the 
time horizon of banks which he calls “relatively short” and the time horizons which underlie “the 
real challenges to prosperity and economic resilience from climate change”; he speaks of “a 
tragedy of horizons” (Carney quoted in The UNEP Inquiry Report, 2015, p. 21; see for similar 
statements: Weber, 2016). That the incentives that drive the banking sector can, under certain 
circumstances, run counter to ensuring the long-term stability of the banking system is another 
familiar point (Evans-Pritchard, 2015). But, at the same time, there is increasing awareness of the 
fact that the major global challenges cannot be met without, let alone against the interests of the 
financial sector.  
The financial crisis and the tightening of capital requirements that it amounted to led to worries 
that environmental concerns would be among the first casualties. The argument was that due to 
the capital intensiveness of most investments into renewable energy, environmental issues are 
prone to suffer when investment capital becomes tight. This also prompted the discussion whether 
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environmental risks should be included into the Basel III Accords (see e.g. Alexander 2014). Such 
an inclusion could, for example, allow for capital requirements on bank loans to be applied flexibly 
when existing guidelines conflict with crucial challenges on the wider society. In the wake of the 
financial crisis, the European Union has, for instance, discussed whether it should concede 
additional flexibility regarding the capital requirements on banks to free additional capital for bank 
lending to small and medium enterprises (European Banking Authority, 2015).  
Furthermore, in many countries governments have encouraged its central banks to become driving 
forces of environmental policies. This phenomenon not only embraces developed countries such 
as the Netherlands and the UK, but also developing countries as well as the BRIC countries. The 
Central Bank of Brazil was, already in 2011, the first regulator of a banking sector that utilized the 
discretion that Pillar 2 of Basel II and III concedes by asking banks to test whether or not 
environmental risk factors can serve as proxies for credit and market risks. Also, under the same 
discretion, the Central Bank has asked banks to take into account environmental governance 
aspects as part of the bank’s broader corporate governance policies. (Center for Sustainability 
Studies at Getulio Varga, 2014).2 Moreover, the People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank, 
has issued green credit guidelines which are supposed to foster responsible lending practices with 
all banks domiciled in the country (China Green Finance Taskforce, 2015). Also the Central Bank 
of Kenya has hit the headlines with its M-KOPA program that supports solar energy in rural areas 
(Frangoul, 2015).  
The most ambitious program of relying on the central bank as a driver of ESG-factors, however, 
comes from public policy-makers in Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh tries to develop 
the country by improving the inclusion of its financial industry as well as the environmental 
sustainability of the energy sector. To make that happen the country’s central bank has launched 
programs that lead the countries’ banks to give out significantly more loans to the rural economy 
and provide access to finance for sustainable projects. It does that, on the one hand, with incentives, 
such as providing lower rates of refinancing if a bank supports the rural economy with credits. On 
the other hand, it enforces requirements on banks to direct a minimum proportion of their loans to 
green projects such as projects related to renewable energy and energy efficiency (Rahman, 2013). 
Atiur Rahman, the governor of the Central Bank of Bangladesh argues that a positive relation 
                                                          
2
 We thank Kern Alexander for clarifications on this point. 
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exists between so called ‘green finance’ and stable economic growth. He, therefore, demands that 
such financing should leave “the sidelines” and move to “the mainstream of global financial flows” 
(Rahman, 2015). Such a shift cannot be elicited without the banking sector. 
2.2 Market Policy and Shareholders 
Recent developments demonstrate that investing sustainably, especially with regards to ecological 
issues, may no longer be a demand that needs to be imposed on the financial sector by external 
forces. The sustainability report of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP reports that “more than 1,300 
institutional investors worldwide, representing $59 trillion in assets under management have 
signed on to the U.N. Principles of Responsible Investing, which seek to integrate sustainability 
concerns into investment objectives. Some of the largest pension plans, endowments, and other 
institutional investors are also becoming vocal advocates for sustainable investing and reporting”. 
(2016, p. 2). In addition, the report notes that large institutional investors, in particular, also frame 
their “guidelines for sustainable investing” (ibid.). In February 2016, Lawrence D. Fink, 
BlackRock’s Chairman and CEO, as well announced that BlackRock from now on takes 
sustainability criteria into account when making investment decisions.   
These developments also have an impact on rating agencies. Rating agencies have by now included 
sustainability parameters into their assessment of companies as well as of countries. Standard & 
Poor’s, one of the so called ‘Big Three’ credit-rating agencies provides a case in point. Reacting 
to demands from its clients, the rating agency started to compose regular reports on climate change 
in which it stresses that climate change has become a “global mega-trend” which the financial 
sector must reckon with (2014, p. 3). Standard & Poor’s takes environmental issues of companies 
into account and expects that events related to climate change will, sooner or later, significantly 
influence even their ratings of countries (Nichols, 2014). 
Stock exchanges are yet another influential player in the drive to increase publicly relevant 
information regarding environmental issues, climate change in particular (Cleary, 2015). Brazil’s 
BOVESPA stock exchange was among the first that adopted a commitment to having companies 
report such information. It linked “requirements on reporting and substantive performance with 
access to capital-raising opportunities” (The UNEP Inquiry Report, 2015, p. 21). The 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange implemented similar requirements (ibid.). The efforts of 51 
different stock exchanges from around the world to push sustainability criteria to the forefront of 
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investment decisions have by now been brought under the umbrella of the ‘Sustainable Stock 
Exchanges Initiative’ which is a project of the United Nations. The initiative crafts guidelines 
which are used by the stock exchanges as a blueprint for helping publicly traded companies meet 
the demands of investors regarding access to a company’s sustainability performance (Sustainable 
Stock Exchanges Initiative, 2014).  
There are, hence, manifold movements from within many corners of the financial world to take 
ESG-factors into account. Thereby, most of the players concerned consider their own efforts as 
complementing, sometimes even as amending and bringing forward the efforts of public policy-
makers.  
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3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Influence of Bank’s Financial Characteristics on ESG Banking Governance 
Some scholars argue that companies that score high on ESG-indices and are successful in 
spreading this information, profit from lower costs of refinancing. The reason is that there are 
capital providers on the market that appreciate high ratings in ESG dimensions. These are often 
called ‘socially responsible investors’. Combined with the regular capital that is equally available 
to all market participants that demand capital these investors increase the supply of capital for the 
companies with higher ESG. This, in turn, results in lower costs of capital for companies with a 
high ESG-score. Haigh and Hazelton (2004) provide an assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of this argument (see also Garriga and Melé, 2004).  
Another business case for ESG involves what came to be called, based on the title of a popular 
2005-article in The Economist, the “Doing-Well-by-Doing-Good” argument. This argument 
makes the case that a company with a reputation of acting socially responsible creates benevolence 
on the side of investors, employees, consumers, and other parties of interest to companies. This 
will ultimately translate into financial advantages for the company in question. For support of this 
line of reasoning see, for example, Becker (1974), Andreoni (1989) and Besley and Ghatak (2005). 
Heal (2005) as well as Benabou and Tirole (2010) provide a neutral analysis of this argument. 
Margolis, Elfenbein and Walsh (2007) tested the argument in a meta-analysis of more than 150 
papers on this topic and only found meagre support for the thesis. For the paper at hand, the Doing-
Well-by-Doing-Good thesis suggests that there is a positive relation between a bank’s financial 
sustainability, as for example measured by its capital reserve, and a bank’s ESG performance. So 
the supposition is that banks that are financially more sustainable, i.e. run on a more cautious 
business model, are, at the same time, the ones that score higher in ESG. The reinforcing effect of 
the interaction between banks’ financial characteristics and their sustainability governance is 
summarized by the following hypothesis: 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between banks’ financial characteristics and their 
sustainability governance. 
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Friedman (1970) made the argument that it is not legitimate for the agents of a public company to 
use their principals’ money for non-profit concerns. If this was legitimate, managers would be free 
to exploit corporate cash to advance their personal desires or even to increase their personal 
reputation among people they deem important to their private advancement (see Tirole, 2001 for 
a discussion on the relation of philanthropy and corporate governance). In an oft-cited 1989-article, 
Jensen argued that profit motives in itself include taking issues into account that are today 
subsumed under the acronym ESG. He argued that a “shareholder-driven company” must invest 
in all measures that are of interest to stakeholders as long as “the additional benefits” of these 
investments “exceed the additional cost” (1989, p. 186).  
In line with these arguments, banks which opt for a riskier business model could score higher in 
ESG dimensions. The rationale is that such banks consciously take on more risk in order to increase 
profit, and this decision for a higher position on the risk-profit plane makes it rational for them to 
invest significantly more in risk management. Hence, companies that have high risk and therefore 
higher incentives to invest in risk management should perform better with regards to their ESG 
governance. If this line of reasoning proves correct, risky banks outperform secure banks in ESG-
indices. We formally state this substitutive relationship by the following hypothesis: 
H1b: There is a negative relationship between banks’ financial characteristics and their 
sustainability governance. 
 
3.2 Influence of Country Environment Score on ESG Banking Governance 
Many economists agree that, even in a world as globalized as the world today, the country of 
domicile, influences bank strategies on issues like ESG (see for a general discussion Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales, 2002). Papers by Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) and Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) suggest that the implications of the banking sector rely on broader national characteristics. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine’s (2004) research makes the case that the physiognomy of a 
country’s banking sector becomes insignificant when controlled for national indicators, such as 
economic freedom or property rights protection.  
On the other hand, there is evidence indicating that the characteristics of the banking sector can 
trigger effects on bank behavior which are independent of wider national characteristics. Barth, 
Caprio Jr. and Levine (2004) provide evidence for a causal relationship of this kind. They show 
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this based on a number of different characteristics which are peculiar to the banking sector, e.g. 
regulations on domestic and foreign banks’ market entry, loan classification habits and other 
characteristics.  
Regarding the national economy score, the most pertinent issue in the literature is whether the 
bank is domiciled in a developed or in a developing country. Inquiring into this issue Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2007) focus on corporate governance. Thereby they suppose that firms which 
are domiciled in less developed countries are less motivated to advance their governance 
mechanisms as they have less access to capital markets. Thus, companies from such countries 
should score lower in our ESG-score.  
The differentiation we draw within the dimension of our country environment score – i.e. into a 
banking sector score and a national economy score – as well as the different lines of reasoning 
within both of these realms prompt us to test the following four hypotheses: 
H2a: There is a positive relationship between the banking sector score and sustainability 
governance. 
 
H2b: There is a negative relationship between the banking sector score and sustainability 
governance. 
 
H2c: There is a positive relationship between the national economy score and sustainability 
governance. 
 
H2d: There is a negative relationship between the national economy score and sustainability 
governance. 
 
3.3 Interaction Effect of Bank Financials and Country Environment on ESG Banking 
Governance 
Beatty and Liao point out that the majority of studies treats the country environment of firms as a 
variable which is exogenous to bank characteristics. But it could well be the case that the 
characteristics of bank governance and the country environment are endogenously related (2014, 
p. 371). Beatty and Liao expound that the lacuna in the research on the endogeneity-issue is 
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especially pertinent when it comes to the banking sector: “Compared to non-banking industries, 
we know relatively little about how banks’ corporate governance interacts with regulation in 
shaping financial reporting and disclosure quality” (2014, p. 370).  
Evidence for the supposition that countries have an influence on bank characteristics is provided 
by papers that focus on the different effects on banks in developing versus in developed countries. 
John and Kedia (2003, 2004) inquire into the impacts of the development of the national economy 
on banks’ decision-making when they focus on a country’s technological quality of monitoring 
and how it affects the choice of governance mechanisms. They find that national economies are 
unable to provide the expertise necessary so that banks get their public reporting externally 
verified. Such a country environment has a negative impact on a bank’s costs of refinancing and 
therefore imposes restrictions to good governance (see Ball 2001 as well as Black 2001). Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2007) contribute to this research by presenting evidence that banks which are 
governed well, and should hence have advantages in terms of access to capital markets, can barely 
profit from their good governance if domiciled in a country with a bad national-economy-score. 
In these cases, the good governance on the micro-level of the bank is outweighed by the negative 
impacts on the macro-level of its home-country.  
The difference between developed and developing countries and how this difference interacts with 
bank characteristics is of special pertinence to measuring ESG variables. The reason is that in 
developing countries regulation policies for advancing an industry’s attention to ESG factors are 
often accompanied by differences regarding the policy-goals underlying ESG factors. In this 
regard, Monnin and Barkawi (2015) point out that in many developing countries green finance 
initiatives are often not initiated in their own right, but as vehicles to advance other policy priorities 
of the country. The authors determine that green finance initiatives, in particular, are often 
supported as part of a larger national program to reduce poverty, to develop rural parts of the 
economy, and/or to deal with issues of public health and basic sanitation, and these effects, not the 
protection of the environment, is the true reason for the implementation of green finance in 
developing countries.  
At the same time, there are studies that show that a high environmental score does not translate 
into good banking governance. Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) measured the effects of comparatively 
well-crafted regulations of the banking sector in the East Asian countries Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
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Singapore and Thailand. Their research indicates that these regulations do not have the desired 
effects in the face of managers and auditors that lack adequate incentives to comply with these 
regulations. A recent study by Christensen et al. (2016) underscores this finding. These findings 
complement research which is interested in the culture of managers as a driver of bank behavior 
(see for example Cohn, Fehr and Marechal 2014, 2015). 
The paper at hand tries to contribute to filling this lacuna. We test whether our findings on the 
influence of bank characteristics on ESG scores hold when interacting with either of the two 
dimensions of our banking environment score and vice versa. In other words, we inquire whether 
an interaction effect on ESG scores exists between the characteristics of individual banks and the 
level of development of the individual banks’ country of domicile with respect to the specificities 
of the country’s banking sector and with respect to the country’s national economy score, 
respectively. This yields the following four hypotheses: 
H3a: There is a positive relationship between the interaction of banks’ financial characteristics 
and its banking sector score and the bank’s respective sustainability governance. 
 
H3b: There is a negative relationship between the interaction of banks’ financial characteristics 
and its banking sector score and the bank’s respective sustainability governance. 
 
H3c: There is a positive relationship between the interaction of banks’ financial characteristics 
and its national economy score and the bank’s respective sustainability governance. 
 
H3d: There is a negative relationship between the interaction of banks’ financial characteristics 
and its national economy score and the bank’s respective sustainability governance. 
 
3.4 Social Impact of ESG Banking Governance 
A study by Paul and Siegel (2006) shows that the public reputation of companies is influenced by 
a company’s commitment to issues related to ESG. Financial data providers like Bloomberg and 
Thomson Reuters publish sustainability parameters which, among other things, are used to forecast 
the overall quality of financial products and institutions. Bloomberg reports that customer usage 
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of its ESG company reports has almost ten-folded from 2009 to 2015 and speaks of an “increasing 
mainstreaming of ESG data usage” (Bloomberg L.P., 2015).  
Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty (2006) have conducted a literature review and found that the 
scientific discourse on the importance of the reputation of companies has risen steadily since 1981. 
At the same time the financial crisis which started in 2007 has led to an unprecedented spark in 
paying attention to company’s reputation (Eisenegger and Künstle 2011; see also Carney 2013). 
The literature on this issue states that the market power and the willingness to change the banking 
business culture has not been strong in the run up to the global financial crisis, however has 
increased significantly after the crisis. Therefore, our dataset distinguishes between pre-crisis, 
during-crisis, and post-crisis times when measuring whether the ESG score of a bank has an impact 
on the bank’s reputation risk. In general, we expect banks with a high ESG score to achieve higher 
public recognition for its ESG investments as well as lower reputational risk, compared to banks 
with a low ESG score. Furthermore, we suppose that this relationship is especially strong in post-
crisis times. This reasoning is formally stated by the following hypothesis:  
H4a: There is no relationship between banks’ ESG Governance Index and their ESG-Awards or 
their Reputational Risk for the years 2005-2009. This relationship turns positive for ESG-Awards 
and negative for Reputational Risk in the years 2010-2014. 
 
Gillet, Hübner and Plunus (2010) studied the social effects of companies’ misconduct in 
governance issues. They are interested in the reputational risks implied in company misconduct 
that leads to a public scandal. They rely on 154 events as listed in the FIRST database of 
OpVantage in the time horizon 1990 to 2004. The events are related to companies in the financial 
sector that are listed on a major European or U.S. Stock Exchange. The authors disentangled 
operational losses from reputational damage by examining stock market reactions to the 
announcement of operational losses and tested for whether this announcement was accompanied 
by allegations of internal fraud. The results show significant abnormal returns at the announcement 
date of the loss, along with an increase in the volumes of trade when fraud was involved. As the 
results indicate that the losses in market value were significantly higher than the operational loss 
amount that was announced in the cases where fraud played a role, Gillet, Hübner and Plunus 
conclude that financial companies were penalized by the market also with a loss in reputation. 
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Thereby, the negative impact was proportionally greater when the loss amount represented a larger 
share in the financial company’s net profit. Although cases where fraud is involved are extreme, 
Gillet, Hübner and Plunus’s 2010-study demonstrates that governance issues have the potential to 
affect a financial company’s reputational risk, both in the short- and the long-run (see as a follow-
up study by the same authors Gillet, Hübner and Plunus 2012). This reasoning is formally stated 
in hypothesis H4b. 
H4b: There is no relationship between banks’ ESG Governance Index and their ESG-Awards or 
their Reputational Risk, respectively, both in the short-term (after one year) or in the long-term 
(after three years). 
 
3.5 Economic Impact of ESG Banking Governance 
If the whole banking industry is in distress, corrective actions on single banks can exacerbate the 
crisis due to the tight interrelations between the different banks in the industry (see e.g. Aebi, 
Sabato, and Schmid, 2012). Therefore, it is important to distinguish the overall states of the 
banking industry. The same argument applies to ESG issues since, just as is true for risk issues, 
also the lowering of social, governance, and environmental performance (as measured in ESG-
scores) can be caused by global factors. This is visible in climate change, or by an individual 
bank’s bad decisions, such as accumulating a too high exposure in industries which suffer from 
global warming. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis with regards to economic effects of 
a bank’s ESG governance in crisis and non-crisis times: 
H5a: There is no relationship between banks’ ESG Governance Index and their Financial 
Performance variables or their Business Risk variables for the years 2005-2009. This relationship 
turns positive for Financial Performance variables and negative for Business Risk variables in the 
years 2010-2014. 
 
Whether measures such as ESG scores have explanatory power for a company’s economic success 
in the short- or long-term, is as well a contested issue in the literature. The results have been 
contradictory (see for three different results, for example, McWilliams and Siegel 2000, Margolis 
and Elfenbein, 2008 as well as Wright and Ferris 1997). Gramlich and Finster (2013) investigated 
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whether a company’s corporate sustainability as measured by the company’s inclusion in 
sustainability indices and the number of years included explains the company’s risk. The authors 
argue that the level of sustainability is likely to have a long-term impact on the dimension of risk. 
However, their findings which are based on 167 European companies do not provide clear 
evidence for the supposed relation. On the other hand, Jo and Na’s (2012) study, which focuses on 
companies in what the authors refer to as controversial industry sectors (especially alcohol, 
tobacco, and gambling), finds such a risk-reducing relation, both in the short- and the long-term. 
Due to prior studies’ contradictory findings with regards to short- and long-term economic effects 
of ESG investments, we formally state the following hypothesis: 
H5b: There is no relationship between banks’ ESG Governance Index and Financial Performance 
variables or their Business Risk variables, respectively, both in the short-term (after one year) or 
in the long-term (after three years). 
 
A graphical depiction of the full model of determinants and effects of the ESG Banking 
Governance Index is provided in Figure 1: 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Measurement of ESG Banking Governance Index 
With the ESG-BGI (short for: Environmental, Social and Governance Banking-Governance-
Index), we intend to create a measure for assessing a financial institution’s investment into 
environmental, social and governance issues. The ESG-BGI is the aggregated score of three 
individual indices: the ESG structure score, the ESG reporting score, and the ESG business 
activities score. Each of these three scores relies on Thomson Reuter’s ASSET4 database. The 
highest possible ESG score is 22 which results from the fact that ESG-BGI’s sub-scores consist of 
22 different binary-coded dimensions. The answer ‘yes’ yields ‘1’. The answer ‘no’ yields ‘0’. As 
is elaborated by Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine (2004), we use this method which assigns equal 
weight to all the dimensions the score is composed of, because this increases the transparency 
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about changes in the response rate of the index when one or more of the dimensions need to be left 
out.  
Table 1 displays the composition of the ESG structure score as the first sub-score the ESG-BGI is 
composed of. This score comprises nine different dimensions.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 displays the composition of the ESG reporting score as the second sub-score the ESG-BGI 
is composed of. This score comprises six different dimensions.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 displays the composition of the ESG business activities score as the third sub-score the 
ESG-BGI is composed of. This score comprises seven different dimensions.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.2 Measurement of Bank Financial Characteristics 
The Bank Financial Characteristics Score (BF score) measures a bank’s core business financials 
in relation to its competitors. The BF score is a sum index which is built by taking above and below 
mean values of twelve measures. Six of the measures are proxies for asset and capital quality. Six 
are proxies for business risk. If ‘Above Mean’ indicates good bank financial quality, all banks 
whose financial ratio lies above the mean of all banks in the sample, score “1”, all others score 
“0”. If, on the other hand, ‘Below Mean’ indicates good bank financial quality, all banks whose 
financial ratio lies below the mean of all banks in the sample, score “1”, all others score “0”. We 
follow Ellul and Yeramilli (2013) in the inclusion of the single dimensions, especially past annual 
returns and the various balance sheet variables. All data used for this score are retrieved from 
Bloomberg.  
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Table 4 lists the twelve dimensions of the Bank Financial Characteristics. The first six dimensions 
are proxies for asset and capital quality. The other six dimensions are proxies for business risk.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.3 Measurement of Country Environment Score 
With the Country Environment Score we are interested in the general conditions a country is able 
to provide for the banks that are domiciled in it. In taking up country-specific variables, we rely 
on Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales’s (2002) argument that for the near future single countries will 
continue to have an influence on companies in general. We employ two different proxies for the 
country environment score – a banking sector score or a national economy score. The majority of 
sources for the dimensions of these two scores are retrieved from the International Monetary Fund 
when it comes to the banking sector score and from the World Bank when it comes to the national 
economy score. 
Table 5 depicts the banking sector score. It compares countries with regards to the specificities of 
their banking sector. The banking sector score is a sum index built by taking above mean values 
of six different measures. In choosing the dimensions we follow the IMF’s Financial Access 
Survey and the IMF’s Financial Soundness Indicators. We thereby retrieve six dimensions.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6 provides an overview of the national economy score. This score provides evidence for a 
country’s economic development in comparison to other countries. The national economy score is 
a sum index consisting of six above mean values and one below mean value.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
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4.4 Measurement of Social and Economic Performance and Risk 
With regards to bank performance we differentiate between social and economic performance. 
Both of these dimensions are complemented with a risk measure. This yields two different panels.  
Panel A of table 7 shows measures for social performance and risk. Data is derived from the 
Thomson Reuter’s ASSET4 database. The dimension to measure social performance is whether 
the company has received an award for its social, ethical, community, or environmental activities 
or performance. The dimension for measuring risk in the Panel A is provided by the bank’s answer 
to the question whether it has been part of media controversy with regards to bribery, corruption, 
political contributions, improper lobbying, money laundering, parallel imports or any tax fraud.  
Panel B of table 7 displays the economic performance and risk measure. Economic performance 
data are retrieved from Bloomberg and are measured in two different dimensions. The first relies 
on return on assets (ROA) and, hence, the profit earned by a bank through the use of all its capital. 
The second uses return on equity (ROE) and, hence, how much value the bank created with the 
investment of shareholder’s money. Data for the risk dimensions are retrieved from BankScope 
and also measured in two different dimensions. The first relies on the variance in total business 
volume and, therefore, on the yearly change in total on-plus off-balance sheet assets. The second 
uses the bank’s impaired loan ratio.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.5 Sample Selection and Description 
Our dataset consists of 270 banks which are domiciled in 50 different countries. The chosen banks 
are a result of data accessibility. These 270 banks are the ones that have been included in the 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database over the whole time horizon (from 2005 to 2014) and that 
have provided answers to the queries relating to ESG factors (see for the particular queries Tables 
1 to 3). All banks in the panel are large, globally operating banks3. As we only deal with a subset 
of all banks, namely globally operating, large banks, our results may not be applicable for findings 
                                                          
3
 Size is measured in terms of the book value of the banks’ assets, with total assets varying from USD 2,071 million 
at the lower end to over USD 3.3 trillion at the higher end. 
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on the banking industry as a whole. However, our focus on this kind of banks improves the 
comparability of banks in our dataset. This is also the case since the banks in our sample comply 
with international accounting standards and tend to receive regular media coverage. For these 
reasons, it is less likely that our results are biased by accounting or public negligence differences 
of the banks investigated (see for the advantages of such an approach Laeven and Levine (2009)). 
The homogeneity of banks in our sample is, however, limited by the fact that the banks rely on 
different business model specializations.  
The time horizon of our study is given by the period of 2005 to 2014. The starting year of the time 
horizon of our sample, 2005, is mostly caused by the fact that Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database 
has been launched in 2004. Hence, it yields the first full measures for the year 2005. However, it 
is crucial for our study that the time horizon we employ allows us to compare the data with regards 
to the global financial crisis which started in 2007. For reasons we lay down in sections 3.4 and 
3.5 we find it sensible to differentiate between pre-crisis, during-crisis, and post-crisis times. With 
its start in 2005 the time horizon that we employ allows for this differentiation. 
  
145 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Table 8 presents summary statistics for the key social and economic performance and risk 
variables, the individual bank financials, and the country environment scores for the banks in our 
panel data set. The panel data comprise one observation for each bank-year combination. The 
summary statistics on the ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) indicate that our index is 
highly skewed to the right and has light tails. Hence, there are very few banks which reach high 
index values. This is also confirmed by the trend analysis of the mean values of the ESG-
Governance Index (Figure 2). The mean values display a gradual improvement of all the ESG-
Governance components over time, however mean values stay far below the maximum of 22 for 
the ESG BGI in all years.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
We find that the sampled banks’ Bank Financial Score has a mean value of more than 6.7 out of a 
maximum of 11 for all bank-year observations and a relatively low standard deviation of 1.76. On 
average, the Banking Sector Score is 2.05 out of a maximum of 5 for all bank-year observations. 
However, the standard deviation for the Banking Sector Score is high at more than 1.12, indicating 
a high variety of the sampled countries’ banking sector development. The second Country 
Environment variable, the National Economy Score, paints a similar picture, with a mean value of 
2.90 and a standard deviation of 1.25 and a maximum value of 5.  
The size distribution of the sampled banks, in terms of the book value of their assets, is highly 
skewed with total assets varying from USD 2,071 million at the lower end to over USD 3.3 trillion 
at the higher end. Due to the skewness of the size distribution of the sampled banks, we use the 
logarithm of the book value of assets, denoted Size, as a proxy for the banks’ size in all our 
empirical specifications. 
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In Table 9, we present the pair-wise correlations between the social and economic performance 
and risk measures of ESG effectiveness, the ESG Banking Governance Index and its bank financial 
and country environment determinants. We use an asterisk (*) to denote statistical significance at 
the 10% level.  
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
The ESG Banking Governance Index is positively correlated with the ESG-Award, which is 
consistent with the idea that banks with a high ESG banking governance get rewarded by the 
public. However, the univariate correlation between the ESG Banking Governance Index and 
Reputational Risk is also significantly positive. This might be a sign for higher public scrutiny of 
banks which invest in ESG banking governance. From the economic perspective, the business risk 
variable, Variation in Business Volume, is significantly negatively correlated with the ESG 
Banking Governance Index, however the second business risk variable, Impaired Loan Ratio, is 
significantly positive correlated with the index. This might be a first indication that the index 
captures overall market risk better than just the credit risk as measured by the Impaired Loan Ratio. 
At the same time, the ESG Banking Governance Index is negatively correlated with Return on 
Assets and not correlated with the Return on Equity measure. We must caution here, however, that 
this correlation is not taking into consideration any time periods which are longer than one year. 
 
The Bank Financial Score’s correlations with the social and economic performance and risk 
measures are in all single cases the exact opposite from the ESG Banking Governance Index’s 
correlations with those measures, which is also displayed in the significantly negative correlation 
between the Bank Financial Score and the ESG Banking Governance Index. This suggests that 
those banks with less sustainable bank financials have higher ESG Banking Governance Indices. 
We must caution, however, against over-interpreting the results from Table 9, as this table simply 
lists pair-wise correlations that do not control for the impact of the bank’s country environment. 
 
5.2 Univariate Tests 
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Table 10 presents a univariate comparison of bank characteristics between banks with high ESG 
Banking Governance Indices versus those with low ESG Banking Governance Indices. We define 
the dummy variable High ESG BGI to identify, in each year, banks whose ESG Banking 
Governance score is greater than the median value of ESG Banking Governance across all banks 
during the year. High ESG = 1 identifies banks with a high ESG Banking Governance score, 
whereas High ESG = 0 identifies banks with a low ESG Banking Governance score. We use ***, 
**, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
We then run a univariate comparison of the mean values of various bank financial and country 
environment characteristics between the two subsamples identified by High ESG BGI = 0 and 
High ESG BGI = 1. To obtain a first impression of the potential differences between banks with a 
HIGH ESG Banking Governance score and banks with a LOW ESG Banking Governance score, 
we compare the social and economic performance and risk measures of ESG effectiveness and the 
bank financial and country environment determinants between these two groups of banks. The 
results are reported in Table 10. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
In terms of social performance and risk, we find that banks with high ESG BGI both have a higher 
probability to receive an ESG-Award and to come under scrutiny for reputational risk. The 
univariate comparison also displays that banks with a low ESG BGI have higher return on assets. 
However, banks with a high ESG BGI have higher return on equity measures. In terms of financial 
risk, banks with high and those with low ESG BGI do not differ significantly in their Variations 
in Business Volume as well as in their credit risk, as measured by the Impaired Loan Ratio. 
Banks with low ESG BGI have a higher Bank Financial Score, indicating that it is the financially 
less sustainable banks which actually achieve higher ESG Banking Governance. Same as Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013) with regards to their risk management index, we also find that banks with high 
ESG Banking Governance scores are larger in size. 
In terms of the banks’ country environment, we find that banks with low ESG BGI have higher 
national economy scores, hinting towards prior research’s claims that it is the banks domiciled in 
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developing countries which invest more in ESG Governance. When looking at the banking sector, 
this relation changes as banks domiciled in countries with a more developed banking sector have 
higher ESG Governance scores.  
However, to deduce some conclusive evidence with respect to the effect of ESG-Governance 
on the banks’ social and economic performance, we have to rely on multivariate analyses as many 
of the key explanatory variables are correlated with each other as well as with the banks’ 
performance and risk measures. 
 
5.3 Multivariate Tests 
5.3.1 Determinants of ESG Banking Governance Index 
We begin our multivariate analysis by examining the determinants of ESG-Governance. To do so, 
we estimate panel regressions of the form: 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
In the above equation, subscript j denotes the bank and t denotes the year. In these regressions, we 
control for important bank financial characteristics (BFS) and country environment characteristics 
(BSS and NES) that may affect banks’ ESG governance. We estimate the regression on a panel 
that has one observation for each bank-year combination, and spans the 2005 to 2014 time period 
(10 years’ time horizon). We include year fixed effects and bank specialization fixed effects in all 
specifications. We include bank specialization fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across the different bank business models. Therefore, the coefficients capture the 
effect of a change in the underlying variable on the change in ESG Governance within the same 
banking specialization.4 All specifications are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
                                                          
4
 We decided to use bank specialization fixed effects to be able to use the most specific group constant term. We 
could not use bank-firm fixed effects as we are examining the variation of banks’ financial characteristics. The same 
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errors that are clustered at the level of specialization. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 11 presents stepwise regression models that examine the relationship between banks’ ESG-
Governance Scores and their financial (BFS) and country environment (BSS in Panel A and NES 
in Panel B) characteristics, gradually introducing our main variables of interest and the interaction 
between these two variables. The results presented in Colum III of Panel A and Panel B correspond 
to our full regression model, i.e., equation (1) and (2), respectively.  
In terms of the one year lagged Bank Financial Score (BFS), all model specifications reveal a 
negative and significant relationship with the ESG Banking Governance Index, thereby supporting 
hypothesis H1b. A one-point increase in the lagged Bank Financial Score corresponds to a decrease 
in the ESG BGI of 1.1454, all else equal. The economic significance of the coefficient estimate of 
BFS is therefore large. The result seems to suggest that financially unsustainable banks have a 
higher ESG BGI because they consider investments into ESG measures as part of their extended 
risk management. Hence, banks with riskier, less stable bank financials tend to invest more in high 
quality ESG governance. Therefore, financial stability as measured by high-quality bank financials 
and the ESG BGI level seem to be substitutes, rather than complements.  
As expected, the Banking Sector Score (BSS) is positively associated with the ESG Banking 
Governance Index and economically significant with a coefficient estimate of BSS for 
specification III of 1.3898, corresponding to a 0.72-point increase of BSS for a one-point increase 
in the ESG BGI. Thus, we find support for hypothesis H2a. Consistent with standard approaches 
to reach more inclusive and stable financial systems (higher BSS), this finding indicates that the 
direct effect of countries with more developed banking systems is an enhancement of the banks’ 
ESG Governance. ESG-related policy measures, therefore, seem to be most effective if the 
country’s banking sector is highly developed. 
                                                          
holds true for the exclusion of country fixed effects as we are examining the effect of the national environment on 
the bank’s ESG governance level. 
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Interestingly, the National Economy Score (NES) is neither statistically nor economically 
significantly associated with the banks’ ESG governance, so we can neither support hypothesis 
H2c nor H2d. With regards to the Country Environment measures, a higher Banking Sector Score 
seems to be the driving force for a high ESG BGI, whereas the development of the National 
Economy does not have any significant impact on the ESG BGI. Hence, policy measures which 
try to enhance sustainability measures in different industries by mandating equal requirements 
from all sectors, may prove to be ineffective for the banking industry. 
Finally, we introduce the interaction between BFS and BSS. This interaction is negatively and 
significantly related to ESG BGI in all specifications, thereby supporting hypothesis H3b. This 
negative interaction effect reinforces the negative effect of the BFS on banks’ ESG governance 
level. The total effect of BFS (β1+ β3) remains negative (specification III), providing further 
evidence that the level of the ESG BGI is higher for banks with weaker bank financials. However, 
when taking the interaction effect between BFS and NES into account, the picture changes: Table 
11, Panel B shows that the sign of the relationship between the ESG BGI and the National 
Economy Score depends materially on each banks’ financial characteristics. In the regressions that 
include the interaction between the bank’s BFS and its Country Environment Score (both BSS and 
NES), the index of the Country Environment Score enters negatively and significantly. This may 
provide a first indication that a further development of a country’s banking sector as well as a 
country’s national economy are unnecessary for higher ESG banking governance, when the banks 
themselves have fundamentally sound and stable business models. 
Hence, ignoring the interactions between the country environment and the financial characteristics 
of the individual banks leads to erroneous inferences about the impact of more stringent policy 
measures to develop sustainable banking sectors and each country’s national economy on the ESG 
Governance of individual banks. From this perspective, improvements in ESG economy and 
banking sector policy measures will only improve the quality of ESG Banking Governance when 
the policy system is customized to the banks domiciled in the respective country. 
 
5.3.2 Social Performance and Risk Effects of ESG Banking Governance Index 
We use the following two variables to measure the social performance and risk effects of our ESG 
Banking Governance Index: ESG-Awards and Reputational Risk. ESG-Awards is measured taking 
the binary answers from the ASSET4 database which asks companies whether they have received 
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an ESG award in the respective year. We measure Reputational Risk using answers from the same 
database on the question whether the company suffers reputational risk because of issues around 
business misconducts. 
In this section, we are specifically interested in the following two time periods: Pre-, Crisis, and 
Post-Crisis periods and short-term versus long-term time periods. To test the Pre-, Crisis- and Post-
Crisis social performance and risk effects of the ESG Banking Governance Index, we estimate 
panel regressions of the following form 
 (3) 
 
 (4) 
 
We estimate these regressions on a panel that has one observation for each bank-year combination, 
includes all 270 sample banks, and spans the 2005 to 2014 period. In the above equation, subscript 
j denotes the bank and t denotes the year. The dependent variable of regression (3) is ESG Award, 
and the main independent variable is the bank’s ESG BGI. PRE is a dummy variable that equals 1 
for the pre-crisis years, 2005 to 2007; CRISIS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the crisis 
years, 2008 and 2009; POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the post-crisis years, 2010 to 
2014. When examining the Pre-, Crisis, and Post-Crisis periods, we condition on the bank 
financials, the country’s banking sector and the country’s national economy that may affect ESG-
Awards and Reputational Risk, respectively. We include year fixed effects in all our specifications, 
and control for unobserved heterogeneity across banks using bank specialization fixed effects. 
The results of our estimation are presented in Table 12. In all specifications, the standard errors 
are robust to heterogeneity and are clustered at the individual bank level. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 12 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
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Panel A of Table 12 displays the effect of the Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis ESG Banking 
Governance Index on ESG-Award. In this regression, ESG-Award is a measure of the banks’ 
ability to receive an ESG-Award in a certain year. In terms of the coefficients on the interaction 
term of ESG BGI x PRE, we find that the coefficient is positive and weakly significant without 
any controls. However, this association turns insignificant as soon as we include our control 
variables. As the variable ESG BGI stays significantly positive, and the total effect of a one-point 
increase in ESG BGI at pre-crisis times is economically significant, with a 41% higher chance to 
receive an ESG-Award, we conclude that the impact of ESG Banking Governance on the 
possibility to receive an ESG-Award has been significantly positive in the pre-crisis years of 2005 
to 2007. 
Interestingly, the interaction of ESG BGI x CRISIS is significantly negative, indicating that the 
effect of the ESG Banking Governance Index on the possibility to receive an ESG-Award is lower 
in crisis years compared to non-crisis years. The total effect of a one-point increase in ESG BGI 
at crisis times is also economically significant, with a 34% lower chance to receive an ESG-Award. 
The interaction of ESG BGI x POST is again significantly positive, indicating that the effect of 
the ESG BGI on the possibility to receive an ESG Award is significantly higher after the financial 
crisis than in pre-crisis and crisis years. However, the total effect of a one-point increase in ESG 
BGI at post-crisis times results in an economically significant, lower chance to receive an ESG-
Award. Hence, we do not find any support for hypothesis H4a with regards to ESG-Awards.   
Panel B of Table 12 displays the effect of the Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis ESG Banking 
Governance Index on Reputational Risk. We find that the interaction of ESG BGI x PRE is 
positive, but neither statistically nor economically significant with and without any controls.  This 
indicates that the ESG Banking Governance Index has no impact on Reputational Risk in the pre-
crisis years of 2005 to 2007. As is the case with ESG Award achievements, the interaction of ESG 
BGI x CRISIS is significantly negative, indicating that the effect of the ESG Banking Governance 
Index on Reputational Risk is lower in crisis years compared to non-crisis years. The interaction 
of ESG BGI x POST is positive, but not significant, indicating that the effect of the ESG BGI on 
Reputational Risk weakens slightly in post-crisis years. In sum, these results display a more critical 
attitude of the public towards the true sustainability risk of banks, reflected in a higher reputational 
risk for banks with lower ESG Banking Governance Indices during the crisis years, compared to 
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the years before and after the financial crisis. We therefore do not find any support for hypothesis 
H4a concerning Reputational Risk. 
Next, we test the impact of short- and long-term ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) on 
social performance and risk, again taking ESG-Award as a proxy for social performance and 
Reputational Risk as a proxy for social risk. We specify the regressions in the following form 
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The results are shown in Table 13, Panel A for the effects on ESG-Award achievements and Panel 
B for the effects on Reputational Risk. When examining the short- versus long-term effects, we 
control for the second social variable, i.e. when testing the social performance effects, we control 
for the risk effect and when testing the social risk effects, we control for the performance effect.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 13 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Concerning the impact of short- and long-term ESG BGI on ESG-Award, we find that a 
comparably strong ESG Banking Governance Index in the prior year is related to a higher 
probability to receive an ESG-Award in the current year. But this relation turns negative, with 
banks with lower ESG Governance Indices three years ago having a higher probability of receiving 
an ESG-Award in the respective current year. This might point towards an award system which 
rewards a relative improvement of a bank’s sustainability governance for being electable for an 
award, instead of an absolute ESG-Governance threshold. 
A higher probability to receive a sustainability award is unrelated to bank financials in the short-
term, however same as with the ESG BGI, banks with less sustainable bank financials three years 
ago have a weakly higher probability to receive a sustainability award. A lower Banking Sector 
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Score (BSS), however, leads to a higher probability to receive an award in the short-term. In the 
long-term, the banking sector seems to be unrelated with the probability of receiving an award. A 
more developed national economy (NES), on the other hand, is only weakly positively related to 
receiving an award in the short-term, but unrelated in the long-term. The results also indicate a 
positive relation between ESG-Awards and Reputational Risk, thereby questioning the validity of 
ESG-Awards as an unbiased measure of low reputational risk. 
 
With regards to the impact of short- and long-term ESG BGI on Reputational Risk, the positive 
and highly significant coefficient on the one year lagged as well as on the three years lagged ESG 
Banking Governance Index indicates that a strong ESG Banking Governance Index in the prior 
year and three years ago is related to a higher reputational risk. Hence, a high ESG Banking 
Governance Index enforces, rather than reduces reputational risk, both in the short- and long-term. 
However, the relationship between reputational risk and the ESG Banking Governance Index is 
economically small. This indicates that banks which invest in ESG Banking Governance are under 
slightly higher scrutiny by the public. 
We also find that higher reputational risk is linked with unsustainable bank financials in the short- 
and long-term as indicated by the significantly negative, but economically rather small coefficient 
on the Bank Financial Score (BFS). Banking sector development seems to be unrelated with 
reputational risk. However, a more developed national economy appears to lead to more 
reputational risk in the long-term, thereby pointing to a vigilant and supervising civil society and 
government. The results also indicate a positive relation between ESG-Awards and Reputational 
Risk, thereby again questioning the validity of ESG-Awards. 
 
5.3.3 Economic Performance and Risk Effects of ESG Banking Governance Index 
We use the following four variables to measure the economic performance and risk effects of our 
ESG Banking Governance Index: Return on Assets and Return on Common Equity for the 
economic performance and Variance in Total Business Volume and Impaired Loan Ratio for the 
economic risk. To test the Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis economic performance and risk effects of 
the ESG Banking Governance Index, we estimate panel regressions of the following form 
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The results of our estimation are presented in Table 14. In all specifications, the standard errors 
are robust to heterogeneity and are clustered at the individual bank level. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 14 about here 
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In Table 14, Panel A we examine how the association between ESG-Governance and ROA varies 
between pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis years. As before, PRE is a dummy variable that equals 1 
for the pre-crisis years, 2005 to 2007; CRISIS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the crisis 
years, 2008 and 2009; POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the post-crisis years, 2010 to 
2014. 
The results in Table 14, Panel A indicate that in the pre-crisis period the interaction of ESG BGI 
x PRE is significantly negatively associated with Return on Assets (ROA). This seems to suggest 
that a high ESG-Governance does not earn higher returns in the pre-crisis period. Yet, the 
economic significance of the coefficients with controls (column II) is rather small. Furthermore, 
we do not find any significant relationship between ESG-Governance and Return on Assets during 
the crisis nor the post-crisis periods. In the crisis period, the interaction ESG BGI x CRISIS is 
marginally positively associated with Return on Assets, indicating a slight, but economically 
insignificant reward in the form of higher Return on Assets for banks with high ESG-Governance 
during times of crisis. However, the different time frames seem to determine the economic 
relationship between the ESG BGI and the banks’ Return on Assets, with 15% increase of the 
Return on Assets in crisis periods.  
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In Panel B of Table 14 we find that opposite to the negative association between ESG-Governance 
and ROA, the association between ESG-Governance and the banks’ return on common equity 
(ROE) is positive and highly significant, with larger positive, yet economically rather small 
coefficients to ESG-Governance before the crisis years. Good ESG-Governance over all time 
periods examined appears to have a significant positive effect on Return on Equity. However, the 
crisis period by itself seems to have a significantly negative impact on banks’ ROE measure. In 
column IV, the coefficient of ESG BGI x CRISIS is marginally positive, but insignificant, 
indicating that the impact of good ESG-Governance on banks’ Return on Equity does not vary 
during crisis times. However, we find a switch in the relation between good ESG-Governance and 
ROE before and after the crisis from significantly positive to marginally negative. This may 
provide a first indication that the equity investors which invest in banks with good ESG-
Governance after the crisis (=POST) are not the ones interested in very high, short-term returns 
anymore. Hence, it seems that investors become more favorable about sustainably operating banks 
after the financial crisis, which is in line with theory that shareholder and stakeholder demands are 
converging. In addition, whereas banks with more sustainable bank financials are able to earn 
higher returns for their investors, banks with a lower Banking Sector Score as well as a lower 
National Economy Score earn higher returns for their investors. This suggests that equity investors 
price risk differently, depending on whether the bank’s own financial structure or externally 
imposed standards of the banking sector or country of domicile are concerned. 
 
As displayed in Panel C of Table 14, the effect of Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis ESG Banking 
Governance Index on the banks’ Variance in Total Business Volume is in line with our findings 
about size: Larger banks are considered riskier after the financial crisis. We find a weakly 
significant, positive interaction effect of ESG BGI x PRE, which switches to a highly significant, 
negative interaction effect of ESG BGI x POST. Hence, banks with higher ESG-Governance 
scores after the crisis seem to decrease their business volume to achieve more stable core business 
levels. The exact opposite effect seems to hold for the banks’ Impaired Loan Ratio as shown in 
Table 14, Panel D. Here highly significant and negative interaction effects of ESG BGI x PRE and 
ESG BGI x CRISIS change to a highly significant, positive interaction effect of ESG x POST. 
However, the economic relationship between the ESG BGI and the banks’ Impaired Loan Ratio is 
largely driven by the different time frames. 
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Lastly, we test the impact of short- and long-term ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) on 
economic performance and risk, again taking banks’ Return on Asset and Return on Common 
Equity as proxies for economic performance and banks’ Variance in Total Business Volume and 
banks’ Impaired Loan Ratio as proxies for economic risk. We specify the regressions in the 
following form 
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The results are shown in Table 15, Panel A for the effects on Return on Asset (ROA), Panel B for 
the effects on Return on Common Equity (ROE), Panel C for the effects on banks’ Variance in 
Total Business Volume and Panel D for the effects on the banks’ Impaired Loan Ratio.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 15 about here 
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Concerning the impact of short- and long-term ESG BGI on the bank’s Return on Asset, we find 
that a comparably low ESG Banking Governance Index in the prior year is related to a higher 
Return on Asset for the bank in the current year. This relation stays the same in the long-term as 
again the coefficient on the three-year lagged ESG BGI is significantly negative. This might point 
towards an economic performance effect under which profit maximization is not the primary target 
of sustainable banks. 
Interestingly, the impact of ESG-Governance on the banks’ Return on Equity varies with the time 
horizon: on a short-term basis, the relationship between ROE and ESG-Governance is significantly 
positive. However, taking into consideration the ESG-Governance score of three years ago, the 
impact of good ESG-Governance turns negative and significant, providing evidence that the return 
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on equity is higher for banks with weaker ESG-Governance. This result is consistent with the 
notion that ESG-Governance effects on the banks’ financial performance measures should be 
considered over a longer time horizon. As a high ESG-Governance score widely contradicts a high 
return on equity measure, our results are in line with theoretical predictions criticizing ROE as a 
misguided short-term measure. 
 
With regards to the impact of short- and long-term ESG BGI on banks’ Variance in Total Business 
Volume, the negative and highly significant coefficient on the one year lagged as well as the 
negative, but insignificant coefficient on the three years lagged ESG Banking Governance Index 
indicates that a strong ESG Banking Governance Index in the prior year and three years ago is 
related to a lower Variance in Total Business Volume. Hence, a high ESG Banking Governance 
Index slightly reduces economic market risk, both in the short- and long-term. This is in line with 
banks investing into ESG Banking Governance due to its risk mitigation potential. Regarding the 
impaired loan ratio, the data indicates a different impact of short-term and long-term ESG BGI of 
a bank. Whereas the coefficient of the one year lagged ESG BGI shows a significantly negative 
relation, the three year lagged ESG BGI indicates a significantly positive effect. However, this 
result may as well be an indication for the higher and more timely loan loss recognition of 
sustainable banks compared to unsustainable banks which tend to delay loan losses. 
 
5.4 Robustness Tests 
A specific concern about our econometric methodology is that of endogeneity. A bank might adopt 
a certain level of ESG banking governance and the financial characteristics of that bank might 
occur in response to specific forces that we do not observe. Without any clear external controls, 
our ability to deal with this endogeneity issue is limited. One approach we use to mitigate these 
concerns is to lag the bank financial and country environment characteristics by one year relative 
to the respective examined years. 
 
Next, we test the validity of the ESG Banking Governance Index as a proxy for a sustainable 
business conduct. For this, we rerun the regressions (1) and (2) with the individual component 
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scores – the ESG Structure Score, the ESG Reporting Score, and the ESG Business Activities 
Score –  which together build the ESG Banking Governance Index:  
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The results are presented in Table 16 and are similar to the main findings of the determinants of 
the ESG Banking Governance Index presented in Table 11. For all three individual scores, the 
coefficient on the variable BFS (t-1) is again negative and significant, which confirms our prior 
finding that financially less sustainable banks have comparably higher ESG Banking Governance 
Indices. Same as in our results with the sum score, ESG Banking Governance Index, the National 
Economy Score NES(t-1) has no significant impact on the individual component scores, whereas 
the Banking Sector Score BSS(t-1) significantly positively impacts all component scores. 
Therefore, we are confident that our ESG Banking Governance Index captures the key aspects of 
sustainable banking business management. The interaction effects between the bank financial 
characteristics on the one hand and the two country environment scores on the other also stay the 
same as in Table 11, with minor differences in their significance: the interaction effect between 
BFS and NES is negative, but insignificant for the ESG Structure Score, whereas the interaction 
effect between BFS and BSS is negative, but insignificant for the ESG Business Activities Score. 
This seems to suggest that the banking sector development is more important for a sustainable 
banking structure, but the development of the overall national economy in which the bank is 
domiciled plays a major role in fostering sustainable banking business activities. Lastly, our 
findings are more in line with the risk-reduction hypothesis than the window-dressing hypothesis 
(Hummel and Festl, 2015; Jo and Na, 2012) since we find no significant difference between the 
ESG Reporting Score and the ESG Business Activities Score, i.e. it is the same banks which have 
a good ESG reporting who also integrate ESG measures into their business activities. Thus, our 
findings remain stable if we account for the influence of the individual components of the ESG 
Banking Governance Index, which, again, supports hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. 
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Finally, in Table 17, we investigate whether our results change if we use the real values for the 
individual bank financials which build the Bank Financial Score, BFS instead of the above and 
below mean values as used in the main regressions. For this, we test the correlations between the 
ESG Banking Governance Index and the individual bank financials, once using above and below 
mean values and once using their real values. This analysis enables us to check whether our 
findings still hold true with the binary approach used. We find two significant differences between 
above/below mean and real values. For the bank financial variable Provisions for Loan Losses/ 
Total Loans the correlation with the ESG Banking Governance Index remains slightly positive if 
real values are used, however the correlation loses its significance. Using real values for the 
variable Off-balance sheet commitments/ Total Assets, we do not find any significant relationship 
between this ratio and the ESG Banking Governance Index. All other variables keep their 
significance and correlation sign. We can therefore conclude that our overall results still hold using 
the binary above/ below mean Bank Financial Score for our main regressions. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we first construct an ESG-index for the banking industry. Secondly, we explain this 
index for individual banks by bank financial, banking sector, and country specific variables, and 
third, we measure the impact of the ESG-index on banks’ social and economic performance.  
Prior literature (e.g. Aebi et al., 2012; Cohn et al., 2015; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Gillet et al., 2012) 
indicates that banks can have a comparatively high – compared to companies from other sectors – 
incentive to invest in ESG measures, because ESG criteria can be understood as part of a bank’s 
wider risk management. Our data display a significantly positive correlation between the financial 
riskiness of a bank and its score in ESG measures. Vice versa, the less risky the business model of 
a bank is, the lower it scores in the ESG Banking Governance Index. This can be of relevance for 
policy-makers since it contradicts the frequently held assumption that in order to advance 
environmental, social, and governance concerns, a country should rather incentivize its banking 
industry so as to lower risk. On the other hand, our findings can be interpreted the other way 
around: it seems more important that banks are incentivized to deliver solid and sustainable risk 
management. The reason is that, according to our data, this is not only a sensible goal in its own 
right but also serves as an effective measure to advance the fulfillment of ESG criteria. 
Furthermore, we ran regressions to test whether, on the one hand, banking-sector specific and 
whether, on the other hand, national-economy specific characteristics influence the ESG scores of 
individual banks in the country of domicile under consideration. Either of these two dimensions 
makes up our country environment score. Thereby, our dataset indicated that characteristics of the 
banking-sector surpass characteristics of the country’s national economy score when accounting 
for the ESG scores of individual banks. Hence, our findings support the stream of literature (e.g. 
Barth et al., 2004; Doidge et al., 2007) that argues that regulation of the economy can only have 
an impact on the banking sector if it is tailor-made to the specificities of the banking-sector. Our 
data, thus, reject the kind of literature (e.g. Ball et al., 2003; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004) that supposes that the banking sector of a country has no separate 
influence on ESG scores apart from national economy characteristics.  
At the same time, our results do not indicate that the national economy score of a country is 
negligible for understanding the ESG scores of individual banks. Therefore, our research connects 
to the vast literature that emphasizes that especially the differences between developed and 
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developing countries are pertinent for understanding ESG. Our data indicates that risky banks 
invest comparably more in ESG when they are domiciled in a country with a comparatively high 
banking-sector score. That the higher banking-sector score of a country is closely linked to a higher 
degree of competition in the country’s banking sector strengthens our supposition that risky banks 
consider ESG to be part of its risk management strategy.  
All in all, our results on what drives the ESG scores of individual banks build a coherent case for 
assuming that the ESG scores of banks can only be improved with policy measures when these 
measures are, first, tailored to the banking industry and, second, tailored to specific countries. This 
applies to policies internal to the market as well as to public policies. Therefore, the findings of 
our paper raise a cautionary flag regarding supra-national efforts for framing and implementing 
global super-regulations. ‘Think globally but regulate locally’ is our paper’s provisional 
recommendation to policy-makers.  
We also used our dataset to test whether a bank’s ESG score has wider repercussions on the bank’s 
performance with regards to earning awards, decreasing reputational risk, improving ROE as well 
as ROA and decreasing business risk. We tested these variables with a number of differentiations 
that are suggested by the previous literature on ESG. We relied on a differentiation between pre-
crisis, during-crisis, and post-crisis times as well as on a differentiation between banks’ short-term 
and long-term ESG-score. Our data indicates that the banks’ ESG governance scores are relevant 
for their social and economic performance. As such, our study adds to this part of the literature on 
ESG that deems ESG an indicator of wider bank performance (e.g. Gramlich and Finster, 2013; 
Hummel and Festl-Pell, 2015). Furthermore, our data demonstrates that this effect has significantly 
increased since the financial crisis. Therefore, we provide empirical support for the argument that 
the financial crisis has led to shifts regarding what investors value in a large bank. Especially the 
fact that this evidence is strong for the financial effects lends itself to the claim that investors pay 
more attention to a bank’s ESG score since the crisis than before the crisis.  
Connecting the findings of the paper at hand to the wider theoretical background it belongs to, and 
as we sketched it in section 2, our paper can be interpreted as lending credence to the hypothesis 
that there is increasing convergence between stakeholder and shareholder demands. Ensuing from 
the insight of Jensen (1989) that shareholder-driven companies must at least pay attention to 
potential profitable investments in stakeholder interests, the findings of the paper at hand 
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emphasize that there is no strict dichotomy between stakeholder and shareholder demands. More 
specifically, the findings of this paper provide tentative support for Rahman’s argument that there 
is a positive relation between so called ‘green finance’ and economic growth (Rahman, 2015) as 
well as for the “Doing-Well-by-Doing-Good” argument (Andreoni, 1989; Becker, 1974; Besley 
and Ghatak, 2005). The strong relation between a bank’s ESG-score and its financial performance, 
which the paper at hand provides evidence for, indicates that, at the very least, investments in ESG 
do not disadvantage banks compared to competitors that do not make such investments. At the 
same time, the finding that risky banks score significantly higher on ESG indices, compared to 
secure banks, demonstrates that corporate strategies that are traditionally presumed to be 
shareholder-driven are not, in general, in conflict with larger social demands. Therefore, our 
findings suggest that the quote by Friedman (1962) that introduced the paper at hand might be 
telling the truth, but only part of the truth. It should probably be complemented as follows: 
There is one and only one responsibility of economic policy-makers – to use its policies for 
engaging in rules designed to improve ESG-factors so long as it stays connected to the banking 
sector, which is to say, engages in intellectual exchange with the latest developments in the 
world of finance, without distrust or suspicion.  
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Table 1: Composition of ESG Structure score 
 
ESG Structure  
Question 
Evaluation 
of ESG 
Structure 
quality  
Explanation Source 
Does the company have a 
policy to maintain an 
effective and independent 
CSR committee? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
General Rule: Only direct statements by the 
company matter here. Inference through 
legal obligations must not be taken into 
account here. 
CSR: The company strives to maintain a 
committee reviewing the company's policies 
and programs that relate to matters of 
corporate responsibility (social and 
environmental) 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Is the senior executive's 
compensation linked to 
CSR/H&S/ Sustainability 
targets? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Companies will receive a "Yes" for this 
indicator if any one of their senior 
executives' compensation is linked to 
CRS/H&S/Sustainability targets. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company describe 
the implementation of its 
integrated strategy through a 
public commitment from a 
senior management or board 
member?  
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Companies which make a commitment 
about Integrated Vision and Strategy and/or 
have a CSR Sustainability Committee will 
receive a "Yes" for this indicator. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company describe 
the implementation of its 
integrated strategy through 
the establishment of a CSR 
committee or team? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Companies who make a commitment about 
Integrated Vision and Strategy and/or have a 
CSR Sustainability Committee will receive a 
"Yes" for this indicator. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company have a 
policy to integrate ESG 
issues into its strategy and 
day-to-day decision making? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Integrated Strategy: The company strives to 
achieve on a company-wide vision, strategy 
or policy where sustainable development, 
social or environmental elements are a focal 
element of it. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Has there been a public 
commitment from a senior 
management or board 
member to integrate ESG 
issues into the company 
strategy and day-to-day 
decision making? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
General Rule: Only direct statement by the 
company matter here. Inference through 
legal obligations must not be taken into 
account. 
 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
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Does the company have a 
CSR committee or team? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
* Data on any team/committee dedicated to 
managing environmental and social issues of 
the reporting organization on a day to day 
basis is considered. 
* The team can be termed as committee 
comprising of employees of the reporting 
organization, who are operational on a day 
to day basis and are not part of the board 
committees, as listed under Corporate 
Governance matters. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company have a 
policy to avoid bribery and 
corruption at all its 
operations? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Bribery and Corruption: The company 
strives to avoid bribery and corruption for all 
its operations. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company train its 
employees on the prevention 
of corruption and bribery? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
The company has training measures in place 
to teach its employees on the prevention of 
corruption and bribery. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
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Table 2: Composition of ESG Reporting score 
 
ESG Reporting  
Question 
Evaluation 
of ESG 
Reporting 
quality  
Explanation Source 
Does the company report on 
belonging to a specific 
sustainability index? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
* Sustainability indexes such as 
FTSE4Good, DJSI 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Has the company signed the 
UN Global Compact? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
* Data from external source 
(http://www.unglobalcompact.org) is 
considered. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company explain 
how it engages with its 
stakeholders? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
* Data on how the reporting organization is 
engaging with its stakeholders, how the 
stakeholders are involved in its decision-
making process and what procedures are in 
place for engagement is considered. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company publish a 
separate sustainability report 
or publish a section in its 
annual report on 
sustainability? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
* The minimum number of pages required is 
5 pages  
* When the company publishes CSR reports 
bi-annually, in any year when there was no 
report, the data point is answered No. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company report 
about the challenges or 
opportunities linked to the 
integration of financial and 
extra-financial issues? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Data on how the company reports openly 
about the challenges or opportunities of 
integrating financial and extra-financial 
issues, and the dilemmas and trade-offs it 
faces. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company integrate 
financial and extra-financial 
factors in the management 
discussion and analysis 
section of the annual report? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Data on how the reporting organization is 
integrating financial and extra-financial 
factors in the management discussion and 
analysis section of the annual report. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
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Table 3: Composition of ESG Business Activities score  
 
ESG Business Activities  
Question 
Evaluation 
of ESG 
Business 
Activities 
quality  
Explanation Source 
Does the company 
participate in any emissions 
trading initiative, as reported 
by the company? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
*Data on whether the reporting organization 
claims to be participating in any emission 
trading (cap-and-trade) scheme is 
considered. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company report on 
making environmental 
investments to reduce future 
risks or increase 
opportunities? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
*Data point takes into account investment 
made by the reporting organization in the 
current Fiscal Year so as to reduce future 
risks and increase future opportunities 
related to the environment. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company report on 
ESG screened Assets Under 
Management? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
*Data on whether the reporting organization, 
as an asset manager, is integrating 
environmental criteria in its decision making 
process prior to making an investment is 
considered. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Is the company a signatory 
of the Equator Principles 
(commitment to manage 
environmental issues in 
project financing)? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
* Data from external source 
(http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/members-
reporting) is considered. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company claim to 
use ESG criteria as part of 
its investment or lending or 
underwriting decisions? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
*Focus is on project financing. 
*What is considered here is whether 
reporting organization is evaluating projects 
based on ESG risks prior to providing 
funding to its customers. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company report on 
assets under management 
which employ 
environmental screening 
criteria or environmental 
factors in the investment 
selection process? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Data on whether the reporting organization, 
as an asset manager, is integrating 
environmental criteria in its investment 
selection process. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Does the company show in 
its role as an asset manager 
that it promotes socially 
responsible investments? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Data on whether the reporting organization, 
as an asset manager, is reporting about its 
role of promoting socially responsible 
investments. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
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Table 4: Composition of Bank Financial Score (BFS) 
 
Formula Evaluation 
of bank 
financial 
sustain-
ability 
Explanation Source 
Total Assets Below mean A below mean size of the bank is regarded 
as less risky and more viable. 
Bloomberg 
RWAs/Total Assets Below mean The share of risk-weighted assets to total 
assets is decreasing asset risk 
Bloomberg 
Net Charge-Offs to Loans = 
[Annualized (Total Charge-
Offs - Total Recoveries)] / 
Average Total Loans 
Below mean The net charge-off ratio evaluates the 
financial institution’s loan quality and risk 
management practices. 
Bloomberg 
Provisions for Loan Losses / 
Net Interest Income 
Below mean This ratio is a profitability measure of the 
bank with respect to its interest-earning 
business. The lower the numerator and the 
higher the denominator, the more profitable 
the loan business of the bank. 
Bloomberg 
Provisions for Loan Losses / 
Total Loans 
Below mean This ratio is part of Asset Quality ratios of 
the bank and determines the quality of loans 
of a bank (credit risk). The higher the ratio, 
the more problematic the loans are and vice 
versa. 
Bloomberg 
Off-balance sheet 
commitments / Total Assets 
Below mean This ratio determines the transparency and 
counterparty risk of a bank. The higher the 
off-balance sheet commitments to total 
assets, the less transparent and more volatile 
the asset base of the bank. 
Bloomberg 
Long-term debt to equity Above mean A higher share of long-term debt is 
decreasing volatility risk. 
ASSET4 
Database 
Return on Asset Above mean A higher return on total assets is increasing 
long-term performance. 
Bloomberg 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Above mean A higher Tier 1 capital ratio is decreasing 
capital risk. 
Bloomberg 
Deposits to Funding Above mean This ratio shows the share of deposits to the 
total funding of banks. The higher the share 
of deposits, the more long-term and 
Bloomberg 
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therefore the less risky the funding of the 
bank. 
Commercial Loans / Total 
Loans 
Above mean This ratio determines the type of loan the 
bank makes. The higher the share of 
commercial loans, the more efficient the 
bank’s role as a financial intermediary to the 
real sector. 
Bloomberg 
Long-term Borrowings / 
Total Liabilities 
Above mean This ratio represents the liability risk of 
banks. The higher the share of long-term 
borrowings to total liabilities, the less risky 
the liabilities of the bank. 
Bloomberg 
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Table 5: Composition of Banking Sector Score (BSS) 
 
Formula Evaluation of 
banking 
sector 
development 
Explanation Source 
Commercial 
bank branches 
per 100,000 
adults 
Above mean This measure represents the density of bank 
branches and therefore the physical access of 
adults to banks. 
International Monetary 
Fund, Financial Access 
Survey website 
Outstanding 
loans from 
commercial 
banks (% of 
GDP) 
Above mean This measure represents the use of financial 
services of commercial banks. 
International Monetary 
Fund, Financial Access 
Survey website 
Outstanding 
deposits with 
commercial 
banks (% of 
GDP) 
Above mean This measure represents the funding of financial 
services of commercial banks. 
International Monetary 
Fund, Financial Access 
Survey website 
Number of 
ATMs per 
100,000 adults 
Above mean This measure represents the access to financial 
institutions’ physical outlets. 
International Monetary 
Fund, Financial Access 
Survey website 
Bank 
Regulatory 
Capital to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets 
Above mean This ratio measures the capital adequacy of 
deposit taking banks. Capital adequacy and 
availability ultimately determine the degree of 
robustness of financial institutions to withstand 
shocks to their balance sheets. 
Data submitted by 
national authorities to 
the IMF following the 
Financial Soundness 
Indicators (FSI) 
Compilation Guide and 
for dissemination 
through FSIs website 
http://fsi.imf.org/ 
Country-
specific 
frameworks to 
include 
environmental 
risks in banking 
Above mean This measures represents the existence of 
country policy measures which govern 
environmental risks in the banking sector. 
Stability and 
Sustainability in 
Banking Reform: Are 
Environmental Risks 
Missing in Basel III? 
(CISL & UNEP FI, 
2014) 
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Table 6: Composition of National Economy Score (NES) 
 
Formula Evaluation of 
national 
economy 
development 
Explanation Source 
GDP growth  
(annual %) 
Above mean Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products.  
World Bank national 
accounts data, and 
OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
GDP per 
capita (current 
US$) 
Above mean GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. 
World Bank national 
accounts data, and 
OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
Foreign direct 
investment, 
net  
(BoP, current 
US$) 
Above mean Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in 
an enterprise operating in an economy other 
than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-
term capital, and short-term capital as shown in 
the balance of payments.  
International Monetary 
Fund, Balance of 
Payments Statistics 
Yearbook and data 
files. 
Agriculture, 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
Above mean Agriculture includes forestry, hunting, and 
fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and 
livestock production. Value added is the net 
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs.  
World Bank national 
accounts data, and 
OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
CO2 
emissions 
(metric tons 
per capita) 
Below mean Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming 
from the burning of fossil fuels and the 
manufacture of cement. They include carbon 
dioxide produced during consumption of solid, 
liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring. 
Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis 
Center, Environmental 
Sciences Division, Oak 
Ridge National 
Laboratory, Tennessee, 
United States. 
CSR 
Disclosure 
Efforts by 
Stock 
Exchanges 
Above mean The Initiative for Responsible Investment 
believes that environmental and social 
disclosure is a key enabler of responsible 
investment. CSR Disclosure Efforts by Stock 
Hauser Institute for 
Civil Society 
(http://hausercenter.org/
iri/wp-
content/uploads/2011/0
172 
Exchanges are important in facilitating growth 
in the field. 
8/CSR-Disclosure-
Updates-4-18-14.pdf) 
CSR 
Disclosure 
Efforts by 
Governments 
Above mean The Initiative for Responsible Investment 
believes that environmental and social 
disclosure is a key enabler of responsible 
investment. CSR Disclosure Efforts by 
Governments are important in facilitating 
growth in the field. 
Hauser Institute for 
Civil Society 
(http://hausercenter.org/
iri/wp-
content/uploads/2011/0
8/CSR-Disclosure-
Updates-4-18-14.pdf) 
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Table 7: Composition of Social and Economic Performance and Risk (SPR and EPR) 
 
 
Panel A: Composition of Social Performance and Risk (SPR) 
 
Social Performance/ Risk  
Question 
 
Evaluation of 
Social 
Performance/ 
Risk 
 
Explanation 
 
Source 
Has the company received 
an award for its social, 
ethical, community, or 
environmental activities or 
performance? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Corporate Social Responsibility awards or 
rankings received by the reporting 
organization are considered. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
Is the company under the 
spotlight of the media 
because of a controversy 
linked to bribery and 
corruption, political 
contributions, improper 
lobbying, money laundering, 
parallel imports or any tax 
fraud? 
Yes = 1;  
 No = 0 
Data on whether the reporting organization 
is openly criticized by the media because 
of issues around bribery, corruption, 
political contributions, improper lobbying, 
money laundering, parallel imports or tax 
fraud. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
ASSET4 
database 
 
Panel B: Composition of Economic Performance and Risk (EPR) 
 
Economic Performance/ 
Risk Formula 
 
Evaluation of 
Economic 
Performance/ 
Risk 
 
Explanation 
 
Source 
Return on Asset = Net 
Income + [Interest Expense 
× (1 – Tax Rate)] / Average 
Total Assets 
 
Measures the 
profit earned 
by a bank 
through the 
use of all its 
capital 
A higher Return on Total Assets is 
increasing long-term performance of the 
bank. 
Bloomberg 
Return On Common Equity 
(in percentage) = (Net 
Income / Average Total 
Common Equity) 
Measures how 
much value 
the bank 
created with 
the investment 
of 
shareholder's 
money 
A higher Return on Common Equity is a 
sign of high profitability to the 
shareholders of the bank. However, if the 
Return on Asset does not increase at the 
same time, it may be a sign of risky debt 
management to boost equity investors’ 
short-term profit at the expense of debt 
investors’ long-term profit. 
Bloomberg 
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Variance in Total Business 
Volume = (Total Off-
Balance Sheet Items + Total 
Assets)(year t+1) / (Total 
Off-Balance Sheet Items + 
Total Assets)(year t) 
Measures the 
yearly change 
in total on- 
plus off-
balance sheet 
assets.  
A sharp decrease in total business volume 
from one year to the next indicates both a 
very volatile and a highly risky off-balance 
sheet business model of the bank.  
BankScope 
Impaired Loan Ratio = 
Impaired Loans/ Gross 
Loans 
Measures the 
credit quality 
of the bank in 
comparison 
with other 
banks and 
over time. 
Lending remains the primary business line 
for the banking industry, and credit quality 
remains the predominant source of risk. 
BankScope 
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Table 8: Summary Statistics (Entire Panel)  
 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ESG Banking 
Governance Index 
2339 5.557503    6.065335          0 21 
Return on Assets 
 
2480 .4225806    .4940695          0 1 
Return on Common 
Equity 
 
2471 .5422906    .4983091          0 1 
Variation in Total 
Business Volume 
1987 .1140815    .2463844   -.7509375   2.215044 
Impaired Loan Ratio 2146 3.646808 4.12161       .033     44.836 
ESG-Award  1995    .5062657 .5000861          0 1 
Reputational Risk  1995    .1709273    .3765398          0 1 
Size (logAssets) 2516 11.29767    1.544746   5.313303   15.11018 
Long-term debt to 
equity  
1896 42.76781    28.57201        .02      90.05 
 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
  
2155 11.74495    4.432304         -6       83.4 
RWAs/Total Assets  2187 .6139702    .2315119   .0006605   5.049456 
Net Charge-Offs to 
Loans  
   1534    .7109171    .9695181    -1.4353     9.0666 
Provisions for Loan 
Losses / Net Interest 
Income  
2458 21.17398    31.49496   -80.3007   582.3486 
Provisions for Loan 
Losses / Total Loans  
2429    .0097286    .0175075   -.1030737   .5037449 
Deposits to Funding  2489    75.57983    17.72627        .7512        100 
Commercial Loans / 
Total Loans  
1514 .5146327    .2271944    .000154   1.549024 
Long-term 
Borrowings / Total 
Liabilities  
2369 .1079266    .1226452   2.93e-06   .9947281 
Off-balance sheet 
commitments / Total 
Assets  
1985 1725.15    76811.17   7.66e-06    3422195 
Bank Financial 
Score 
2610 6.717625    1.760354          0         11 
Banking Sector 
Score 
 
2710 2.049077    1.124655          0 5 
176 
National Economy 
Score 
2710 2.89631    1.248086          0 5 
 
Table 8 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis.  
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Table 9: Correlations among Key Variables 
 
 ESG-
Award 
Reputa- 
tional Risk 
Variation in 
Business 
Volume 
Impaired 
Loan Ratio 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
ESG Banking 
Governance  
(t-1) 
ESG Banking 
Governance (t-1) 
0.3934*  0.4218*  -0.1616*  0.1099*  -0.2131*  -0.0218   1.0000 
Bank Financial 
Score (t-1) 
-0.1594* -0.2940* 0.1136* -0.2979* 0.2902* 0.2091* -0.3051*  
National Economy 
Score (t-1) 
-0.0773* 0.1037* -0.0209  -0.3460* -0.1408* -0.1476* -0.0769*  
Banking Sector 
Score (t-1) 
-0.0765*  0.0347   -0.1317*  -0.0786*  -0.3364*  -0.3564*  0.0978* 
Size (t-1) 0.3884*  0.4564*  -0.1923*  0.0127   -0.3299*  -0.0980*  0.6814* 
 
Table 9 presents pair-wise correlations between the social and economic performance and risk measures of ESG 
effectiveness, the ESG Banking Governance Index and its bank financial and country environment determinants.  
We use an asterisk (*) to denote statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 10: Univariate Comparison of High vs. Low ESG Governance Banks  
 
 High ESG 
BGI=0 
High ESG 
BGI=1 
Difference p-value No. of 
observations 
of High 
ESG=0 
No. of 
observations 
of High 
ESG=1 
ESG-Award .2622081 .7245964 -.4623883*** 0.0000 942 1053 
Reputational Risk .0626327 .2678063 -.2051736*** 0.0000 942 1053 
Return on Assets .470233 .3807721 .0894608***   0.0000 1159 1321 
Return on Equity .5215146 .5607334 -.0392188* 0.0508 1162 1309     
Variation in Business 
Volume 
.1208518 .1072496 .0136022 0.2186 998 989 
Impaired Loan Ratio 3.358288 3.91509 -.5568017 -.5568017 1034 1112 
Bank Financial Score  
(t-1) 
7.106713 6.312991 .7937216*** 0.0000 1162 1196 
National Economy 
Score (t-1) 
3.014694 2.821967 .1927268*** 0.0001 1225 1223 
Banking Sector Score 
(t-1) 
2.003265 2.151838 -.1485723*** 0.0012 1225 1223 
Size (t-1) 10.48532 12.02335   -1.538035*** 0.0000 1104     1152 
 
Table 10 presents a univariate comparison of bank characteristics between banks with high ESG versus those with 
low ESG. We define the dummy variable High ESG to identify, in each year, banks whose ESG Banking 
Governance score is greater than the median value of ESG across all banks during the year. High ESG = 1 identifies 
banks with a high ESG Banking Governance score, whereas High ESG = 0 identifies banks with a low ESG 
Banking Governance score. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 11: Determinants of ESG Banking Governance Index  
 
Panel A: Linear and Non-linear relationship between banks’ ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) and 
their Bank Financial Score (BFS) and Banking Sector Score (BSS)   
 I II III 
Main Variables of Interest:    
BFS (t-1) -1.1454*** -1.1155*** -0.9747*** 
 (-14.8846) (-19.4491) (-24.4077) 
BSS (t-1)  0.9121*** 1.3898*** 
  (5.1509) (6.3357) 
BFS x BSS   -0.0853*** 
   (-7.7980) 
    
Constant 11.3096*** 7.3581*** 7.2782*** 
 (15.3792) (27.0539) (24.7524) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
SPECIALISATION FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO 
Observations 2,149 2,149 2,149 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2030 0.2269 0.2309 
 
Panel B: Linear and Non-linear relationship between banks’ ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) and 
their Bank Financial Score (BFS) and National Economy Score (NES)   
 I II III 
Main Variables of Interest:    
BFS (t-1) -1.1454*** -1.1244*** -0.8181*** 
 (-14.8846) (-20.9560) (-11.0492) 
NES (t-1)  -0.3641 0.3629 
  (-0.6548) (0.9478) 
BFS x NES   -0.1227*** 
   (-3.8731) 
 
   
Constant 11.3096*** 11.6791*** 9.3537*** 
 (15.3792) (9.2183) (15.5389) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
SPECIALISATION FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO 
Observations 2,149 2,149 2,149 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2030 0.2071 0.2202 
 
This table presents the results of (panel) regressions estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the bank 
specialization level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. The regressions include year- and specialization 
effects. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed). 
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Table 12: Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis Social Performance and Risk Effects of ESG 
Banking Governance Index 
 
Panel A: Effect of Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) on ESG-Award 
Achievements   
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Main 
Variables of 
Interest: 
       
ESG BGI 0.0375*** 0.0399*** 0.0420*** 0.0433*** 0.0341*** 0.0345*** 0.0301*** 
 (49.9110) (54.5405) (35.6762) (28.6573) (17.5992) (19.9423) (45.2713) 
PRE 0.2447*** 0.3619***     0.3608*** 
 (19.9178) (20.8219)     (11.0559) 
CRISIS   -0.2968*** -0.3736***    
   (-25.9969) (-23.4903)    
POST     -0.3153*** -0.4294*** -0.0237 
     (-11.7382) (-11.7912) (-0.4744) 
ESG BGI x 
PRE 
0.0128* 0.0071     0.0169** 
 (1.8618) (1.2188)     (2.6484) 
ESG BGI x 
CRISIS 
  -0.0152*** -0.0133***    
 
  (-11.3584) (-6.9076)    
ESG BGI x 
POST 
    0.0068*** 0.0084*** 0.0128*** 
     (3.4398) (5.0246) (7.5635) 
Control 
Variables: 
       
BFS (t-1)  0.0053  0.0044  0.0036 0.0048 
  (0.3807)  (0.3152)  (0.2558) (0.3345) 
BSS (t-1)  -0.0706***  -0.0707***  -0.0722*** -0.0702*** 
  (-38.0947)  (-29.6317)  (-28.7273) (-36.3532) 
NES (t-1)  0.0118  0.0129  0.0124 0.0129 
  (1.2759)  (1.7402)  (1.6826) (1.6625) 
Constant -0.0220 0.1103 0.2562*** 0.5013*** 0.2760*** 0.5451*** 0.1207 
 (-1.0613) (0.7628) (17.1209) (4.7339) (22.7412) (4.9439) (1.1971) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SPECIALISA-
TION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 1,995 1,818 1,995 1,818 1,995 1,818 1,818 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.2769 0.2979 0.2805 0.3018 0.2763 0.2995 0.3016 
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Panel B: Effect of Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) on Reputational 
Risk 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Main 
Variables of 
Interest: 
       
ESG BGI 0.0246*** 0.0218*** 0.0261*** 0.0229*** 0.0251*** 0.0198*** 0.0184*** 
 (8.9329) (12.1743) (10.8053) (11.7478) (20.9644) (16.7630) (17.7975) 
PRE -0.0242 -0.0368     0.0418 
 (-0.7154) (-0.5696)     (1.2791) 
CRISIS   -0.0614 -0.0452    
   (-1.3253) (-1.1385)    
POST     0.0003 0.0142 0.0708* 
     (0.0073) (0.2242) (2.0657) 
ESG BGI x 
PRE 
0.0070 0.0021     0.0056*** 
 (1.1839) (0.8830)     (3.8462) 
ESG BGI x 
CRISIS 
  -0.0039** -0.0046**    
 
  (-3.3049) (-2.7972)    
ESG BGI x 
POST 
    0.0002 0.0030 0.0045** 
     (0.0761) (1.4780) (2.3814) 
Control 
Variables: 
       
BFS (t-1)  -0.0374**  -0.0377**  -0.0380** -0.0376** 
  (-2.9655)  (-2.9898)  (-2.9539) (-2.9356) 
BSS (t-1)  -0.0102  -0.0102  -0.0107 -0.0101 
  (-0.7046)  (-0.6767)  (-0.7192) (-0.6829) 
NES (t-1)  0.0464***  0.0467***  0.0466*** 0.0467*** 
  (6.3767)  (6.7356)  (6.7956) (6.6662) 
Constant -0.0885*** 0.2528** -0.0938 0.2244*** -0.0927* 0.2401*** 0.1774** 
 (-19.2706) (2.9973) (-1.8191) (12.9412) (-2.1346) (9.8449) (3.1547) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SPECIALISA-
TION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 1,995 1,818 1,995 1,818 1,995 1,818 1,818 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.1759 0.2180 0.1755 0.2188 0.1748 0.2184 0.2184 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate regressions estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. The regressions include year- and specialization effects. ***, 
**, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed). 
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Table 13: Impact of short- and long-term ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) on 
Social Performance and Risk  
 
Panel A: Impact of short- and long-term ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI), Bank Financials and 
Country Environment on ESG Award Achievements  
 I II III 
Main Variables of Interest:    
ESG BGI (t-1) 0.0463*** 0.0424*** 0.0409*** 
 (31.6076) (44.0202) (43.2971) 
BFS (t-1)  0.0138 0.0168 
  (1.2293) (1.7958) 
BSS (t-1)  -0.0632*** -0.0601*** 
  (-12.9017) (-10.9656) 
NES (t-1)  0.0247* 0.0228* 
  (2.3367) (2.2741) 
ESG BGI (t-3) -0.0107*** -0.0045 -0.0056 
 (-3.5043) (-1.1391) (-1.2568) 
BFS (t-3)  -0.0173* -0.0156* 
  (-2.2025) (-2.2225) 
BSS (t-3)  0.0000 -0.0009 
  (0.0047) (-0.1127) 
NES (t-3)  -0.0150 -0.0186 
  (-0.9745) (-1.3910) 
Control Variables:    
Reputational Risk   0.1043*** 
   (4.7550) 
Constant 0.3111*** 0.6048** 0.5626** 
 (6.4113) (3.1301) (3.3016) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
SPECIALISATION FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO 
Observations 1,475 1,420 1,420 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2727 0.2800 0.2849 
 
Panel B: Impact of short- and long-term ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI), Bank Financials and 
Country Environment on Reputational Risk  
 I II III 
Main Variables of Interest:    
ESG BGI (t-1) 0.0167*** 0.0151*** 0.0120*** 
 (9.5631) (12.8252) (6.7126) 
BFS (t-1)  -0.0288* -0.0298** 
  (-2.3476) (-2.5435) 
BSS (t-1)  -0.0289* -0.0244 
  (-2.1438) (-1.6679) 
NES (t-1)  0.0178 0.0160 
  (1.6663) (1.5402) 
ESG BGI (t-3) 0.0120* 0.0100** 0.0103** 
 (2.1077) (3.0623) (2.8929) 
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BFS (t-3)  -0.0168** -0.0156** 
  (-3.0721) (-3.3379) 
BSS (t-3)  0.0090 0.0090 
  (1.4820) (1.6169) 
NES (t-3)  0.0345** 0.0356** 
  (2.7081) (2.9840) 
Control Variables:    
ESG Award Achievements   0.0721*** 
   (4.1058) 
Constant -0.0264 0.4053** 0.3617** 
 (-0.4850) (2.8795) (3.0756) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
SPECIALISATION FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO 
Observations 1,475 1,420 1,420 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1900 0.2343 0.2395 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate regressions estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. The regressions include year- and specialization effects. ***, 
**, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed). 
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Table 14: Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis Economic Performance and Risk Effects of ESG 
Banking Governance Index  
 
Panel A: Effect of Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) on Banks’ Return 
on Asset (RoA) 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Main 
Variables of 
Interest: 
       
ESG BGI -0.0153*** -0.0055** -0.0171*** -0.0074** -0.0203*** -0.0076*** -0.0040** 
 (-4.6326) (-2.4854) (-4.7276) (-2.3722) (-24.2174) (-5.5757) (-2.3703) 
PRE -0.2381 -0.0137     -0.1183 
 (-1.1389) (-0.1054)     (-1.7806) 
CRISIS   0.2970* 0.1517**    
   (2.0727) (2.4517)    
POST     0.2602 0.0503 -0.1007 
     (1.2066) (0.3472) (-1.3730) 
ESG BGI x 
PRE 
-0.0137** -0.0113***     -0.0128*** 
 (-3.3380) (-10.4893)     (-4.1594) 
ESG BGI x 
CRISIS 
  0.0008 0.0034    
 
  (0.2554) (0.8535)    
ESG BGI x 
POST 
    0.0053 0.0016 -0.0020 
     (1.2686) (0.4724) (-0.4836) 
Control 
Variables: 
       
BFS (t-1)  0.0657***  0.0661***  0.0663*** 0.0656*** 
  (8.4048)  (9.0418)  (8.6132) (8.6126) 
BSS (t-1)  -0.1210***  -0.1212***  -0.1206*** -0.1212*** 
  (-6.4668)  (-6.4184)  (-6.4317) (-6.3234) 
NES (t-1)  -0.0410***  -0.0416***  -0.0410*** -0.0412*** 
  (-4.8928)  (-5.8369)  (-5.5101) (-5.2705) 
Constant 0.4036*** 0.1853*** 0.1322 0.1385 0.1383 0.1320 0.2929*** 
 (7.7391) (4.5699) (0.9042) (1.7700) (0.8953) (1.4070) (13.9177) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SPECIALISA-
TION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 2,179 2,077 2,179 2,077 2,179 2,077 2,077 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.1130 0.2353 0.1103 0.2340 0.1112 0.2338 0.2350 
 
  
185 
Panel B: Effect of Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) on Banks’ Return 
on Common Equity (RoE) 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Main 
Variables of 
Interest: 
       
ESG BGI -0.0007 0.0104*** 0.0029 0.0125*** 0.0092** 0.0212*** 0.0147*** 
 (-0.1637) (3.9669) (0.6178) (3.7004) (3.3511) (8.4515) (8.2187) 
PRE -0.1329 0.1115*     0.0080 
 (-1.1809) (2.0841)     (0.5267) 
CRISIS   0.0746 -0.0978***    
   (1.0178) (-5.1755)    
POST     0.0881 -0.1589* -0.0919 
     (0.7390) (-2.3216) (-1.8421) 
ESG BGI x 
PRE 
0.0275*** 0.0274***     0.0231*** 
 (36.4365) (10.0550)     (5.4054) 
ESG BGI x 
CRISIS 
  -0.0019 0.0021    
 
  (-0.6621) (0.7387)    
ESG BGI x 
POST 
    -0.0105*** -0.0125*** -0.0059* 
     (-4.7436) (-8.4215) (-2.1941) 
Control 
Variables: 
       
BFS (t-1)  0.0600***  0.0585***  0.0587*** 0.0599*** 
  (6.1962)  (5.7582)  (6.0651) (6.3727) 
BSS (t-1)  -0.1596***  -0.1605***  -0.1614*** -0.1602*** 
  (-10.5624)  (-9.9147)  (-10.2313) (-10.3992) 
NES (t-1)  -0.0177  -0.0174  -0.0189 -0.0185 
  (-0.4746)  (-0.4482)  (-0.5026) (-0.5037) 
Constant 0.8593*** 0.7779*** 0.7920*** 0.9960*** 0.7807*** 0.9745*** 0.8895*** 
 (29.7746) (11.6012) (10.2654) (7.9232) (9.2838) (7.7496) (8.5807) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SPECIALISA-
TION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 2,171 2,069 2,171 2,069 2,171 2,069 2,069 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.0833 0.2396 0.0728 0.2302 0.0762 0.2351 0.2401 
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Panel C: Effect of Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) on Banks’ Variance 
in Total Business Volume 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Main 
Variables of 
Interest: 
       
ESG BGI -0.0047*** -0.0023*** -0.0026** -0.0005 -0.0011 0.0026* -0.0022 
 (-13.0919) (-4.1666) (-3.1315) (-0.9697) (-0.8348) (2.2505) (-1.3438) 
PRE 0.0930 0.1221     0.0379 
 (1.2511) (1.5842)     (0.3903) 
CRISIS   -0.0598 -0.0872    
   (-0.9345) (-1.2322)    
POST     -0.1356** -0.1616** -0.0839*** 
     (-2.8094) (-3.1937) (-3.6165) 
ESG BGI x 
PRE 
0.0153* 0.0167*     0.0165 
 (2.1083) (2.1265)     (1.8663) 
ESG BGI x 
CRISIS 
  -0.0033 -0.0018    
 
  (-1.4979) (-0.7763)    
ESG BGI x 
POST 
    -0.0033** -0.0050*** -0.0002 
     (-2.3899) (-3.5174) (-0.1215) 
Control 
Variables: 
       
BFS (t-1)  0.0150***  0.0139**  0.0143** 0.0150*** 
  (3.9099)  (2.8295)  (3.1634) (3.8838) 
BSS (t-1)  -0.0284***  -0.0277***  -0.0289*** -0.0284*** 
  (-13.6213)  (-9.6149)  (-12.9064) (-12.4219) 
NES (t-1)  0.0004  -0.0001  -0.0006 0.0004 
  (0.2188)  (-0.2206)  (-0.6380) (0.1955) 
Constant 0.0023 -0.0565 0.1364*** 0.1214*** 0.1355*** 0.1176*** 0.0279 
 (0.2086) (-1.6166) (3.4099) (10.7843) (3.4455) (9.4078) (0.5238) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SPECIALISA-
TION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 1,860 1,792 1,860 1,792 1,860 1,792 1,792 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.1786 0.2017 0.1671 0.1868 0.1674 0.1900 0.2013 
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Panel D: Effect of Pre-, Crisis- and Post-Crisis ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) on Banks’ Impaired 
Loan Ratio 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Main 
Variables of 
Interest: 
       
ESG BGI 0.0568*** -0.0342** 0.0548*** -0.0403*** -0.0388 -0.1482*** -0.1017*** 
 (3.7020) (-2.9378) (3.5360) (-3.6180) (-0.9174) (-22.8363) (-18.7511) 
PRE -1.4154** -2.0970***     -2.2444*** 
 (-2.6840) (-6.3594)     (-5.7755) 
CRISIS   2.0708*** 2.9836***    
   (17.4726) (9.9652)    
POST     1.4160** 2.3368*** -0.2933 
     (2.5941) (6.5433) (-0.5428) 
ESG BGI x 
PRE 
-0.1537* -0.2261***     -0.1593*** 
 (-2.1158) (-6.4303)     (-5.0141) 
ESG BGI x 
CRISIS 
  -0.0652* -0.0586***    
 
  (-2.3106) (-6.4731)    
ESG BGI x 
POST 
    0.1166* 0.1353*** 0.0879*** 
     (2.2322) (8.1724) (7.8649) 
Control 
Variables: 
       
BFS (t-1)  -0.6946***  -0.6777***  -0.6887*** -0.6969*** 
  (-3.8130)  (-3.6844)  (-3.8370) (-3.8819) 
BSS (t-1)  0.1643***  0.1698***  0.1822*** 0.1769*** 
  (4.6739)  (4.1822)  (4.6106) (4.9303) 
NES (t-1)  -1.0693**  -1.0578**  -1.0549** -1.0622** 
  (-3.2738)  (-3.0979)  (-3.2490) (-3.3240) 
Constant 2.0733*** 10.2220*** 0.2244 7.1606** 0.4346** 7.5170** 10.2752*** 
 (4.4993) (4.0220) (1.7106) (3.0499) (3.3667) (3.2735) (5.1282) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SPECIALISA-
TION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 1,943 1,803 1,943 1,803 1,943 1,803 1,803 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.1092 0.2596 0.1060 0.2516 0.1107 0.2588 0.2620 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate regressions estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. The regressions include year- and specialization effects. ***, 
**, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed). 
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Table 15: Impact of short- and long-term ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI) on 
Economic Performance and Risk  
 
Panel A: Impact of short- and long-term ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI), Bank Financials and 
Country Environment on Banks’ Return on Asset (RoA) 
 I II III 
Main Variables of Interest:    
ESG BGI (t-1) -0.0188***  0.0079* 
 (-5.0744)  (2.0180) 
BFS (t-1)   0.0557*** 
   (4.4404) 
BSS (t-1)   -0.0392*** 
   (-5.3906) 
NES (t-1)   -0.0440* 
   (-2.0796) 
ESG BGI (t-3)  -0.0223*** -0.0176** 
  (-4.7135) (-2.8339) 
BFS (t-3)   0.0071*** 
   (4.5650) 
BSS (t-3)   -0.0953*** 
   (-6.2709) 
NES (t-3)   0.0138 
   (1.4207) 
    
Constant 0.0906 -0.1259*** -0.1242 
 (1.0338) (-5.9377) (-1.1946) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
SPECIALISATION FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO 
Observations 1,982 1,491 1,491 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1262 0.1394 0.2546 
 
Panel B: Impact of short- and long-term ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI), Bank Financials and 
Country Environment on Banks’ Return on Common Equity (RoE) 
 I II III 
Main Variables of Interest:    
ESG BGI (t-1) -0.0015  0.0238*** 
 (-0.3109)  (11.5626) 
BFS (t-1)   0.0635*** 
   (5.9842) 
BSS (t-1)   -0.0921*** 
   (-9.0168) 
NES (t-1)   0.0108 
   (1.2177) 
ESG BGI (t-3)  -0.0080 -0.0151*** 
  (-1.5752) (-6.5477) 
BFS (t-3)   0.0120*** 
   (7.2826) 
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BSS (t-3)   -0.0892*** 
   (-12.6599) 
NES (t-3)   -0.0147 
   (-0.4366) 
    
Constant 0.8492*** 0.6697*** 0.6409*** 
 (21.4692) (62.0141) (6.6763) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
SPECIALISATION FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO 
Observations 1,975 1,485 1,485 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0699 0.0843 0.2616 
 
Panel C: Impact of short- and long-term ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI), Bank Financials and 
Country Environment on Banks’ Variance in Total Business Volume 
 I II III 
Main Variables of Interest:    
ESG BGI (t-1) -0.0039***  -0.0026*** 
 (-23.9730)  (-6.0613) 
BFS (t-1)   0.0158*** 
   (12.7867) 
BSS (t-1)   -0.0166*** 
   (-6.0960) 
NES (t-1)   0.0181* 
   (2.1154) 
ESG BGI (t-3)  -0.0056*** -0.0002 
  (-17.5248) (-0.2960) 
BFS (t-3)   -0.0045*** 
   (-4.0251) 
BSS (t-3)   -0.0137*** 
   (-4.0002) 
NES (t-3)   -0.0191* 
   (-2.2715) 
    
Constant 0.1592*** 0.0781** 0.1012*** 
 (4.0860) (3.2807) (9.9774) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
SPECIALISATION FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO 
Observations 1,802 1,406 1,353 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1239 0.0607 0.0895 
 
 
Panel D: Impact of short- and long-term ESG Banking Governance Index (ESG BGI), Bank Financials and 
Country Environment on Impaired Loan Ratio  
 I II III 
Main Variables of Interest:    
ESG BGI (t-1) 0.0623***  -0.1101*** 
 (4.2351)  (-6.0898) 
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BFS (t-1)   -0.6033*** 
   (-6.0144) 
BSS (t-1)   -0.0640 
   (-0.7108) 
NES (t-1)   -1.0411*** 
   (-7.0390) 
ESG BGI (t-3)  0.0976** 0.0831* 
  (3.2660) (2.0683) 
BFS (t-3)   -0.2414* 
   (-1.9099) 
BSS (t-3)   0.3840*** 
   (3.5886) 
NES (t-3)   -0.2109 
   (-0.7624) 
    
Constant -0.2700 -0.1876 8.6147*** 
 (-1.7610) (-0.4863) (3.8651) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
SPECIALISATION FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO 
Observations 1,804 1,412 1,365 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1108 0.1052 0.2785 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate regressions estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. The regressions include year- and specialization effects. ***, 
**, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed). 
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Table 16: Test of validity of ESG Banking Governance Index as proxy for Sustainable 
Bank Culture  
 
Panel A: Determinants of ESG Structure Score 
 I II III IV V VI 
Main Variables 
of Interest: 
      
BFS (t-1) -0.2536* -0.2481** -0.2522** -0.1409*** -0.2071** -0.1169*** 
 (-2.3597) (-2.6009) (-2.5541) (-7.1142) (-2.5627) (-6.7328) 
NES (t-1)  -0.0749  0.1600*  0.1019 
  (-0.3536)  (2.0382)  (1.3731) 
BSS (t-1)   0.3501**  0.4954*** 0.4337*** 
   (3.4902)  (3.5574) (4.0963) 
BFS x NES    -0.0450  -0.0469 
    (-1.6337)  (-1.5154) 
BFS x BSS     -0.0291** -0.0082 
     (-3.3138) (-0.8186) 
Constant 3.6047** 3.6744** 2.1868*** 2.9604*** 2.1876*** 1.4021*** 
 (3.4522) (2.9481) (3.6968) (3.6328) (3.7533) (10.8434) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SPECIALISA-
TION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.1462 0.1466 0.1612 0.1530 0.1626 0.1710 
 
Panel B: Determinants of ESG Reporting Score 
 I II III IV V VI 
Main Variables 
of Interest: 
      
BFS (t-1) -0.1651*** -0.1494*** -0.1634*** -0.0823*** -0.1404*** -0.0701** 
 (-10.8756) (-12.7480) (-10.7564) (-3.6416) (-9.8889) (-3.2979) 
NES (t-1)  -0.2127  -0.0651  -0.0974 
  (-1.4020)  (-0.5648)  (-0.9278) 
BSS (t-1)   0.2216***  0.2958*** 0.2784*** 
   (4.7007)  (8.5540) (6.9681) 
BFS x NES    -0.0283***  -0.0314** 
    (-3.6060)  (-2.9371) 
BFS x BSS     -0.0149*** 0.0006 
     (-5.1004) (0.0653) 
Constant 1.1125*** 1.3085*** 0.2061 0.8634*** 0.2083 -0.2918 
 (13.1761) (6.1562) (1.1211) (8.3630) (1.1068) (-0.8753) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SPECIALISA-
TION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.1014 0.1208 0.1199 0.1285 0.1209 0.1571 
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Panel C: Determinants of ESG Business Activities Score 
 I II III IV V VI 
Main Variables 
of Interest: 
      
BFS (t-1) -0.2560*** -0.2462*** -0.2529*** -0.1604*** -0.2425*** -0.1516*** 
 (-9.1985) (-12.7472) (-12.0495) (-8.3676) (-13.5035) (-6.4243) 
NES (t-1)  -0.1332  0.0555  0.0169 
  (-0.6988)  (0.4061)  (0.1365) 
BSS (t-1)   0.4160***  0.4496*** 0.4023*** 
   (3.8053)  (3.8126) (3.5919) 
BFS x NES    -0.0361**  -0.0447** 
    (-3.1899)  (-2.9238) 
BFS x BSS     -0.0067** 0.0137 
     (-3.3968) (1.5339) 
Constant 1.6140*** 1.7367*** -0.0878 1.1675*** -0.0868 -0.8179 
 (6.4057) (3.9813) (-0.3206) (4.5129) (-0.3152) (-1.6668) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SPECIALISA-
TION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 2,149 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.0865 0.0916 0.1334 0.1006 0.1332 0.1587 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate regressions estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. The regressions include year- and specialization effects. ***, 
**, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance (two-tailed). 
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Table 17: Correlations between ESG Banking Governance Index and Bank Financials 
using Above/ Below Mean and Real Values  
 
 Bank Financials at 
Above/ Below Mean 
Values 
Bank Financials at 
Real  
Values 
ESG-Banking Governance Index 1.0000 1.0000 
Size (logAssets) 0.6613* 0.5921*      
Long-term debt to equity  -0.3246*       -0.3979*       
Return on Assets -0.1665*        -0.1243*      
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
 
 
-0.1262*       -0.0907*       
RWAs/Total Assets  -0.3297*       -0.3681*       
Net Charge-Offs to Loans  0.0636*       0.0898*       
Provisions for Loan Losses / Net Interest Income  0.0682*       0.1048*       
Provisions for Loan Losses / Total Loans  0.0458*       0.0198        
Deposits to Funding  -0.3700*       -0.4401*       
Commercial Loans / Total Loans  -0.2448*       -0.2297*      
Long-term Borrowings / Total Liabilities  0.2104*       0.1373*      
Off-balance sheet commitments / Total Assets  0.1067* -0.0230       
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Figure 1: Model of Determinants and Effects of the ESG-BGI Index 
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Figure 2: Trends in ESG Banking Governance Index and Its Component Scores  
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Figure 3: Trends in Bank Financials and Country Environment 
 
 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean Values of Bank Financial Score, Banking Sector Score 
and National Economy Score 
2005 - 2014
BF-Score Country-Score Banking-Score
197 
References 
Aebi, V., Sabato, G., & Schmid, M. (2012). Risk management, corporate governance, and bank 
performance in the financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance (36), pp. 3213-3226. 
Alexander, K. (2014, August). Stability and Sustainability in Banking Reform: Are Environmental Risks 
Missing in Basel III? Retrieved from  
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/StabilitySustainability.pdf 
Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence. 
Journal of Political Economy (97-1 ), pp. 1447–1458. 
Ball, R. (2001). Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient system of public financial 
reporting and disclosure. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, pp. 127-169. 
Ball, R., Robin, A., & Wu, J. (2003). Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting income in four 
East Asian countries. Journal of Accounting and Economics (36 (1-3)), pp. 235–270. 
Barnett, M. L., Jermier, J. M., & Lafferty, B. A. (2006). Corporate Reputation: The Definitional 
Landscape. Corporate Reputation Review (Vol. 9, No. 1), pp. 26-38. 
Barth, J., G., C. J., & Levine, R. (2004). Bank regulation and supervision: what works best? Journal of 
Financial Intermediation (13), pp. 205–248. 
Beatty, A., & Liao, S. (2014). Financial accounting in the banking industry: A review of the empirical 
literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics (58), pp. 339–383. 
Becker, G. (1974). A Theory of Social Interaction. Journal of Political Economy (82), pp. 1063–1093. 
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2010). Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility. Econometrica (77), pp. 
1–19. 
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2005). Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents. American 
Economic Review (95-3), pp. 616–636. 
Black, B. (2001, June). The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms,. Emerging 
Markets Review (2(2) ), pp. 89-108. 
Bloomberg L.P. (2015). Customers using ESG data. Retrieved from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bcause/customers-using-esg-data 
Bushman, R. M., & J.D., P. (2006). Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting: The 
influence of legal and political institutions. Journal of Accounting and Economics (42 (1–2)), pp. 
107–148. 
Carney, M. (2013, February). Rebuilding Trust in Global Banking. Retrieved from 
http://www.bis.org/review/r130226c.pdf 
198 
Center for Sustainability Studies at Getulio Varga. (2014, September). The Brazilian Financial System 
and the Green Economy: Alignment with Sustainable Development. Retrieved from 
http://unepinquiry.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/brazilianfinancialsystemgreeneconomy_febraban-gvces_april2015.pdf 
China Green Finance Taskforce. (2015, April). Establishing China's Green Financial System. Retrieved 
from https://www.cbd.int/financial/privatesector/china-Green%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf 
Christensen, H., Lee, E., Walker, M., & Zeng, C. (2016). Incentives or Standards: What Determines 
Accounting Quality Changes Around IFRS Adoption? European Accounting Review (Vol. 24, 
No. 1). 
Cleary, S. (2015, December). Stock Exchanges and Sustainability. Retrieved from 
http://unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Stock_Exchanges_and_Sustainability.pdf. 
Cohn, A., Fehr, E., & Marechal, M. (2014). Business culture and dishonesty in the banking industry. 
Nature (516), pp. 86-89. 
Cohn, A., Fehr, E., & Maréchal, M. (2015, August). A Culture of Gambling? Evidence from the Banking 
Industry. Retrieved from http://michelmarechal.com/sites/default/files/u12/Riskculture24.pdf 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2004). Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of 
Financial Intermediation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (Vol. 36, No. 3, Part 2), pp. 593-
622. 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G., & Stulz, R. (2007). Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance? 
Journal of Financial Economics (86), pp. 1–39. 
Eisenegger, M., & Künstle, D. (2011). Von der sozialen zur volkswirtschaftlichen Verantwortung: Wie 
die Finanzmarktkrise die Reputationsdynamik verändert. Die Volkswirtschaft. Das Magazin für 
Wirtschaftspolitik (7/8), pp. 59-62. 
Ellul, A., & Yeramilli, V. (2013, October). Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risks: Evidence from U.S. 
Bank Holding Companies. The Journal of Finance (Vol. LXVIII, No. 5), pp. 1757-1803. 
European Banking Authority. (2015, July 31). EBA Discussion Paper and Call for Evidence on SMEs and 
the SME Supporting Factor. Retrieved from 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1153414/EBA-DP-2015-
02+Discussion+Paper+on+SME.pdf 
Evans-Pritchard, A. (2015, April 29). G20: fossil fuel fears could hammer global financial system. 
Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/11563768/G20-to-probe-carbon-bubble-risk-
to-global-financial-system.html 
Fink, L. (2016). Letter to Chief Executives at S&P 500 Companies from Lawrence D. Fink, Chairman 
and CEO of BlackRock, . Retrieved from http://www. businessinsider.com/blackrock-ceo-larry-
fink-letter-to-sp-500-ceos-2016-2 
199 
Frangoul, A. (2015, February 25). Pay-as-you-go solar power takes off in Africa. Retrieved from 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/25/pay-as-you-go-solar-power-takes-off-in-africa.html 
Freeman, R., Harrison, J., Wicks, A., & Parmar, B. d. (2010). Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. New York Times, 33. 
FSB. (2016, March 31). Phase 1 Report. Retrieved from https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/phase1report/ 
Garriga, E., & Melé, D. (2004). Corporate social responsibility theories: Mapping the territory. Journal of 
Business Ethics (53), pp. 51-71. 
Gillet, R., Hübner, G., & Plunus, S. (2010). Operational risk and reputation in the financial industry. 
Journal of Banking & Finance (34), pp. 224–235. 
Gillet, R., Hübner, G., & Plunus, S. (2012). Reputational damage of operational loss on the bond market: 
Evidence from the financial industry. International Review of Financial Analysis (24), pp. 66–73. 
Gramlich, D., & Finster, N. (2013). Corporate sustainability and risk. Journal of Business Economics 
(83), pp. 631–664. 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2002). People's opium? Religion and economic attitudes. (pp. 1-
71). Cambridge, Ma.: National Bureau of economic research. 
Haigh, M., & Hazelton, J. (2004). Financial Markets: A Tool for Social Responsibility? Journal of 
Business Ethics (52), pp. 59-71. 
Heal, G. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility—Economic and Financial Perspectives. Geneva Papers 
(30), pp. 387–409. 
Hummel, K., & Festl-Pell, D. (2015). Much Ado About Nothing? Sustainability Disclosure in the 
Banking Industry. Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik (16/3), pp. 369–393. 
Jensen, M. C. (1989). The evidence speaks loud and clear. Harvard Business Review (Vol. 67, No. 6), pp. 
186-188. 
Jo, J., & Na, H. (2012). Does CSR Reduce Firm Risk? Evidence from Controversial Industry Sectors. 
Journal of Business Ethics (Vol. 110, No. 4), pp. 441-456. 
John, K., & Kedia, S. (2003). Institutions, Markets, and Growth: A Theory of Comparative Corporate 
Governance. Working Paper. New York University. 
John, K., & Kedia, S. (2004). Design of Corporate Governance: Monitored Debt, Takeovers, and 
Ownership Structure. Working Paper. New York University. 
200 
Joint Statement. (2015). by Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, 
and Wells Fargo. Retrieved from http://www.ceres.org/files/bank-statement-on-climate-policy 
KPMG and WWF. (2015). Ready or Not? An assessment of sustainability integration in the European 
banking sector. Retrieved from http://wwf.fi/mediabank/7413.pdf 
Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2009). Bank governance, regulation and risk taking. Journal of Financial 
Economics (93), pp. 259–275. 
Margolis, J., & Elfenbein, H. A. (2008). Doing well by doing good? Don’t count on it. Harvard Business 
Review (Vol. 86, No. 1), pp. 19-20. 
Margolis, J., Elfenbein, H., & Walsh, J. (2007). Does It Pay To be Good? A Meta-Analysis and 
Redirection of the Relationship between Corporate Social and Financial Performance. Harvard 
Business School Working Paper.  
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2000, May). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: 
correlation or misspecification? Strategic Management Journal (Vol. 21, No. 5), pp. 603–609. 
Monnin, P., & Barkawi, A. (2015). Monetary Policy and Green Finance – Exploring the Links. In C. 
Zhang, S. Zadek, N. Chen, & M. Halle, Greening China’s Financial System (pp. 153-183). IISD. 
Nichols, W. (2014, May). Climate change will hit sovereign credit ratings, S&P warns. Retrieved from 
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/analysis/2345520/climate-change-will-hit-sovereign-credit-
ratings-s-p-warns 
Paul, C., & Siegel, D. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility and Economic Performance. Journal of 
Business Ethics (Vol. 13, no. 3), pp. 207-221. 
Post, J., Preston, L., & Sachs, S. (2002). Redefining the Corporation: Stakeholder Management and 
Organizational Wealth. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Rahman, A. (2013). Inclusive Finance and Sustainable Development. Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of 
Bank Management. 
Rahman, A. (2015, February 10). Inclusive sustainable finance leads to stable inclusive growth. Retrieved 
from http://www.afi-global.org/news/2015/2/10/rahman-inclusive-sustainable-finance-leads-
stable-inclusive-growth 
Standard & Poor's Rating Services. (2014, May). Climate Change Is A Global Mega-Trend For Sovereign 
Risk. Retrieved from http://maalot.co.il/publications/GMR20140518110900.pdf 
Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative. (2014). Sustainable Stock Exchanges 2014 Report on Progress. 
Retrieved from http://www.sseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/SSE-2014-ROP.pdf 
The UNEP Inquiry Report. (2015, 10). Retrieved from 
http://www.sustainablefinance.ch/upload/cms/user/UNEPInquiry_The_Financial_System_We_N
eed_EN_October2015.pdf 
201 
Tirole, J. (2001, January). Corporate Governance. Econometrics (Vol. 69, No. 1), pp. 1-35. 
US Department of Labor (2015, 10). New guidance on economically targeted investments. Retrieved from 
https://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/ebsa20152045.htm 
Weber, A. (2016, March 31). Interview with Axel Weber on corporate culture and responsibility at UBS. 
(UBD, Interviewer) Retrieved from 
https://www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/corporate_responsibility/how-we-do-
business/chairman_statement.html 
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (2016, April). Corporate Sustainability. (R. Levine, Editor) Retrieved from 
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/160295_corporate_sustainability_newsletter_april2016_
v5.pdf 
Wright, P., & Ferris, S. (1997). Agency conflict and corporate strategy: The effect of divestment on 
corporate value. Strategic Management Journal (Vol. 18, No. 1), pp. 77-90. 
 
 
  
202 
Part III: Concluding Essay 
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Conclusion 
 
Ensuing from the legacy of Adam Smith who already proved a good intuition for the complexity 
of the connection between free private markets and public regulation, the essay collection at hand 
set itself the goal of contributing to the complicated and oft-discussed question on the optimal 
interplay between market discipline and public policy under various conditions. The first paper – 
“Individual Morality or Economic Framework?” – relied on a case study assessment of 
experiments in behavioral economics. It argued that market discipline and public policy are both 
needed for implementing specific economic and social results. The second paper – “Sustainability 
Disclosure in the Banking Industry” – relied on a framework specifically constructed for the paper 
and on a case-study assessment of the sustainability disclosure of two sample banks. It argued that 
both market discipline in monitoring banks’ non-financial disclosures as well as sector-specific 
disclosure guidelines are needed. The third paper – “Voluntary Standards versus Mandatory 
Regulations?” – built an empirical study on the effects of mandatory disclosure regulations on the 
sustainability disclosure level. It argued that market discipline is more effective for voluntarily 
disclosing firms, whereas mandatory policy may be more effective for voluntarily non-disclosing 
firms. The fourth paper – “Determinants and Effects of ESG Banking Governance” – constructed 
an environmental, social, and governance (ESG) index for banks and evaluated the factors behind 
the index and its impact on bank performance. This paper argued that market discipline is most 
effective if tailored to bank financial characteristics and targeting long-term performance, whereas 
public policy is most effective if it is implemented in a sector-specific way. 
Beside the research goals the individual papers pursued, the main goal of this essay collection as 
a whole was to apply the insights of recent literature on the interplay between market discipline 
and public policy in general to the banking sector in particular. In this vein, the second and the 
third paper were dedicated to investigate the existence of unexpected negative effects of mandatory 
disclosure guidelines in the banking industry. The goal of such guidelines is to increase a 
company’s level of disclosure. The general research on the interplay of market discipline and 
public policy brought to the fore that disclosure guidelines can have the effect of crowding-out 
companies’ voluntary disclosure of relevant information. After such guidelines have been 
implemented, companies tend to “only” publish the information that they are obliged to publish 
whereas before, on a voluntary basis, some of them may have provided more detailed disclosures. 
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Paper two and three showed that this effect can also apply to the banking sector. Hence, the essay 
collection cautions to believe in the enforcement of certain upside effects which might be desired 
from a political perspective by regulation. Such regulation can trigger unexpected side effects for 
a majority group which is then limited in the signaling potential of their disclosures.  
Also the fourth paper applies knowledge about regulation in general to the banking industry in 
particular. Recent years have heralded a drive for integrating environmental, social, and 
governance factors (‘ESG-factors’) into the business models of companies. While there are 
suggestions on how this could be done for companies in general, there has been little research so 
far on what it means to include these factors into the business model of banks. Often, it is assumed 
that ESG guidelines can be implemented in a one-size-fits-all-companies manner. The essay 
collection at hand however cautions to believe that what might be fitting to companies in general 
must be fitting to banks at the same time. Therefore, paper four developed an index of ESG-factors 
that is tailor-made to the special demands of the banking industry. 
Besides making recent research on the interplay between market discipline and public policy for 
companies as such fruitful to the banking sector in particular, the essay collection, as a whole, 
underlined the complexity of the connection between market discipline and public policy. Paper 
one showed that finding a fitting balance between market discipline and public policy cannot be 
circumvented by a belief in implicit obligations for coordinating choice problems. The findings of 
paper two and three also emphasize the complexity of the issue by demonstrating that unexpected 
side effects of regulation are also possible in the banking industry. By determining why the banking 
industry needs to be treated differently than other industries when trying to integrate ESG-factors 
into the decision base of bank managers, paper four, once again, underlined the complexity of the 
interplay between market discipline and public policy. This issue needs to be treated individually 
not only, as was referenced in the introduction, by a country’s or even a region’s economic 
environment, the current point on the economic cycle, the difference between developed and un- 
or under-developed countries, or a company’s culture, but also with regards to the sector one is 
dealing with. 
While the essay collection tried to contribute specific suggestions that need to be proven in 
practice, it underscored that the quest for the optimal interplay between market discipline and 
public policy under different economic conditions is an issue that will accompany economic 
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research for the foreseeable future. Adam Smith’s legacy regarding the relation of private markets 
and public policy is still pertinent. 
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